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JANUARY, 1943
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—Governments alone have failed to establish lasting peace

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FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

VOLUME V, NO. 1 **JANUARY, 1943**

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SOWING, EARLY WINTER

The stump he put on the andirons at sunset whole
Is settled in a thousand particles of coal.
He bends up out of sumptuous recumbent line,
Slowly powerful; throws on a new bronze cone of pine;
Puffs vigorously through reed at the sponge of ashes,
Dead-gray as his grandsire's coat, in the corncob bowl;
Fades back into chair again almost supine
Of body and soul.

The embers threaten a moment. Fire flashes
Explosively, and the room is filled with shapes.
The one cheap piece of stupid statuary
Throws up and down a dancing jackanapes
Incongruously merry.

The man starts quick in the light and swallows and grieves.
The wind is going southward, slashing leaves
With ropes of water.
God, what is the world coming to? . . . Fire and water . . .
Slaughter . . .

He swallows thickly, brooding on his son,
Who has gone from a farmer's hoe to a soldier's gun.

With forearm kin to copper in strength and hue,
He throws on another pine cone, throws on two.
And before the three have begun to whiten and crinkle
And tinkle like bits of broken bottle . . . tinkle,
He grooves the broad field of his brow
In many a sharp-cut wrinkle,
Just as this very day he drove his plow
Into hilly loam and sowed his winter grain.

It is a far more serious sowing now,
Feverish in his brain.
For the field is hung with shadow and is acid,
And the seed is sudden hate of earth and man.
His knotted hands crush Germany, Japan. . . .

Outside the wind has died, the rain is placid.

LeGarde S. Doughty

EDITORIAL

ONE year of hard struggle has gone by since that historic date of January 1, 1942, when the representatives of twenty-six governments signed the now famous Declaration of the United Nations. Today, the name United Nations is known all over the world as a symbol and a promise of a new and better humanity. On the battlefronts, in free and in occupied countries men and women are resisting, fighting, dying in the name and for the sake of the United Nations. For that has become the synonym of freedom, security, and prosperity for all mankind. In it is implied the only hope of ending this war by a real victory over fascism and by a real peace, and not merely by a compromise and by a new armistice.

During the first year of existence, the United Nations had to face the full might of the Axis Powers and of their miserable satellites. During this year, fascist forces still had the initial advantage of a decade of preparation for war. They had the industrial resources robbed and stolen from all the occupied countries. They could still count on the fanatical, brutal discipline of millions and millions of Fascists. During this time the United Nations still had to learn the essential principles of global war, of the full mobilization of all forces and of all resources necessary for political, military, and economic war. They had to learn the difficult technique of establishing a new kind of international community based not on traditional egotism and distrust, on conflict and rivalry, but on the highest human concepts of generosity, mutual help and, above all, of equality—principles without which there will never be a real United Nations.

The balance of the United Nations in the first year of their existence presents great credits, but also serious debits. In the military field, the credits are visible in Russia, in Africa, and in the Solomons. The Soviet armies, despite the two incredibly strong nazi drives intended to annihilate Russia, are again on the offensive. Again, as last year, they are attacking and killing the enemy, but with the very essential difference this time that a vital part of the nazi air force had to be dispatched to Africa. Even more important is the fact that next spring Hitler will no longer be able to concentrate all his forces against them. In Africa, British and American armies, supported by their fighting allies from almost all of the occupied countries, have taken the offensive. This campaign reveals the character of Allied strategy. It is no longer a defensive move to protect the Near East and the Suez Canal; it is an effort to drive the Axis forces from all Africa in order to use it as one of the springboards for the coming great and decisive assault on the enemy in Europe.

In the Solomons, Japan is suffering her first defeats. She is learning that surprise, hypocrisy, and treachery have only a temporary value and do not bring the decisive results which the ruthless military clique in Tokio had expected. In the Solomons, a great test is taking place within a limited space, with heavy forces engaged on both sides. The United Nations have shown

marked superiority in this kind of engagement, and it can be expected that this superiority will manifest itself in larger areas. The armies and the weapons of the United Nations are increasing in quantity and quality, and if the necessary co-ordination is achieved, the prospect for 1943 looks very bright.

In the economic field, the United Nations have made similar progress. They have closed to the enemy almost all areas which he does not occupy. But even more important, they have taken great steps in economic co-operation among themselves. The philosophy of lend-lease, with which the name of President Roosevelt is forever associated, is laying the foundations for a democratic international economic policy while the war is still going on. In the political field, methods have been considerably improved. Radio broadcasts, leaflets, and other instruments of political warfare are no longer negligible factors. They are giving Goebbels more and more headaches. Efficiency and co-operation in propaganda are on the increase and are showing results.

But the balance also presents serious debits—in some cases perhaps only temporary debits—perhaps even necessary debits, but still debits. The greatest of all is the absence of a Supreme Council of the United Nations. However cordial the relations among the United Nations may be, the peoples of the world, who have suffered so much from lack of unity among the anti-Axis forces before the war, are anxious to see the strongest unity established now, precisely because that is one of the aims of this war. The peoples all over the world want to see established by the United Nations, while the war is going on, such powerful machinery and such effective co-operation that they can be sure these will be operative in the peace and in the reconstruction of the world. As long as there is no active supreme body of the United Nations, every slight incident, every measure of expediency will be looked upon with suspicion and will open a wedge for enemy propaganda.

Darlan, too, is a debit. Military expediency may have made it necessary to write this debit into the books of the United Nations, but as long as it is in the books, the creditors—that is, all the people, and particularly the French people, who are fighting and hoping for a new world order—remain terribly anxious. The President's statement that this is only a temporary measure has helped greatly to quiet this anxiety, but there is a strong desire that positive measures be taken in order to establish the fullest co-operation with democratic and fighting France. The general anxiety about such episodes as the Darlan deal indicates that this time the people really refuse to compromise with fascism and with Fascists.

And finally there is something that is more than a debit, namely, fear. The fear that reactionary forces are again trying to spoil the fruits of victory by opposing the effective creation of the association of the United Nations. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles described the situation in his splendid address at the dedication of a memorial to Mrs. Sara Delano Roosevelt.

> Already we hear again the voices of those who decry all form of practical international co-operation. Already we would make this fundamental issue, the issue of our national future, a question of party politics. Already we can once more follow the machinations of those special privilege interests which would again turn the policy of the United States into one of narrow isolation, because of their belief that they

themselves would profit through such a course. Surely this is a question which transcends the bounds of any aspect of party and any claim of material advantage by a special few.

Mr. Welles spoke out what is in the minds of all—not only of the people of America, but of the people of England and France and all others who, in looking back at their policies before the war, have come to realize that it is the vital interest of every nation to co-operate constructively in the organization of a democratic world order for lack of which, through abstention and isolation, war, misery, and tyranny now torture humanity.

It is in the power of the governments and the peoples of the United Nations to eliminate the debits which are still on the books, and to end the fear of the future. The effective organization of the United Nations, the adoption of a platform of international democracy and collective security, and the complete break with all remnants of fascism and semi-fascism are the only means whereby all mankind may be assured that this war will not only destroy the evils of the past but that it will bring about a better world in the future.

Mr. Otto Hapsburg

HOW unfortunate and incredible that, with all the other difficulties before the United Nations, there should have arisen this question of the Hapsburgs. Until the announcement about the Military Committee and the letter of the War Department, it would have required a strong imagination to realize that the Hapsburgs still constitute a political problem. Perhaps the recent death of Count Leopold von Berchtold, the former Foreign Minister of the Hapsburg monarchy, who represented the frivolous, provocative, and irresponsible policy of the Austro-Hungarian empire, might have reminded us of them as of a past and unpleasant episode in history. But suddenly the Hapsburgs have come back into political reality because, with typical Hapsburg methods, they have attempted to make capital out of a letter which accepts the help of the Military Committee in recruiting volunteers for the Austrian Battalion. If Mr. Otto Hapsburg had renounced clearly and definitely all aspirations to the throne, if he had respected the laws of the Republic of Austria and the will of the people who had formerly been subject to the rule of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, nobody would have attached great importance to his Military Committee. But he and his aspirations constitute a tremendous threat to the people of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Rumania, and to the Free Italians. When the Axis Powers have finally been defeated, these people will run the risk of finding themselves engaged in a new civil war in order to stop the Austrian pretender from re-establishing the anachronistic throne of Vienna.

Nazism and fascism have undertaken the task of crushing the beginnings of democracy in Central Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia, and now, when there is a hope that nazism may be destroyed, the peoples of that part of Europe again face the danger of finding themselves once more subjected to the same kind of oppression under the name of Hapsburg. These peoples have definitely closed the pages of the Hapsburg dynasty, and under no conditions will they accept any compromise, as the Declaration of Seven Nations, signed on December 1, 1942, has stated.

Where shall the United Nations find their true allies? They have only to use those democratic forces which clamor to join the fight. There is a splendid Austrian Labor Committee composed of faithful representatives of Austrian democracy. They have much more authority to speak in the name of the Austrian people than has this Military Committee composed of pretenders of outlawed dynasties and of semi-fascist conceptions. It is in them that the United Nations will find the spirit to win the war, the real allies to mobilize all the forces against the Axis. Among them the United Nations will find authentic representatives of the coming political and economic democracy of Europe—their partners in the new world order.

Conference of the World Confederation

FOR two days, on December 4 and 5, representatives of private organizations from thirty countries met in New York at the First Conference of the World Confederation of International Groupments. In the Plenary Sessions as well as in the various Commissions many men and women were present who have given warning from the very beginning against the dangers of fascism and the dangers resulting from the lack of international co-operation. The conference had many highlights; some of the addresses are presented in these pages; and it is gratifying to know that the Organizing Committee has arranged to publish a book including the complete proceedings.

During this Conference, the delegates not only examined the general principles of democracy but scrutinized the fundamental methods of federalism and federal administration, of international education, of world economics, and of the organization of public opinion. The discussions in the various Commissions demonstrated decisively that the problem of world organization is not solely a question of technical procedure but is, first of all, determined by the world consciousness of all the free peoples. Without this world consciousness, and without the willingness to break with old chauvinistic and selfish conceptions of the different national policies, there can be no real world organization. The conference has particularly demonstrated that there is a strict interrelation between various aspects of international organization. One cannot have effective international co-operation in one field and not have it in others. Economics and education, collective security and prosperity are interdependent. There is no insurmountable difficulty in any aspect of international organization, but every solution depends on and derives from the determination of the peoples of the world to renounce obsolete conceptions in international relations.

In this connection Ambassador Wei Tao-Ming makes an excellent point when he asks humanity to break with the methods of the old diplomacy and of its spirit of egoism and antagonism. He suggests replacing the old diplomacy by a new and constructive conception based on harmony and equity. In fact, the Chinese Ambassador wants the United Nations to employ in the field of diplomacy one of the great principles for which this war is being fought. Deputy Prime Minister Walter Nash gives a concrete example of this new diplomacy in suggesting that Russia and China be made full partners with equal rights, not merely in the final elaboration of Anglo-American

plans, but in their initial formulation. The equality of the four will then be extended to all the other members of the United Nations. This seems to us the only method whereby great progress in the organization of the United Nations can be achieved immediately.

Silence is Complicity

WE have often protested in these pages against the terrible massacres of the Jews by the ruthless nazi rulers. Last November, the Free World Association and the Committee to Defend America organized one hundred and twenty meetings in a world-wide campaign against the shooting of hostages. Many Jews have already been killed, and all of them are reduced to a status of slavery. Never before has there been published a document containing more horrible facts on the basis of information given by the State Department than the one which the delegates of Jewish organizations, under the chairmanship of Dr. Stephen S. Wise, have recently made known to the public. It is the duty of the United Nations to do everything in their power to stop these massacres. It may be necessary to draw the attention, not only of the criminal Hitler Government, but of all German generals, and the German people as a whole to the personal responsibility of all those who are participating in or are tolerating these massacres.

Recently there was some talk that Sweden become provisionally a refuge for all those who are threatened with extermination. We hope that the governments of the United Nations have taken all measures to that effect, and that they have accepted all the expenses involved in such an undertaking. The Vatican, too, is here faced with one of its essential duties and must try to do everything to save them. Silence before such crimes becomes complicity.

Of course, we must realize that unfortunately the saving of millions of innocent Jewish victims and of all peoples under the barbarian yoke will come only after the United Nations victory over the Axis and the complete destruction of fascism. These tragic events again must strengthen our determination never to tolerate, under any pretext, fascism or semi-fascism. It must be clear to all of us—that fascism of whatever nationality is a threat to the whole of humanity. Mankind has paid, and is paying, too high a price for all the appeasements and "hands-off" policies toward those regimes which came into power by illegal means.

A Correction

OUR attention has been drawn to certain reflections on the State Department unsubstantiated by evidence in the article by Arthur Upham Pope, published in the October issue of FREE WORLD. We have received evidence of the inaccuracy of these statements. We sincerely regret their publication, so much the more since they appeared in the same issue with greetings from high officials of the State Department. In this connection we naturally want to make clear that these greetings do not constitute in any way official sanction of the contents of this magazine.





FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

- natural phosphates
- F iron ore
- P lead ore
- Z zinc ore
- M manganese
- coal
- existing railways
- international boundaries
- northern limit of desert

FRENCH AFRICA North of DAKAR

- wool, alfa
- cereals, olives, fruit
- vine
- ground nuts
- cotton
- N & S limits of the acacia tree
- N & S limits of the Sahara

RESOURCES

French North Africa has a large variety of minerals, the most important of which are phosphates and iron. In 1939, it produced 4,065,000 metric tons of natural phosphates—almost a third of the world output in the same year—as compared to 3,922,000 produced in the United States. As the map indicates, Tunisia has the largest production in North Africa but in Morocco the phosphate content of its fields is much higher; it is even higher than that of the U.S.A., ranging from 75-77 per cent, as compared with 68-77 per cent for the U.S.A.

About 2,240,000 tons of iron ore were mined in this territory in 1938 (14,435,000 in the U.S.A.), Algeria leading with 1,640,000, Tunisia 460,000. An important manganese deposit is located west of Bou Arfa. Large deposits of zinc and lead are worked in Algeria and Tunisia.

Although barley is the chief cereal growth, amounting to 35,780,000 quintals in 1939, the wheat grown in North Africa is equal to about half of Australia's output. Next in importance is the production of olive oil, which in 1939 exceeded 600,000 quintals, constituting more than five per cent of the world total. The chief agricultural items of West Africa are ground nuts, in which it is second in production after India; cotton, which is cultivated by irrigation; gum arabic from a type of acacia tree; and wool. All of these items are valuable raw material for war purposes.

FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF INTERNATIONAL GROUPMENTS

A Free World After Victory

BY ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

WE have heard a great deal about the basic things which must form a free world. Security, which means freedom from fear; freedom from want, which is a kind of economic structure that is based on a world outlook, because unless it is, I doubt very much if we can have this freedom; freedom of worship; and freedom of peoples (by that I mean an attitude toward each other all over the world of respect and co-operation, not looking down on any race but realizing that all human beings are entitled to the same consideration throughout the world)—those are the basic things which we will need for a free world.

You know them as well as I do, but there is just one thing that I should like to emphasize to this audience. You are not the people who have to be convinced of what will have to be done in the future. You here are the people who will do whatever is necessary, will accommodate yourselves, will work, will compromise, as long as you see that you are moving toward a goal which will end as a brotherhood of man. You know that the only real way to reach that is through the individual's spiritual development and determination that that shall be the spirit which will rule in the world.

You know all that. So there is only one thing that I need say to you and that is that you are not the people who must go on talking to each other. I think in the years that lie behind us, we perhaps failed in that too often we took the easy way. We talked with the people who thought as we thought. We talked to the audiences that agreed with us. We did not go sufficiently out into the world to talk to the people who disagreed with us, and to try to find out what the basis of disagreement was.

I hope that we will not make that mistake again. I hope that we will unite on the basic things that all people must accept if we are to move forward little by little to a better world after victory. And having united on those basic things, I hope we will not quarrel with each other on details of how we shall bring those about, and I hope that we will go out into the world with courage and stand before audiences that disagree with us and try to get our story across.

Imperatives for Peace

BY WALTER NASH

THERE are two factors that I think should be given profound thought during the next month or so. Unless we do give that thought, unless we do the work which is necessary to bring some things into being, then I fear it is possible for this war to have been fought in vain.

The world today is facing at the immediate moment three grave dangers: One is the loss of the war. The second is the non-understanding of war aims. The third is divergent war aims of the United Nations.

With regard to the war, the position looks infinitely better now than it did six weeks ago. There has never been a better month than the month of November, 1942, since September, 1939. But because the news is better, that makes it more imperative that the work which this organization has been brought into being to do, should be started urgently by all governments and all people. Never was the need more urgent than today.

We have, I believe, reached a stage in the war when we can discuss with some considerable reality, if not the shape of the post-war world, at least the type of machinery and procedure which should be set up to determine the shape of that world.

Recent events have shown that victory, when it comes, may not come rapidly, but will almost certainly come suddenly. The struggle ahead will certainly still be long and hard, but we may find that the turn to victory may be abrupt and sudden. We must, therefore, be sure that when that victory comes we have at least in readiness, if not a blueprint of the world of the future, certainly the plans for the councils and organizations which are going to draw up those blueprints. If I may extend this comparison, we want to have the machine tools ready for the construction of the peace and we want to have them ready in the very near future.

I do not propose to discuss the exact questions of this machinery, but I do wish to lay down one or two principles which I feel it is imperative to follow. The first imperative for a peaceful world order after this war is that Russia and China should be parties to all agreements concerning the future world from the time of the initiation of the discussion of these agreements. They must come to any conference table of the main powers of the United Nations and sit down when the schemes are originated. We should not go to them and present a combined Anglo-American plan and say this is what we think, with the implication of—take it or leave it. Anything of that nature must tend to arouse their antagonism and their suspicion. All four of these main United Nations must sit down to the table as equals. I am not suggesting that the Big Four, as they may be called later, should have the exclusive rights of determining the peace by any means. All of the United Nations must have their voice when that time comes, but I am suggesting that no peace will be practicable unless these four chief powers are in agreement, and we will get that agreement far more rapidly and far more easily if we cast out of our minds our old prejudices and suspicions and sit down as soon as possible to work out the main lines of the post-war

world as equals—Russia, China, America, and the British Commonwealth.

The main region in which misunderstanding and suspicion can arise is, of course, in the relations between Russia, on the one hand, and Great Britain and America, on the other. There still exist in many minds suspicions about the Russian Government which we must get rid of if we are going to be able to make any satisfactory peace. We must examine all the statements they put forward with the greatest of care, because I think such examination does a great deal to remove suspicions.

Let us look for one moment at the question of war aims. The Russians have signified their adherence to the United Nations' Declaration which reaffirms the principles of the Atlantic Charter. This general support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter has been reiterated recently by no other person than Stalin himself in his speech of November 6. I wish that he had included China at that time, but he definitely said the aims of these three were: "Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equal rights for all nations and the inviolability of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to manage according to its own wishes, economic help to nations which have suffered and co-operation with them in the task of attaining material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, and destruction of the Hitlerite regime."

If we look for a moment on each of these points in turn, we can see that they constitute a strenuous underlining of the main points of the Atlantic Charter. Stalin's statement that Russia, as well as England and America, stands for "the abolition of racial exclusiveness and equal rights for all nations and inviolability of their territories" is Point Six of the Atlantic Charter. And it is good that the Atlantic Charter should be on the walls of every institution of this country. It is good that the Four Freedoms should be blazoned out every time it is possible for them to be blazoned out. We forget what we are fighting for unless they are right in our schools, our churches, in all our organizations.

What are we fighting for? We are fighting for the Four Freedoms and the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We ought to have them drilled into us and our youngsters every day.

This is what President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill wrote when they wrote the Atlantic Charter, which is a charter for the world, not a charter for the Atlantic—for the world, all people. They said: After the final destruction of nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Stalin then went on to say that Russia stood for "liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights." There again he underlined Point Three of the Atlantic Charter which stated that the signatories "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

Stalin's principle—the right of every nation to manage according to its own wishes—is Point Two of the Atlantic Charter and the first section of Point Three of the Atlantic Charter which read: "They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. . . . They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

His next point—economic help to nations which have suffered and co-operation with them in the task of attaining material welfare—is virtually the same as Points Four and Five of the Atlantic Charter which read: "They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world, which are needed for their economic prosperity. . . . They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security."

I have stressed these in detail because they are in accord with the principles set out by Roosevelt and Churchill. They are

a blow against a type of suspicion which can poison the future if we are not careful.

There are other points in this speech of Stalin's which repay study. He referred warmly, for instance, to the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of 1941 and the United States-Soviet Agreement signed during Molotov's visit to the United States in 1942. He referred in a very friendly manner to Mr. Churchill's visit to Moscow last summer. There have been other signs, too, of this tendency to friendliness on the part of the Russians. For instance, when our troops entered North Africa, Stalin went to the trouble to reply in detail to a second letter forwarded him by Mr. Cassidy, the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow, and spoke warmly of the opportunities which the Anglo-American campaign in North Africa opened up. Then I see that he cabled congratulations to the United States Secretary of War on the great successes achieved by the American Army and the British Army in North Africa. These gestures are not the signs of a country or a man toward whom we should maintain an attitude of suspicion.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that this suspicion must be attacked from both sides. Stalin himself has made this beginning in breaking down by several statements the tremendous body of distrust in Russia of the Western Allies, a distrust which dates right through from the conclusion of the last war and which was intensified by many events in the intervening period. The attitude of mind which was built up in Russia at that time, justifiable or not justifiable, is something which has to be broken down before we can plan a solid and durable peace together. I think the impact of the war is breaking it down. They saved our civilization for many years on the great eastern front at Stalingrad and many other places. I think the fact that more and more British and American and other foreign soldiers and observers are coming, as a result of the war, into direct contact with the Russians helps bit by bit to dissolve the barriers that have been built up. This will intensify all the more if theaters of war develop, as, for instance, they well may in an area like the Balkans in which we could have Russian and Anglo-American forces fighting side by side.

II

I have spoken at some length on the relations with Russia because they seem to me to be the core of one of the main problems of the post-war settlement, but there is another one which I think of great importance. That is that there should be in this country complete understanding as to the true nature of the British Commonwealth and that there should be complete understanding in the British Commonwealth as to the true nature of America and the other American Republics.

I am the representative in the United States of the independent nation of New Zealand. That nation, though fully independent, happens also to be a member of an association called the British Commonwealth. I am certain that I echo the opinion not only of New Zealand Government, but of the New Zealand people, when I say that we are proud of our association with the British Commonwealth and that we have no desire to see that Commonwealth abolished or broken up. What we do want, is to see the principles embodied in it and which have found practice to a considerable extent in the relationship between the self-governing Dominions and the United Kingdom—I am not talking of the Colonial Empire which is primarily the United Kingdom's own concern—extended and, if you like, imitated elsewhere. For it is a timely reminder that the British Commonwealth has shown you that a group of independent nations can work together in a form which retains their independence, but at the same time gives them the immense advantage of united strength. The proof of that independence is the fact that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa decided to fight; Ireland, a like member of the Commonwealth, right or wrong, decided otherwise. All were independent to choose. Some chose one way and one chose the other way.

New Zealand can claim to have played in this war a role of considerable importance, despite the comparative smallness of her population and resources. To mention only one or two instances, it was one of our cruisers which helped destroy the "Graf Spee" in the early days of the war. It was our division which fought the main rear-guard action in Greece, which battled for

the main airfield in Crete, which first reached Tobruk when the siege of that town was raised first at the end of 1941, and which, in Mr. Churchill's own words, played a decisive part in stemming a great retreat at El Alamein last summer. But we were able to do this not because of our own ability alone, but because we were part of a bigger whole. Our cruiser "Achilles" was of great value in the South Atlantic battle against the "Graf Spee" because it was fighting side by side with British cruisers. Our troops in all these actions had British aircraft in support of them, very often British gunners firing alongside them and British tank crews brigading with them. Nearby there were Australian divisions, South African divisions, pilots from Canada, and men drawn from other independent parts of the Commonwealth. These men all came from independent nations, and they are in the war by the vote and decision of their own Governments.

We in New Zealand came into the war entirely of our own free will. We have raised our own voice with complete frankness regarding the conduct of the war, whenever we thought fit. We have taken no orders from England and at no time has anyone attempted to give such orders. We are, I stress this again, an independent nation with a Government whose legal power, I suggest to you, is greater in extent than the federal power of the United States Federal Government because it is not limited by the sovereignty of your various states. But while we are intensely proud of that independence, we are also proud to belong to a bigger unit because we have found that membership in that bigger unit of the British Commonwealth of Nations has given us opportunities for development, has given us access to culture, literature, and ideas which we have not the resources or the population yet to develop in our own small country. For that reason we see in the British Commonwealth of Nations a principle which should not be destroyed, but should rather be extended so that a similar relationship can be established between other independent countries in the world and into which the present colonial and less developed areas can be admitted one by one as they come to adult nationhood. Of these areas I would say India will be one of the first to be admitted to that full freedom the moment the war finishes. She has been promised freedom and I am convinced she will get it.

But that does not affect the needs of the campaigns of the present. Winning the war must be the first thing, though we must always prepare the paths we propose to travel when peacetime comes. I conclude, therefore, by stressing these three main points. One is that we should ensure that Russia and China, as the two other major United Nations powers, should be notified of all discussions of post-war agreements at the start of those discussions and that each of these countries, Russia, China, Great Britain, and America, should meet as equals. The second point is that we should do everything possible to break down the suspicion of Russia that exists on our side of the barrier and the suspicion of us that exists on the Russian side of the barrier should be broken down, too. The third point is that we should clear up one of the possible grounds of misunderstanding between Great Britain and the other chief United Nations by encouraging a close examination of what the British Commonwealth of Nations really is and that we should look to see what institutions really are, despite the fact they may bear the title Imperial or Empire or any other such word.

The strategy of victory, to me, must be formed of a united war strategy and a united peace strategy. All should be in it to determine and to act. So also must be the strategy for post-war a united strategy. It cannot bring peace if it is not. The superior people idea must go forever. Suspicion must go. We can build a better world. We are using the lives and bodies of our young people to make a new world possible. We will betray them; we will betray those who have fought for freedom in the past; we will betray the children of this generation and the children of their children unless we determine now the materials we will use in the foundations of the future. But we must also build such a foundation and such a structure that all men and all women, of whatever color, whatever creed, whatever class, or whatever language they may speak, shall have an opportunity to live the abundant life rendered possible by the Creator of all good things.

Victory is not Enough

BY WEI TAO-MING

AT a time like the present, when the military outlook is definitely beginning to turn in our favor, it is an urgent necessity for people to remember that our task does not end with the winning of the war. We must also win the peace. That is why we should, at every opportunity, prepare ourselves for that peace.

No one can doubt that this war, the most widespread in history, literally embracing the four corners of the earth and the seven seas, is also the most devastating spectacle yet seen on this planet of ours. Already in the number of men killed and wounded on the front lines, in the number of civilian casualties, in the number of starving and homeless people the world over, mankind has suffered many times over the pitiful consequences brought about by the last war. The new band of international gangsters has improved the methods of wanton destruction and brutal murder. We see the iniquitous system of hostages, the inhuman methods of torture, the starving of defenseless peoples, the systematic massacres in cold blood of whole populations in towns and villages.

If this war is more cruel in every aspect in comparison with past wars, there is one most encouraging sign that we did not have in the past. I refer to the spirit in the leaders of government and in the leaders of society. It is the spirit of co-operation, of genuine interest in the welfare of others, of world responsibility. That spirit is fundamental to the plans of the future. For victory is not alone our aim. It is but the means to attain the goal which we have set for ourselves. That goal is to prevent all wars and to build a better world, in which future generations will grow up in security and happiness.

However, it would be an exaggeration to say that this is the first time in world history when men have begun to think beyond the strict confines of their own national existence. Throughout the ages there have been leaders who have had this spirit, and who have tried to bring about a better world. But after each crisis and after each war this idealism failed to become a reality. The opportunities toward concerted action in building a better world were never fully utilized. What accounted for the repeated failure? There may be a thousand causes, but the fundamental one is the spirit of the old diplomacy. Old diplomacy was essentially based on egoism and antagonism. Under the spell of this form of diplomacy, many nations failed to realize that, just as within a state the individual citizen must seek his own interests through the interest of the state and work for the well-being of his fellow citizens before his own happiness can be secured, so within the family of nations the first concern of a state must be in the progress and the general well-being of the world if it hopes to maintain and develop its own prosperity and welfare. It must seek its own interests within the world's interests, for the world's interests are the interests of each nation. In spite of the foresight of a few leaders, there were many people who could not discard their old concepts. Still others thought it wise to support an ideal merely for the sake of expediency. Just as among friends, if one merely observes the best etiquette for friendly conduct, and yet at heart cherishes thoughts of selfish gain at another's expense, there can be no spirit of sincere co-operation, so it is among nations. The result has been endless conflict.

I believe all peoples have dreamed of

peace and progress; only conflicting aims and desires defeated their high hopes and aspirations. It is clear that the ideals and the mechanics of an international system—noble and perfect as they may be—are not enough to bring about a better world. The key to success lies in the heart of man.

I also believe that this time we have a much better chance of making our dreams come true. Today we know better. The new spirit of world responsibility is deep in the minds and hearts of our leaders and in ourselves. We know that the welfare of each of us depends on the welfare of all of us. We are convinced that peace, prosperity, and progress depend on extending collaboration, mutual understanding, and active assistance wherever needed. But while rejoicing in our new unity of spirit, we would be deceiving ourselves should we claim that the work is done. This spirit and this vision have got to be constantly strengthened and extended if we wish to win the war and to win the peace.

In the Chinese language "peace" is a compound term, made up of two words. It is pronounced *Ho Ping*. *Ho* means harmony and *Ping* means equity. Harmony and equity are constructive words. We believe they are the true foundation and indispensable factors of peace. To have peace and a better world, we must constantly develop harmony of interests and desires among all peoples. We must establish an equitable system of international relations founded on just and equal treatment regardless of race, creed, or color. To my mind, harmony can only come through equity, especially political and economic. Men can work together best as equal partners with equal rights and duties. It is the same among nations. In the peace to come, nations large and small must stand as equals in the family of nations; there must be no thought of superiors or inferiors; each must be allowed to work out without external interference its own national destiny, and to make independently its proper contributions to the common store of scientific, cultural, and spiritual values. Large nations have only greater responsibilities but they do not have greater rights. They must help where help is needed and render it in a spirit of comradeship and good will. Economic equality among nations means—and I quote from the Atlantic Charter—the right to "access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." There must be no monopoly of the world's goods or services. Rather, the bounties of nature are to be shared among the greatest number of people so that there will be expanding economic prosperity for all lands.

Back in 1934, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement in China. It was based on the principles of courtesy, justice, integrity, and sense of honor. These principles were a combination of the best that the old Chinese philosophies had taught us and the most advanced of modern ideas for human development. We have tried to inculcate these principles into the minds and hearts of our people so that the new spirit can gradually be realized in their everyday life and in their conduct.

In China this movement has been a success. I believe that to change the old concept of international relations for the realization of a better world order, an international new life movement based on these same principles is necessary. The spirit of the old diplomacy—egoism and antagonism—must be completely extinguished in the hearts of all men and of all nations. Political domination and economic exploitation can no longer be tolerated. In their place, the new diplomacy of harmony and equity must be cultivated. Once we succeed in establishing a new intangible to rule our international conduct, the way of approach to international questions will be different from the past and physical factors of disagreement can always be overcome. In the spirit of friendly understanding and sincere co-operation, racial differences, instead of being causes of estrangement, will be turned into cumulative forces which work for unity and co-ordination. In the same spirit, natural resources and opportunities of market in one country will be opened to the techniques, science, and creative capital of other peoples in the best interest of all mankind without appeal to violence and without fear of exploitation. With adequate mechanics for an international system we shall thus see a happy family of nations firmly confederated in a common destiny of prosperity and peaceful progress.

Americanism is Internationalism

BY LUIS QUINTANILLA

IT is always befitting for a citizen of an American Republic to speak of internationalism before an American audience. This Hemisphere is the natural habitat of that spirit; and, in our continent, the United States of America is the most successful example of the goodness of internationalism. One could almost say that this strong and generous country is an international community in itself. From the beginning, the American Colonies have been the champions of internationalism. After their emancipation, they became United States and such they remain today. Independence and federal union of states, through the brief interlude of confederation: such is the political development of the truly international community known to the world as the U. S. A. Freedom and union: two American beacons lighting the way for the rest of the world.

In fact, the city of New York is in itself a majestic monument to internationalism. If today we had to select *one* city in the entire world as a sample of human civilization in the year 1942, that city would be New York. And who made New York? The citizens of the world. Practically all the races and languages can be seen or heard in the streets of this metropolis. Yes, New York is an impressive proof that internationalism has a creative power surpassed by none. It is no more a dream but a tangible reality. We Americans know that there is no fundamental incompatibility among men, whatever the color of their skin, the language they speak, or the religion they profess. To us, human beings are first of all *human*. This is the compelling message of New York.

However, it would be unfair to think that the international spirit has manifested itself exclusively in the United States or in the city of New York. The truth is that since the beginning of its independent life in the early nineteenth century, the entire Latin American continent breathed internationalism. The glamorous hero of Latin American independence, Simón Bolívar, may well be hailed as the most abundantly rich personality of the New World. Over a century ago, he abolished slavery; fought some two hundred battles in tropical jungles and snow-clad Andean peaks; freed half a dozen nations; personally drafted their political constitutions and even traced the broad lines of their international policy—a policy that we call Pan-Americanism today. His fight to keep the new nations together was as glorious as and perhaps even more dramatic than his fight to emancipate them from the Spanish yoke. Nearly a century and a half ago he advocated one great confederation—he liked to refer to it as "The Nation"—in which all the new countries of America would find themselves united. He also planned periodic meetings of a Pan-American Congress. Bolívar is the recognized Father of international arbitration and of the idea of a League of Nations.

In 1797, General Francisco Miranda, the precursor of independence, founded in London a political society known as "The Great American Union." The Chilean Egaña, in 1810, wrote in a project of declaration of rights of the people of Chile, that "the states of America must unite for their external security against the aims of Europe." The tentative constitution of

Chile asked for a *continental citizenship*, the formation of a General Congress of the Nation (America), and the adoption of a system of union and mutual security. Also, in 1810, Bolívar, then a deputy from Venezuela, proposed a Spanish American League of Nations. To the London *Morning Chronicle* of September 5, 1810, he stated that "the Venezuelans will take care to invite all the peoples of America to unite in a single confederation." In 1811, the authorities of Buenos Aires granted papers of naturalization to foreign officers fighting for the independence of Argentina. In 1818, Bolívar, fighting for the independence of Venezuela, promised his help to the inhabitants of Argentina and conveyed to them his project for the union of all the countries of South America. In 1821, from Colombia (Nueva Granada), Bolívar, the Venezuelan, wrote O'Higgins, the Chilean, to give him assurances that the armies of Colombia were about to march into Ecuador with instructions to help the armies from Argentina and Chile to liberate Perú. Those were glorious days indeed for Pan-Americanism.

Bernardo Monteagudo, another pioneer of Spanish American independence, in a study published after his death (1825), had gathered his ideas "on the necessity of a general federation of the Spanish American states," in which he suggested collaboration with Great Britain and the United States. José Cecilio del Valle, from Central America, expressed himself in these terms: "I would like to see a general congress . . . which would endeavor to solve this problem . . . devise the most useful plan so that none of the nations of America may be the object of foreign invasions." The Uruguayan liberator, Artigas, made a similar statement in his "*Ordenanzas de Corso Marítimo.*" Bernardo O'Higgins on May 5, 1818, said in his manifesto to the people that the "simultaneous operation of our forces . . . will determine whether it is possible to form on the American continent a grand confederation." The Foreign Minister of Colombia, Pedro Gual, submitted to the Congress of Bogotá: "First, that the American states ally and confederate themselves perpetually in peace and in war, to consolidate their freedom and independence, guaranteeing each other, mutually, the integrity of their respective territories." The Colombian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, Manuel Torres, proposed a Continental union in 1821. In a note addressed to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, he wrote: "This [the project to establish a monarchy in Mexico in order to favor the views of the Holy Alliance] is a new reason which ought to determine the President of the United States no longer to delay a measure which will naturally establish an American alliance, capable of counteracting the projects of the European powers and of protecting our republican institutions." A similar suggestion was made in London by the Mexican Minister, José Mariano de Michelena, to the Brazilian representative in that capital. In the United States, the lonely voice of Henry Clay was heard in 1820 in favor of "a human freedom league" from Hudson's Bay to Cape Horn.

II

PAN-AMERICANISM, at its inception, was indeed a Latin American affair. Expressions like Congress of America, Congress of the Nation, General Federation, General Congress, a Grand Confederation, Perpetual Alliance and Confederation, American Alliance, the Greatest Nation in the World (meaning all America), the American Pact, a Cordial Confederation, a Truly American League, a Society of Sister Nations, and Bolívar Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation were popular terms in the political vocabulary of early nineteenth century Latin America. Independence and confederation of nations: the two terms seemed at first inseparable; inseparable not only in theory but in practice. The first Latin Americans were inter-Americans. They acted as such.

In 1818, Bolívar wrote to Juan Martin de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata: "We shall hasten with the keenest interest to consummate on our part the American pact which, forming a political body of all our republics, holds America up to the world with an aspect of majesty and greatness without parallel among the older nations. America, thus united, heaven permitting, can call herself Queen of the Nations and Mother of Republics." Bolívar's Pan-Americanism — the only Pan-Americanism

acceptable to Latin Americans—was a continental policy of equal rights and mutual obligations. It was meant to be a dialogue, not a monologue, like President Monroe's. It was to be a Pan-Americanism of partners, not one in which a self-appointed tutor assumed the responsibility of protecting his weaker neighbors, if and when convenient to his own national, selfish interests. Bolívar's pattern of a truly continental order was then and is still today Pan-Americanism.

Pan-Americanism is unparalleled in the world's history. It is the first successful experiment in the friendly organization of an entire hemisphere. There have been many "Pan" movements in history: Pan-Islamism, for instance, an attempt at brotherhood through a common faith; Pan-Slavism, an attempt at union through community of race; or Pan-Germanism, an ideal of union through community of language. But Pan-Americanism does not exclude any religion or race or language. Its only boundaries are those of the Western Hemisphere. If it reaches full maturity, Pan-Americanism will become an impressive demonstration that, given a climate of international morality, large and small nations, powerful and weak ones, can live side by side in peace. This would mean that not only individuals or nations, but whole continents as well, have outlived the law of the jungle, and that a reasonable solution of international difficulties may be found whenever there is the will to do so. Pan-Americanism is a synthesis. It embraces twenty-one countries living under all kinds of weather, in all types of geographical environments, with people of all races, worshiping different gods, and speaking many languages. Not only are we impressed by the international character of our policies, but, again, by the international originality of our culture.

Our culture is not exclusive but inclusive. It is richer than any other on earth, because it incorporates mankind. They all made it; there lies its originality. It is inaccurate to say that our culture is that of Europe. America is Europe and the world; not an addition, but a multiplication; not a sterile juxtaposition of disconnected cultures, but more and more a synthesis in which individual ingredients spontaneously blend their identities for the benefit of the final product. Eliminate, through prejudice, any one of the ingredients and you will automatically impoverish that product. To divide America is to weaken it, not only in the political but in the cultural field as well. Our essential originality lies in the limitless amplitude of our culture. It is, if any, a universal culture. That is one more reason for our unshakable conviction in its ultimate triumph. Never has mankind witnessed so portentous an enterprise.

Culture is like a symphony: the more instruments, the more powerful the orchestra; and the more powerful the orchestra, the richer can be the symphony. Also, America's culture is a dialogue. Never was it meant to be a soliloquy. It claims no infallibility. We like to keep wide open the windows of our continent, so that light may come in, and the breeze from any direction. Finally, we wish to hear other peoples' voices and we want our own to be heard by them. American culture is real, universal: human. We are truly human when we share universal feelings. In fact only then are we certain that we exist. The more we find in others, the more we know ourselves. America is rich in human material, that is why it is so authentic. We despise conventionalism, superficiality. We dislike automatism as well as useless complexity. We refuse to lose contact with life. To sophisticated minds we may at times appear candid. Some Europeans have even called us childish. Let us be proud of our American candor.

The culture of America is wholesome. If I may employ here a well known terminology, I will say that America's culture is both horizontal and vertical. It *ex*tends and it *in*tends. It is horizontal in that, through sympathy, it spreads to all men the world over. And it is vertical in that, within each man, it involves his entire personality. On this side of the world, we mean to live generously, authentically. For that end, America's continent, history, and culture are well suited. In fact, so well suited that they have made it possible for a dream of mankind to materialize. In spite of the multiple national differences, America has a coherent personality. When it speaks, the world can hear one majestic voice. And that voice, if it wishes to remain American, can never speak against internationalism. Only by being internationalists shall we remain typically Americans.

England Plans for the Future

BY KATHLEEN COURTNEY

IF Americans are to understand what we in England are thinking and planning for the future, they must consider the facts against the background of life as it is lived in our country today. I don't think I realized until I came over here to how great an extent it is true that England is a beleagured fortress. Our country is not just what it used to be—an island whose shores you could leave whenever you wanted to and visit the Continent of Europe or countries further overseas. We are now a fortress and we have to live as people live in a fortress. We live on short commons, of course. That is of no particular importance. We can get along all right. But we live hard. We have to work hard. We have experienced not only the bombing, which was perhaps spectacular and certainly unpleasant, but a great many other things besides which have changed our point of view.

We live only twenty miles away from an army that might at any moment invade us. I don't know exactly what point is twenty miles away from New York, but imagine that at that distance you have a powerful army which might at any moment attack you, and then you will realize that our point of view is a little different from that of people whose enemy is a good, long way away. We have experienced a whole series of painful reverses. All these things have changed our thinking. I believe they have made us a little bit grim. You do not live through those years 1939 to 1942, as we have lived through them, without becoming perhaps a little grim.

There are other things which make life different and difficult. If you take our population between the ages of fourteen and sixty-five, you find that two out of every three people are doing full-time work either in the national forces, the armed forces, or in civil defense or in war industry. That leaves only one out of every three in that age group for other things. It includes all the women who are mothers; it includes all the people looking after our children; it includes the vast army of voluntary workers, the vast army of half-time workers—an army to which you may add practically all of the people over sixty-five because, except people who are really ill or more or less bedridden, I don't think there is a person in our country who does not do a hand's turn for the war. There are even grandmothers in the factories doing sometimes whole-time and often doing part-time work. So we have not got an awful lot of time left over for other things.

Then you have got to add a few other things. You have got to add a blackout which is a blackout and not a dimout. I thought New York a city of light when I arrived. Now I know it is not and I am willing to believe it is not, but I seem a little bit surprised when I see these blazing windows and the lights on the street and I see my hand before me when I walk. Our blackout is a blackout, and it does make life difficult after four o'clock on a winter afternoon. You cannot get about so easily.

Then, you know, we have a paper shortage. That may sound as if it had little to do with international affairs, but it has because you cannot print just anything you want or write anything you want or even duplicate something or run off in the gazette anything you want. You have got to think twice about every bit of paper that you need. Now, you here who work in organizations and send out documents, just think what that would mean if you had to think about every bit of paper that you use. Perhaps some of you might be re-

lieved if there were more thought about the paper used, but it makes it difficult for the organizers. There is also a shortage of secretaries. At any moment you may lose your secretary who is taken away for the armed forces or for the munition factories. People whose secretaries are under or about fifty feel nervous all the time. That does not make work any easier.

I am saying all these things because I want you to realize the background against which we do our thinking. Our thinking and our planning for the future have to be done in a different way from the way in which you do it here. So when you don't learn that in London we have great gatherings like that of the *New York Herald Tribune* the other day, which I was privileged to attend and which impressed me enormously, please remember the simple fact that we have not got the time.

But do not suppose that because of these facts and because we do it in a different way, we are not thinking and planning. We began the very moment the war broke out and people asked themselves why the existing international organization, the League of Nations, had not succeeded in preventing war. They have gone on asking that question; they have gone on thinking, discussing, planning. There are small meetings—perhaps not spectacular, since they must take place as best they can in villages and towns, with people giving what time they can—and there are study groups. The studies which are published are, I think, pretty fundamental and very good.

But the thinking, as I say, is not spectacular, because it cannot be. I think—and I speak doubtfully because one can never be sure about how a whole nation is thinking, even one's own nation; no whole nation ever thinks all the same at the same time—but I would say that in general in regard to the post-war world, we are thinking in terms of a world-wide organization which will assure defense against aggression.

We put security first, and I think I may say that all the nations of Europe, the nations of the occupied and invaded countries, put security first. They want to build a better world and they know they cannot build it unless they can build it behind a rampart of security. We are determined to see things as they are. That, I think, is one of the results of the stripping from us of many of the trimmings and trappings of life. It makes one realize things as they are.

We try to—we do, I think—live in a rather real world and look to the future with some sense of realism. We do not believe that we can spring from the chaos and anarchy which must follow this war straight to a perfect world organization. We know we shall have to build from the bottom. We believe that we shall find a great deal to guide us in what we learned during the years in which the League of Nations existed, but that we must have an organization which offers better security. In addition to that, we want to see a new and better economic system.

But there is one point on which I think most of us feel rather strongly, and that is this: You are not going to get your new world merely out of a new economic system. That will not prevent war. You have got to get a respect for international law, a real respect for law, a real belief in law, and a determination to uphold it. Unless every nation in this world, unless every man and woman, every citizen worthy of the name is determined to defend not only the law in his own country, as we do defend the law in our own countries—those of us who are worthy of the name of citizens—but unless we are also determined to uphold that law which shall preserve the smallest and the weakest from aggression, why, then, we must give up hopes of security or of a better world.

General Smuts, speaking the other day in England, speaking not in the House of Commons but to the House of Commons, reminded us that an American statesman had said, "This is the century of the common man." And the General added, "Let it be our privilege, the privilege of this generation to see to it that that searching of soul by the intolerable sufferings that this generation has brought about, this terrific ordeal, shall not this time be in vain."

That is the message, if I may call it a message, that I bring from my country to your great country. Let us, together with our great allies, with China and with Russia, see to it that this awful period of suffering shall this time not be in vain.

A New Peace for a New Era

BY FIORELLO H. LA GUARDIA

AS a diplomat, I have not been very much of a success. I have the very bad habit of telling the truth at all times and I find that occasionally when I do express myself or characterize any government or individual head of a government, I am charged with having bad manners. Yet, I do not apologize or take back anything that I said in 1937 or 1938. I told Mr. Hull not very long ago that, after all, my language was mild compared to his today.

I think it is quite proper and fitting that there should be discussion on after-war arrangements, particularly in this country. International affairs is a common topic of discussion in Europe because they have been living with it for centuries. Here it is a rare one. And because a great many of us do not understand it, discussion on the subject is shunned; and then we are prone always to take the easiest way and just say, "Oh, well, it is no concern of ours," and let it go at that.

After the last war, many of us who had been overseas really believed that we had accomplished something. We believed it with all our souls. I returned to Congress when I was discharged from the army and I took part in reducing the strength of our army and reducing the size of our navy. We really believed that we were entering a new era and we labored under that illusion for many years. I think that immediately following the armistice, the world believed that there would not be another war for centuries, and you all know what transpired after that.

Now, the least we can do is to profit by the mistakes of the past and utilize the experience, bitter as it may have been, in shaping the destinies of the people of the world after this war. You will find, though it is not expressed at this time, a decided viewpoint in this country still existing to the effect that as soon as the war is over, we should withdraw and take no part in European or Far Eastern affairs. That school of thought still persists in this country and it is bound to find an outlet after we cease firing, particularly if there is a national election intervening between the armistice and the peace conference. That is inevitable. So all of the information that can properly be brought to the American people on existing conditions and the hope of the world is very timely and useful.

Everyone agrees generally with the proper grouping of nations. I think it was President Wilson who stated that nations should be carved along easily recognizable lines of nationality. That is a general formula, but it is not enough. We have learned that language, culture, and ethnological background, in and of themselves, are not enough. It will be necessary in the new grouping to take into consideration the resources and the possible economy that might be carved out of any newly created or re-established country. Failure to do that puts the country at a terrible disadvantage and it becomes the prey of a larger and stronger and wealthier neighboring nation or must naturally become belligerent for its own existence.

I was in Paris immediately following the

last war. I think it was in April. I went abroad with the Committee on Military Affairs of the House and I was visiting with Colonel House, who told me of a very interesting incident. There was a question of changing the borderline of one of the newly created governments, but they had no map of sufficiently small scale to indicate the change. It was only a few hundred meters. He just could not understand it, so he sent a surveyor to the particular place and found that the reason one country was asking for the change was that it just wanted to take one more sugar refinery away from the other. That illustrates the necessity of really taking into consideration the economy and the resources rather than fixing arbitrary lines at a given point.

I do not believe the problem in Europe is going to be as difficult as it was following the last war. We gained some very useful experience and a great deal was done in shaping the new countries and in breaking the hold of the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties. Czechoslovakia and Poland, of course, must be restored as such. No one would question that. Belgium and Holland, although small, come within the definition and, of course, should be restored. But with the added experience, a great deal can now be provided to establish, in the fullest sense of the word, the freedom from want advocated in the Atlantic Charter. The point I am trying to make is that no political or racial or historical background should suffice without economic security for the people of each country.

We can also go to the Balkans as an illustration. It is always most difficult to explain the Balkan problem to the American public. I think a good start toward its solution was made in the organization of Yugoslavia. But after it was organized, Yugoslavia was ignored, and the politicians made a sorry mess of it. There is no question that Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia belong together. They have been kept apart for centuries by the Hapsburg policy of dividing. A new country was formed after the war and then abandoned. A country like that which has its traditional hatreds, artifically created among these people, requires some treatment and nursing until it can grow up and really understand that what they are fighting about is unimportant. A period of a few years must be allowed before the peoples of those countries have to decide their form of government. That does not solve the entire Balkan problem because, frankly, I do not know what to do with Bulgaria, and Rumania is another problem. We surely cannot make the mistakes as to Rumania that we made in the last war.

Once the Balkan situation could be solved—and no one questions the right of Greece to its existence—then we must find and provide for the newly formed Balkan states proper outlets to the sea and proper means of communication and the opportunity of living without that fear of want. Hitler's plan took all of that into consideration. It was based on the exploitation of these countries for his own benefit. He frankly stated, "Oh, surely, Holland and Belgium will be recognized; surely, Poland and Czechoslovakia, too. You can have your language; you can have your art; you can have your music. But I will have the *Einfluss Sphare* by controlling foreign affairs, defense, currency and commerce." That would have made a powerful nation and would have placed in the hands of whoever was at the head of that nation, the domination of Europe, of Africa, and, of course, its influence in South America. That was his plan.

II

WE believe that all countries should and must govern themselves, and then we must provide mutual protection against exploitation. That requires, of course, a world standard of living. If one country has a very low standard, it cannot exist because it will be frozen out by tariffs of countries having a higher standard.

For years, as a young man, I prepared consular invoices. I served in the Consular Service forty years ago. That was 1903, 1904, 1905, and 1906. I still remember that part of the work in the Consular Service was to ascertain the cost of production, the cost of materials as separated from the cost of production, and the labor cost. In most instances our tariff was brought up to meet

the difference in production costs. That did not help the workers of the country involved at all.

Now, what we must do is to bring up the standards of living in order to obtain some sort of an equalization. Liberty in hunger is not completely satisfactory, just as abundance in slavery is not satisfactory. We cannot ignore—and there is where the rub is going to come—the economic protection of these countries.

Another big mistake or tradition which we must break after this war is a reshuffling or a redistribution of colonial possessions. That should be a thing of the past. To me, it does not make much difference if a colony is owned by one country or possessed by another country. It is just as tough on the people there.

President Roosevelt points out—and I think there is the solution—that overpopulated countries must find expansion, but that this relief from overpopulation must take place in the form of emigration of those people and not the giving of colonies or new lands to those countries for exploitation. In other words, we must open up new countries, just as the Western Hemisphere was a new country for Europe and people from all countries of Europe came here. I think we did a pretty good job of it. We all did not come on the Mayflower. Some came in the steerage and their children became mayors. So places must be found in the world where people can go and form a new country, a new nation. There is still plenty of territory and climate today is not such a barrier as it was a century ago. That solution, I believe, rather than maintaining the *status quo* of mandated countries and colonial possessions, is one of the hopes of the world.

This approach will require an amount of unselfishness that has rarely been found in international conferences. It is my hope that no attempt will be made to solve these problems immediately after firing ceases. There must be a period where we can readjust ourselves and again get a normal perspective. From the moment that firing ceases we will have a great deal to do in getting food and medical supplies to millions and millions of people. We must all contribute that which we have in food, supplies, transportation, and personnel. We must see that millions of little children get as much of their childhood as is humanly possible. One of the saddest parts of this entire war is the hardship and suffering inflicted on children with insufficient nourishment and living in constant fear. There are some who have never learned to play or laugh. We must provide for these children at once in all countries, even in the countries of our enemies. We must not neglect them.

Then if we could possibly find some way—and I think a way may be found—for an armistice or a moratorium on politics, we should provide some sort of an interim government in order to hold in abeyance the forces of conflicts. This will give the people a chance to recover mentally and physically from the effects of the war and then to crystallize the natural, spontaneous public opinion on the adjustment of the problems that have been menacing the peace of the world for centuries. I think now is the time that it should be made clear by the United Nations that we were dragged into this war, that it started with aggression, that we expect to end the war, and that there should be no expectation on the part of the existing Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan to have representatives sitting at any peace conference or conference of world adjustment. It will only mean a repetition with some very mild and innocuous changes if we do so.

Now, that may sound a little brutal, but I see no hope at all for the future peace of the world if we do anything to perpetuate the ideas or the philosophy of the Axis Powers. We have to put such a finality to that that it will not recur for centuries and centuries to come.

No Anti-Communist Central Europe

BY CHARLES A. DAVILA

THE noninterference policy of the Great Democracies in countries where fascist regimes were set up before the war is mainly responsible for the hardships which faced the democratic forces in Central and Southeastern Europe. That policy was the result of divided public opinion in the Occident. The so-called conservative groups lived in the illusion that the triumph of fascist principles would save their privileges. The extreme leftists counted on the Third International and the Soviet regime to bring about the destruction of those privileges. Between these two groups which were looking for guidance to Berlin and Moscow and had actually "denationalized" themselves for class reasons, an amorphous mass of none too enthusiastic democrats were trying to "muddle through," indulging in wishful thinking, hoping against hope, ready to trust any adventurer who condescended to give them a calming shot in the arm. That is what happened at Munich, in September, 1938, to Chamberlain and Daladier.

All that obviously meant only one thing: the resignation of democracy. The British, American, and French statesmen had not realized that, the doctrine of democracy having originated in their countries, they could not evade the duty of upholding it everywhere, if they did not want their own peoples to lose confidence in their principles and to look elsewhere for guidance. In the face of fascist or communist proselytism, there was no corresponding democratic proselytism. But this aloofness, this resignation was not only due to the confusion in public opinion and to the lack of vision of the politicians. It was also due to a complacent feeling of superiority.

The German or Hungarian theory of "racial superiority" is much criticized nowadays, but most people do not realize that the idea that only some peoples deserve the blessings of democracy is nothing else but another *Herrenvolk* theory. To make a historical comparison, does one think that the American people, one century and a half ago, was more "mature for democracy" than, for instance, Southeastern European peoples, who have already had parliamentary regimes for several generations are today? In 1776, the percentage of illiteracy for America was much greater than the percentage for even the most backward European country today. Yet the principles of the American Constitution worked, because they embodied the fundamental needs of the human being.

The noninterference or isolationist policy would, in fact, continue if the provision of the Atlantic Charter, giving every people the right to choose its own form of government, is not restricted to democratic forms of government. I mean by this that some fundamental principles must be obligatory for every country. These are the irreducible rights of free speech, free press, and religion. Every kind of minority, political, racial, or religious, must be protected by the international community. In that respect, the sovereignty of the states must be definitely curtailed. As for the "freedom from want," the masses in the various countries will vote themselves economic security,

if their governments and the international economic organism which will be created by the victorious United Nations do not take care of that problem.

With those minimum guarantees for individual rights, there can be varied forms of governments, of systems of national representation, of voting systems in the various countries, according to their own tradition or historical development. Still, all these principles will work only under two conditions in the states of Central and Southeastern Europe: (1) If, by using the democratic common denominator, we shall be able to get rid of the nationalistic idiosyncrasies. (2) If no *cordon sanitaire* against Soviet Russia will be set up.

Nationalist idiosyncrasies have been and still are the greatest evil in that part of the world. They make objective, reasonable solutions of the problems and constructive collaboration between the various peoples absolutely impossible. It means always emotionalism against reason and justice. Selfish interests, exploiting cliques always hide behind nationalistic organizations. Thus, excessive nationalism prevents indispensable social, political, and economic reforms, and is responsible for the lack of progress of the whole community.

To stop this nonsense, the leaders of the countries where democracy originated should state in strong and clear words that democratic principles must be accepted everywhere with all their international implications. A strong democratic leadership is what the enlightened people in every country are yearning for in order to get rid of the confusion created by fascist or totalitarian propaganda. They all expect from the leaders of democracy a new Sermon on the Mount. What they are getting instead are bewildering news, showing that counter-revolutionary forces are at work and, as in the case of Otto "of Austria," are scoring points.

Similarly, the Democracies must indicate clearly that no tendency to set up in Central and Southeastern Europe a *cordon sanitaire* against Soviet Russia will be tolerated. That tendency is due to the policy of fear, the worst of all policies. It absurdly assumes that even if the masses in Central Europe were satisfied under democratic regimes, they still would be attracted by revolutionary ideas; it assumes a sort of organic spirit of destruction on the side of the Communists, an assumption which is contradicted by many manifestations, pledges, acts, and achievements of Soviet Russia; but worst of all, it naively believes that some conservative counter-revolutionary construction in Central Europe, using all the decayed materials of pre-war Europe (and even before), would constitute a dam against the revolutionary tide. Some people have not yet understood that only democratic liberties make revolutionary movements unnecessary and that, on the contrary, reaction does not stop, but creates revolutions; the Metternich period did not teach them anything. Furthermore, a *cordon sanitaire* against communism would constitute the ideal milieu for the survival and prospering of German imperialism.

II

If democratic reforms are facilitated in Central Europe by the stern attitude of the Western Democracies, one does not need to be afraid of revolutions. On the contrary, only then will a close and friendly collaboration between the Central and Eastern European countries and Soviet Russia be possible and then will the Russians be able to reach a doctrinal and political compromise with the Western Democracies, without which there will be no peace, internal or external. In the case of a *cordon sanitaire* against her, Soviet Russia can do nothing else but stand pat and pursue her propaganda to get the support of the proletariat everywhere. And let us make no mistake about the possibility that the weakened condition of Russia may make Stalin docile to conservative schemes after the war is over. He has seen worse times and, regardless of the losses, the prestige of the Soviets will be greater than ever when peace comes.

Another error made by some churches is to believe that Marxist "materialism" can be conquered by religious spiritualism. They assume that the heroic resistance of the Russians is due only to the awakening of nationalism (which, incidentally, if true, would be a greater obstacle to world organization than the rigid internationalism

of the Third International). Not to understand that the heroic fight of the Russian people is, to a great extent, the result of proletarian consciousness, which is a spiritual force, constitutes a psychological error which will make the solution of the problem of religion in Russia even more difficult than it is.

To conclude, democracy in Central and Southeastern Europe is the only way to pacify that part of the world and its success depends on the aggressiveness of the Western democrats; it is the only way to make a collaboration between the Western Democracies and Soviet Russia possible, to give political substance to the Twenty-year Pact. Any noninterference policy, not to speak of appeasement, will create chaos in all the territories evacuted by the German armies; many local leaders of underground movements or military commanders will grab the power and fight each other; Allied army commanders will not be able to impose civil authority.

To prevent all that, the men who gained moral authority in those countries by stubbornly opposing fascist and dictatorial doctrines should be openly backed by the United Nations. In the beginning, those men will represent the only unquestioned authority, capable of maintaining order. To treat them, as was done before the war and is still done today, like "untouchables," and to try to get the support of former Fascists, semi-Fascists, or royal pretenders with former fascist backing, means to destroy irreplaceable democratic values, gained by a long and arduous process of selection in the various national communities. This policy will inevitably lead to civil war in every country presently under nazi domination, when the war is over. But even during the war, this policy will hardly produce any practical results. Against totalitarian regimes backed by German troops, the unarmed population cannot stage any general revolt. What can be done is to engage in guerrilla warfare and sabotage. But to produce that, the spiritual forces must be encouraged by democratic solidarity, not discouraged by appeasement. To count on the dynamism and spirit of self-sacrifice of fascist traitors to fascism is another psychological error.

Expediency for military reasons is perfectly justifiable. But opportunism in questions of principle will maintain confusion of mind and end in chaos. When the people in Europe are no longer hungry, when their first needs have been satisfied, no military occupation of the various countries will be able to prevent disorders, if men with moral authority, due to an unblemished democratic record, do not head the local Governments. Any attitude today on the side of the United Nations that destroys the prestige of those democratic leaders, instead of strengthening it, ultimately harms the very aims of this unprecedented fight for world freedom and a "people's peace."

This war is not another "balance of power" war. It has become a crusade for freedom. Politically, it must be fought with the fervent faith of crusaders, not with the skepticism of appeasers. Let us definitely rid ourselves of the spirit of Munich and wipe out fascism not only in Axis-occupied Europe and Japan-occupied Asia, but also in the midst of the Western Democracies. This lack of unity, this confusion must stop. The people everywhere must be certain that this world crisis will lead to compulsory democracy, guaranteed by international democratic solidarity. It is a big order, but short of that achievement, all the unprecedented sufferings of this war will have been endured in vain.

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IN order to make room for some of the notable addresses and papers delivered at the First Conference of the World Confederation, we have been obliged to omit both the Round Table and the Plans for the Future, which are regular features of FREE WORLD. They will appear as usual in the February issue.

EDUCATION as a factor in Post-War Reconstruction

BY ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN

IN the making of plans for international peace and justice, three sets of factors must be dealt with. I list them in order of increasing importance, which is also the order of increasing difficulty. They are first, economic; second, political; and third, educational. As to the first of these, all men now know that the time has come when we must create and administer a unified economic world order. Economic chaos is no longer tolerable. It is no longer necessary. But second, this ordering and controlling of our business activities implies and requires that we create and administer a unified political world order which shall be equal in scope, but superior in power, to the forces of economic procedure. The production and distribution of wealth must be under public control. A world economy without a world government spells strife and disaster. But third, political institutions in turn must be sustained and controlled by adequate education. The nature and quality of a government depends upon the nature and quality of the intelligence of its citizens. The tragic experience of Adolf Hitler has shown us that no dictatorship can endure unless it can teach its people to be slaves. But, it is equally certain that no democracy can endure unless it can teach its citizens to be free. A unified world economy, authorized and controlled by a unified world government, implies, as a basic postulate, a united system of world education.

When I speak of world unity in economics and politics and education, I am not thinking of a unity which ignores or denies the facts of multiplicity. I am thinking, rather, of unity in multiplicity—a unifying activity which, as it faces the varieties and complexities of human experience, endeavors to save them from sinking down into chaos and meaninglessness and brutish strife. What we must have in economics, in politics, in education, is an ordered multiplicity—an economic order, a political order, an educational order. These are three interdependent phases of a single human enterprise. They are three sides of that endeavor by which—if I may borrow a phrase from Rousseau—the human being "ceases from being a stupid and unimaginative animal and becomes an intelligent being, and a man."

Now, if what I have said is true, then two serious dangers beset the planning of the United Nations for post-war reconstruction. First, our economic experts working in isolation may be tempted by "the bias of happy exercise," to devise an economic world order without placing it under the control of an adequate political world order. Second, our political experts, influenced by the same bias, may attempt to create and maintain political institutions without giving them a solid foundation in an adequate system of popular education. If those dangers are not avoided, then the outcome of our struggle for the Four Freedoms will be the establishment of more than four slaveries. Our economic arrange-

ments will fail because they are not supported and controlled by adequate political institutions. Our political institutions will fail, because they are not rooted in the understanding and good will of their citizens. If those evils are allowed to come upon us, catastrophe is inevitable. The greatness of our opportunity will be the measure of the greatness of our failure to meet it.

The economic danger of which I have spoken can be very simply though, on this occasion, very abstractly indicated. It has to do with the choice between public and private control of business. If we say that an economic world order is created, what we are really saying is that some human mind, or some group of human minds, has taken control of the economic forces of our civilization. Order, as here used, means control. To say that the play of economic forces has become orderly is to say that someone has taken charge of them. Someone has so studied them, so measured and charted them that they can be directed to work together for the realization of assigned ends. Forces in themselves have no order. Order is a human contrivance. It is a human achievement. If, then, the world of business becomes a world of order, the first question to ask is: "Whose order is it? By what methods and toward what ends is it directed?"

And to that question two sharply different answers are possible. The control of the world's business may be in public hands or in private hands. It may be exercised with common consent or without common consent. It may belong to the common people or to the masters of the common people. If the first of these alternatives is adopted, if the production and distribution of the world's wealth is made subject to the common judgment, the common will of the citizens of the world, then world government, in some form or other, is established. But the danger which now threatens us is that our economic experts will lead us in the other direction. Men who through special knowledge have the inside track, and especially the shrewd and aggressive minds of our Anglo-American business world, will be sorely tempted, without the consent of their fellows, to take into their own hands the domination of the economic process. Such men do not always realize what they are doing. They commonly regard themselves not as our masters, but as the servants of natural forces which work through them. It is not by accident that the men who dominate our Anglo-American economic life have so generally believed in Natural Laws as governing human society. But that belief is, more or less unconsciously, simply a cover for the brutal fact of their own domination over the lives and fortunes of their fellows. These men, if they are not subjected to the authority of political institutions, will lead us into disaster. I do not on the whole challenge their good intentions. But I do challenge their understanding of what they are doing. I do not deny the need of economic leadership. But I do protest the futility of self-appointed, dictatorial leadership. Government, whether economic or political, must be by consent of the governed. If control is not public, then it is private. And a world economy in private hands means war—and war again. Only under a free world government is a free world economy possible. There is only one device by which human beings can escape the evils of dictatorship. That is by governing themselves.

But secondly, the enterprise of government has its own perplexities and dangers. If it be decided that an international economy is to be politically controlled, if its problems are to be dealt with by common consent, then all the difficulties of human education come rushing upon us. How shall the citizens of the world give consent, or refuse to give consent, to measures which they do not understand? Two thousand years ago, Epictetus stated the principle underlying this dilemma when he said: "The rulers of the state have said that only free men shall be educated; but God has said that only educated men shall be free."

Here, then, is the second, the greater danger which threatens the plans which our experts are making for the organization of the world. To arrange that a world government shall be conducted by the consent of the governed implies and requires a system of world education. If we are to have a free world community, the citizens of the world must learn what free institutions are and how under actual conditions they can be achieved. To say this is not to

deny that in the first instance the problems of an international society must be dealt with by "experts." These problems must be studied with all the finesse of scholarly investigation and with the wisdom which comes from wide political and economic experience. But for the purposes of free self government such study is not enough. The same problems must be studied on the popular level. "Experts" may recommend. But "citizens" must decide. And that means that the citizens of a world order have much learning to do. They must become able to comprehend and to pass judgment upon what their leaders say. Even more important than that, they must learn to know each other, to think together, to understand the common enterprise. In the last resort, political institutions can succeed only as they grow out of and give expression to fundamental agreements of idea and purpose. But that implies mutual acquaintance, mutual understanding — in short, a common education. A free world government is possible only if from one end of the world to the other, free men and women are engaged in widespread, well organized, and persistent study both of the *end* to be realized and of the *conditions* which are favorable and unfavorable to its realization. Just as a government must rule its business, so must a people rule its government. On any other basis than that we shall have dictatorship and with it the wars, the injustice, the slavery which dictatorship, whether open or concealed, inevitably brings.

II

IF now we turn from the negative side of our problem to its positive side, from the dangers which threaten post-war reconstruction to ways of overcoming those dangers, I venture to suggest how a beginning might be made in the establishment of a system of world education adequate for our economic and political needs. I have in mind the creating of an International Institute of Education, somewhat analogous in kind, though differing in function, to the International Labor Office in the planning of the League of Nations. The positive considerations from which that suggestion springs are somewhat as follows:

1. It is I think essential that from the start international planning shall include as an organic element in its procedure provision for general popular education. And, especially, teaching must be devised for those mature persons who are to have the rights and responsibilities of world citizenship. As men plan for a world order, economic, political, and educational institutions must grow together. We cannot practice justice and freedom unless we can teach them. To impose economic and political arrangements upon citizens who do not understand them is to plan for the renewal of world conflict.

2. The international education which we need cannot be limited to provision for intellectual co-operation among scholars. Nor can the need be met by the establishment of one or more universities. Scholarship is essential. But it is not sufficient. The task which lies before us is that of cultivating among all the common people of the world such knowledge and good will as will weld them together into an international community.

3. It follows from what has just been said that, in its initial stages at least, international teaching must be done chiefly in the field of adult education. The citizens of the world must learn what it means to be a citizen of the world. They must learn to use their minds, to enjoy using their minds, for the making of a free human society.

4. The education of which we are speaking must be, in the democratic sense, free. It must present to its pupils not the solution of a problem but the problem itself with all its perplexities. Such teaching forbids the use of propaganda. The common people of all countries must be led into a common study of a common enterprise in which they are together engaged.

5. It is equally certain—though the statement of the fact seems paradoxical—that in all countries the same basic education must be given. Amid all the varieties of circumstance, the same lessons are to be learned. Chinamen, Englishmen, Indians, Russians, Peruvians, Javanese—for all these the same fundamental problems must be presented, the same teaching methods applied, the same intellectual materials used. The first essential is that learners shall recognize that from one end of the world to the other the same human struggle to devise and maintain law and order is go-

ing on. To be educated is to be fitted to participate in that struggle.

On the basis of these considerations it is, I think, possible to draw in outline the form which an Institute of International Education might take. One can see also certain forms which it must not take.

1. The teaching we need cannot be given by the separate nations, acting separately. It must be given by the international organization itself as a fundamental part of its own procedure. All genuine education is initiation. It is the attempt of some social group to fit its members, old and young, for participation in the activities which the group is carrying on. The world government itself must study and teach what it is doing. No other group, no separate groups, can meet that responsibility.

2. It follows from what has just been said that the financial support of world teaching must come from the world government. That teaching must be free from all the restrictions and conditions which direct financial support from local or national sources might lay upon it. And in the same way the international organization must take direct and unqualified responsibility for the intellectual and administrative control of the teaching process. The world government must do its own studying, its own teaching.

3. The staff of an Institute of Education would be drawn in part from the administrative staff of the international organization. It would include also other scholars and teachers who are trained for the critical examination and interpretation of the principles of world order. If these two groups could be fused together into a unified faculty clearly aware of its responsibilities, we might achieve that integration of intellectual and practical activities which is so sadly lacking in much of the scholarly work, much of the teaching which is now going on.

4. The pupils of the Institute would be drawn from universities throughout the world. They would be young scholars who have completed in some special field of study the intellectual training ordinarily required for admission to teaching on the university level.

5. These young scholars would have at least a year of training at the Institute. They would study there the work of the international organization, its aims and methods, its general principles and its specific problems, its successes and its failures, its hopes and its fears. They would be fitted to become, in the forms of adult education, interpreters of what the international organization is trying to do.

6. On the completion of their training, the Institute would send these young scholars throughout the world as teachers of its citizens. Acting in collaboration with local authorities, they would go from community to community, staying two or three or even four months in each place. But the Institute would keep them in close touch with each other and with itself. It would endeavor to make of them a well-integrated teaching body, clearly aware of its own purposes, ready to promote the realization of those purposes in the midst of all the differences of circumstance into which they might come. These international interpreters would learn as well as teach. In them and in their work, the motives, the ideas of world peace and world justice would find an approach at least to adequate expression.

III

ANYONE who has engaged in actual teaching knows how fragmentary are the suggestions which I have made. The path of education is not an easy one. The task of devising and administering a scheme of education for the citizens of the world will be a long and perplexing one. And yet, fifty years of the achievements of adult education in many countries indicate the lines which we may at the beginning fruitfully follow. I mention here three of these:

1. As our teachers enter local communities, public meetings would be held at which various phases of the international enterprise would be presented, together with the intellectual materials bearing upon them. Such presentations would be supplemented by discussion at the meeting and on other occasions.

2. More important, however, than listening and discussing are the activities of careful and sustained study. To this end, small study groups would be formed in which leaders and pupils together would read and reflect upon the great books and the decisive documents in which international issues find their most enlightening formulations. The far-off goal of this method

would be that every adult citizen of an international society should be an active member of such a group. That goal will not soon be reached. But only as we approach it are we making headway toward an international society.

3. In the new forms of communication and travel, the radio, the film, et cetera, there are opening up vast new possibilities of teaching achievement. These must be tested and developed. They are for the first time in history making possible the creation in intellectual terms of a single, unified human society. In fact, so great are their promises and so great their dangers that they must not be allowed to develop without public criticism and control. They can be made to serve as instruments either for the elevation or for the degradation of the intelligence and generosity upon which in the last resort all human attempts at cooperation must rest. It would be a primary task of the Institute to explore and to develop the teaching possibilities of these agencies.

IV

As I close this plea for an Institute of Education in the field of world government, two final words must be spoken. The need which I have presented is immediate and urgent. If adult education is to be ready to play its part in post-war reconstruction, decisive action must be taken at once. It will not do to wait until the experts in economics and politics have finished their work. The plans for teaching must modify and be modified by all other types of planning. The Institute of Education must take form and assume responsibilities step by step with all the other agencies which will appear as the general project moves forward. To that end, official and unofficial conferences should be now under way. Too much time has already been lost.

As we plan for the education or re-education of the nations of the earth, let us not think it is only our enemies who will have new lessons to learn. That theme has been much played in these days of bitter strife. But in sober fact it must be said that if, as we hope, we are to be the victors in the world conflict, it will be we, rather than our foes, who stand in greater need of teaching. Defeat brings its own lessons. But victory in battle has never been a good teacher. And we Anglo-Americans have been terrifyingly successful in the struggles of the modern world. Seventy-five years ago, Matthew Arnold told in bitter, hopeless words the impenetrability of the successful British mind to the forces of education. "One has often wondered," he says, "whether upon the whole earth there is anything so unintelligent, so unapt to perceive how the world is really going, as an ordinary young Englishman of our upper class."

I quote these words not because of their peculiar reference to the ruling class of England. They apply to all individuals and to all nations who have won predominance over their fellows. The greatest danger to the United States is that as its power and success grow greater, there will come upon it the same blindness to its own need of education. The lessons of freedom and equality are not easy for nations accustomed to superiority and domination. It is the victors who must be educated. It is upon them that an International Institute of Education must lavish its efforts. It is idle to plan for a free world and, at the same time, to plan that we shall be masters of it. A free world is a world of equals. All men, all nations must be educated.

●

ALL of the papers read at the Conference of the World Confederation, as well as the noteworthy discussions from the floor, will be brought out in book form by the L. B. Fischer Publishing Company early in March as the third in the series of FREE WORLD Books. A list of those present at the Conference and at the dinner of the Confederation will be included. Participants who failed to register are invited to send in their names.

Roots of Co-operation

By LI YU YING

THE World Confederation of International Groupments is the result or the crystallization of world co-operative tendencies. These tendencies have not come into being in New York today; nor were they born in Europe or Asia yesterday. They do not belong to any particular country, nor to any particular period; they belong to the whole world and to all times. If we turn back to the Eighteenth century, we find them in the activity of Benjamin Franklin in France and of Lafayette in America. Both expressed the same tendency for international world co-operation which we are expressing today. Further back, in ancient times, we can discern these tendencies in the federative organization of Greek cities. And even their organization is not the first expression of federalism. The fact is that the universal and philosophic concept of confederation started with the history of the world, whenever and wherever men began to realize the purpose of life and feel the need for co-operation.

After many years of thought and reflection based on the experience of past centuries we have come today to a more precise form of a World Confederation of International Groupments. And this, too, is neither the beginning nor the end of our endeavors. The world, like our confederation, is a whole and a continuity. A whole in the sense of one for all and all for one; a continuity in the sense of a succession of epochs, nebulous, geologic, prehistoric, historic, and so on up to the infinite.

The various international groupments have roots so deep that it is difficult to determine from where they came and where they are going. Like the ancient groups and societies of Greece and Egypt, like the Humanists of England and the Encyclopedists of France, like the American Federalists or the Republicans of China—and so many others—they are groups which express our ideas and ideals in manifest or implied form. Like deep springs they have communicated with each other underground.

The names of these groups are only their outward manifestation. It does not matter to what nationality they belong. What really matters is that what their names stood for progressed with time toward a better expression of their ideals, toward a greater and better fraternity of men. This fraternity always exists, even when men are not fully conscious of it and even when they do not understand each other. First Europe established this fraternal contact with Asia; later, the old hemisphere with the new. Mutual co-operation has been practised from the beginnings of time, from the lowest rung of the ladder by which humanity climbed to the present state of civilization—as Prince Kropotkin has so authoritatively demonstrated.

We individuals, communities, groups—however diverse we may know ourselves to be—we still understand each other, and we shall help each other to develop this fraternity of co-operation without which society will experience nothing but tragedy and disaster—wars of classes, wars of nations and races. These wars ravaged mankind in the past. They are ravaging it now. And it is imperative that they should cease forever and that we should establish a new era of security and of peace in the widest sense of the word with the fullest social as well as international application. The word, justice—not only political, economic, and international but also universal—must play the most important role in this endeavor.

What is the essential nature of the Con-

federation which is gathered here? This great Confederation is not the final form in which we shall eventually see it. It is a psychological condition which is part and parcel of the world, of nature, and of all human knowledge and experience. It is a potential organization so vast that it permits all the individuals and all the groups of the world to find refuge within its encompassing protection, not only today but in the days to come.

During and after this war, which we hope will be the last, a federation of United Nations will be established. It does not matter under what name. The fact is that it will certainly exist as a federation or confederation of governments. But in order that it could accomplish its purpose there must exist another federation—a popular federation or confederation of peoples, founded on their mutual understanding.

Allow me to make clear the distinction between the two kinds of federations—the governmental federation, on the one hand, and the popular federation, on the other. These two systems are complementary. They must work together like the wheels of a bicycle, facilitating and accelerating the progress of the world. Their collaboration is the very essence of the federative principle, for federalism is not only a political and economic but also—and above all—a social and moral system. The federative system cannot be conceived without the great moral principle of mutuality, recognized and advocated by the French philosopher, Proudhon, and the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat Sen. Today we are clearing the ground for this popular federation-to-come without which the federation of the United Nations, or any governmental federation, cannot become a working system. I am happy to be able to contribute, together with my friends, to the construction of the bridge leading from its conception to its concrete realization.

President Roosevelt has insisted greatly on the Four Freedoms and Vice-President Wallace has also shown us the price of these freedoms. Together they have indicated some of the definitions of the federative principle. While federalism will not be easily achieved, it must not be regarded as something utopian or extreme. On the contrary, it is the middle road which, if pursued with sufficient wisdom, can lead us to happiness. Wisdom consists in accepting relative satisfaction. It is right that in our society everyone should be relatively satisfied, but no one ought to have absolute satisfaction. For, if there is an individual or a group or a nation or a continent, that seeks to obtain 100 per cent of satisfaction, it will be only at the expense of others. This is what we must avoid and what we shall not be able to avoid except through a universal federation.

It is therefore necessary that all individuals and all groups accept this principle, and that all of them make an effort at self-education in order to absorb and make their own the spirit of common culture and to spread it, as a drop of oil spreads over water, over the surface of the entire world. But such a task cannot be dictated by a rigid authority. It must be accomplished by the peoples themselves, though they can be helped greatly by their governments. That is the role of the World Confederation of International Groupments, a role that calls for co-operation between both the governmental and the popular federations.

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

The Goatherd and the Goat

A GOATHERD, trying to drive one of the animals back to the flock, threw a stone and broke the goat's horn.

"Don't you dare tell the Master," he warned the goat.

Said the goat: "That broken horn can speak for itself."

Responsibilities *of the* United States *in the* Post-War World

By QUINCY WRIGHT

THE question whether and to what extent we want our country to participate in the organization of the world for peace suggests a number of inquiries. We might inquire as to the present state of public opinion in the country. Do the American people want peace? Gallup polls show that they do, unless the country is attacked. Only a small minority favored war before Pearl Harbor. Even those who wanted to intervene usually took this position because they thought it would make for permanent peace.

As a matter of fact, the division between the interventionists and the isolationists did not concern the general desirability of peace, but rather the best means for attaining it. The isolationists thought peace could be obtained by running away from war. They favored neutrality in the presence of foreign war, and the more pacifist wing favored the brand of neutrality adopted in the legislation enacted from 1935 to 1937 which abandoned the profits of neutral trade in the interests of commercial and financial isolation which they believed would eliminate certain causes of war. The interventionists on the other hand thought history supported the proposition that peace cannot be obtained by running away from war. They considered it necessary that every country assume responsibility for the prevention and suppression of aggression, and for organizing the world for progress and justice. With these developments of the world order they hoped that peace might be obtained as a by-product.

The opinion of the interventionists is at the present time generally accepted. Most people assume that peace can only be secured by organizing the world, and the issue is, are Americans prepared to participate in such organization. Gallup and other polls indicate that an increasing number of people have become convinced of the Wilsonian thesis and are ready to enter a new League of Nations. In fact, a larger proportion are ready to enter such a League if stronger sanctions are provided than existed in the Geneva institution.

In the political struggles of 1919 and 1920, there were some who rejected the Covenant because they thought it created too strong an international organization and impaired national sovereignty too much. There were others who rejected it because they thought it was too weak and would not be able to accomplish the purposes for which it was designed. Apparently twenty years' reflection has turned opinion toward the latter view. People are ready to sacrifice elements of military, economic, and legal sovereignty in order that the sovereignty remaining may be more adequately enjoyed under the shelter of a

world organization strong enough to do the job.

Opinion today favors American participation in effective world organization, but what will be the trend of opinion on this question after the war? And what ought to be done now to assure a suitable opinion at that time?

Judging by experience, we can expect enthusiasm for world organization to wane when the fighting is over. The United Nations and the ideal of a universal commonwealth which can institute "the century of the common man" appeal at a moment when we are assuming such overwhelming responsibilities in waging war, that the future burdens of participation in world government seem slight indeed. We may expect, however, that, as in 1919, a great weariness of responsibility will sweep this and other countries when the task of defeating aggression is achieved. Unless the public is educated to a more fundamental appreciation of the need than it was in 1919, it may slip back into the easy rut of isolationism. That task of education must be undertaken during the war, or it will be too late. The people of the United States—in fact, the people of all the United Nations—must know the kind of world they want if they are to maintain the morale necessary to win the war, and even more they must know the kind of world they want if they are to continue that morale to win the peace.

The world as a whole is a large thing to look at, and yet a conception of the world as a whole must find its way into the minds of common people here and everywhere if an effective world organization is to be built. No one can view the world in all its detail and all its richness. A conception of it can only be carried in mind if significant features are selected and pieced together to make a picture which though simplified sufficiently conforms to the general nature of our world to be useful. Public opinion forms itself about simple symbols which can be understood. Often these symbols are so remote from reality that public action is bound to fail in its purposes. Symbols must be simple, but they must be relatively true. What are the essential features of the world in which we live?

II

SINCE the collapse of the medieval system resting upon the idea of a unified Christendom pyramiding up to the Pope or emperor, the structure of world politics has been that of the balance of power. Sovereign states have preserved their independence, not by reliance upon law but by reliance upon military and political power. Each government has been alert to prevent the dangerous growth of a neighbor by utilization of alliances and war. As a result, though many ambitious sovereigns have attempted world conquest, none has been able in the last four centuries to succeed. Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Napoleon, and the Kaiser —each made considerable headway in enlarging power and subverting its neighbors, but each in the long run failed because of the operation of the balance of power. In each of these cases it was England which took the lead in organizing alliances, subsidies, and expeditions to frustrate the aims of these would-be world conquerors. England was able to do this because it occupied a relatively secure insular position; it maintained a dominant navy supported by a priority in industry and finance; it supported a relatively liberal economic policy; and it had renounced since the Hundred Years War territorial ambitions in Europe. As a reward for preserving the balance of power in Europe, Britain was able to maintain a dominant position overseas for two centuries.

The balance of power as the basic structure of world order gave moderate stability during the nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century, far from giving stability, it has been a major cause of two world wars. What changes account for this?

The immediate reason undoubtedly lies in the changed position of Great Britain. Its capacity to serve as the balancer has been greatly diminished through a decline in the relative invulnerability of the British Isles to attack consequent upon the development of the submarine and the airplane. The dominant position of British sea power has furthermore been affected by changes in naval architecture and by the rise of powerful navies in the United States and Japan. Similarly, the dominant posi-

tion of British financial and commercial power has been challenged by other states, especially the United States and Germany. Great Britain will not again be in the position to maintain a stable equilibrium in world politics.

There are, however, many who suggest that if Britain cannot perform the function of a balancer, the United States can. The United States, it is argued, still remains relatively invulnerable to immediate attack, and, with its tremendous industrial and potential military power, is in a position by making alliances, subsidizing other countries, and intervening when necessary in Europe and Asia to prevent the rise of a dangerous aggressor. American writers utilizing the German concept of *Geopolitik* have insisted that our position is favorable for such a policy. They suggest that we follow the policy which Canning advocated for England a century and a quarter ago of remaining isolated except when exigent circumstances demand intervention. With such a policy, an assured leadership of the other countries of the Western Hemisphere and a friendly attitude toward the members of the British Commonwealth contributing bases for operations near Europe and Asia, they believe an American century might be initiated in which prosperity would extend and the wars of states in Europe and Asia would be localized geographically and economically.

There are, however, conditions which make the realization of such a policy extremely doubtful. Changes in the technique of war have resulted for the time being in augmentation of the power of the offensive. Most important is the invention of the airplane, which has shattered the significance of distances, weakened all varieties of defense, and made civilian populations and industry directly vulnerable to attack. In the days when war could operate in only two dimensions, small states with moderate armies could defend themselves against attack at least until a great ally could come to their aid. Under these conditions the prospect of successful aggression even by powerful states was limited. With modern military instruments the *Blitzkrieg* can overrun small states in a few days or even hours. Therefore, unless the balance of defense and offense is restored in military affairs, the prospects of successful aggression will seem excellent to ambitious rulers. This war may possibly prove that in the long run aggression does not pay, but only at the expense of world-wide war inflicting tremendous losses upon all the populations. Under such conditions of warfare the position of a balancer in a balance of power world would be extremely expensive and the opportunities for prosperity and progress in such a world would be limited.

Furthermore, war has become extraordinarily industrialized. Whereas formerly a country had to devote only one per cent of its population and perhaps five per cent of its economy to the conduct of war, under modern conditions practically the entire man power and economy have to be devoted directly or indirectly to war. This industrialization, however, has not only increased the general participation in war while the war is on. It has also required much more elaborate preparations before the war begins. A country, if it is to wage war efficiently, must prepare intensively for five or six years. During this period, as illustrated in the development of Germany under Hitlerism, the population and economy of the country must concern itself primarily with war. The people must devote themselves to the production of guns rather than butter. If wars are to occur every twenty-five years, if they last four or five years, and if this period is to be preceded by five or six years of intensive preparation for war and to be followed by eight or ten years of recovery from war, very little time remains for the normal development of peaceful industry. Economy must be permanently devoted to preparation for war. It will no longer be possible to maintain relative freedom of trade while playing power politics. Power politics has required that the national economy be devoted to economic warfare, not to economic welfare.

It is for this reason that during the last fifty years states have tended toward higher barriers to trade and vain attempts at more self-sufficient economies, foregoing the advantages of geographic division of labor. This has meant the disruption of industries and lowering of standards of living. This in turn has fomented social unrest, which

together with intensive preparations for war and the general expectation of war has made for revolution, instability, and the rapid spreading of war once it breaks out. Under the conditions of modern industrialized war a world based upon the balance of power tends toward militarization, impoverishment, and instability.

Another phenomenon of the last century has been the rise of democracy. This also has militated against stability in the balance of power. Democracies are unfitted to participate effectively in the game of power politics. That game requires that considerations of power go ahead of considerations of domestic welfare, that diplomacy be conducted with speed and secrecy, and that war be always available as an instrument of policy. Democracy, however, implies that policy be devoted to national welfare and individual freedom, that decisions be taken publicly and by deliberate procedures, and that war be renounced as an instrument of policy. Reflection upon the characteristics of democracy and of autocracy in the conduct of foreign affairs, and upon the experience of the last few years, makes it clear that in the great game of power politics autocracies are at a great advantage. They are in a position to bluff, to threaten, to prepare, and to utilize force and fraud efficiently. Though they may eventually lose wars, they generally win in the diplomatic and military preparations for war, and in the early stages of war, thus compelling the Democracies to endure enormous sacrifices and to become in a measure autocracies themselves if they are to win in the long run.

While it is true that Great Britain has long been one of the most democratic of countries in its domestic affairs, and while it is true that Great Britain effectively conducted a balance of power policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is also true that during most of this time British foreign policy was affected to only a slight degree by parliamentary and democratic institutions. In fact, one circumstance in recent years which has militated against effective conduct of power politics by Great Britain is the rise of the influence of Parliament and of the Labor party in the shaping of foreign policy. Not only is democracy unfitted in technique to conduct power politics effectively, it is unfitted in its moral foundations. Democracy is government by public opinion, and the public thinks in terms of moral principles, always finding it difficult to make the dubious shifts and turns required for the balancing of power. Sound balance of power policy may have required in 1935 the Hoare-Laval agreement sacrificing Ethiopia, but public announcement of this proposal was such a shock to public opinion in Great Britain and the other Democracies that it was impossible to carry out. The United States with its checks and balances, its free manifestations of public opinion, and its bias against secrecy, power politics and diplomatic perfidy, would be peculiarly unfitted to play the balance of power game efficiently.

III

If stability cannot be restored under the balance of power system, what alternatives are available? Only two have been suggested—a world empire and a world federation of nations. Hitler is following the example of Louis XIV, Napoleon, and the Kaiser in attempting to build a world empire by conquest, but he hopes to have the greater success which followed the similar efforts of the first Chinese emperor Ch'in, of the Indian Chandragupta, of Alexander and of Caesar in earlier times. They succeeded in destroying balance of power systems which had existed for centuries and unifying civilizations by conquest. Nearly all civilizations in the past, whether in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, or the Mediterranean have eventually been unified by the method of conquest, a method, however, which has had within it the seeds of its own destruction. If history can serve as a guide, the immediate success of Hitler's efforts would only mean the stagnation and eventual decay of the present world civilization.

Efforts have been made during the course of several civilizations to federate the states, but these efforts have never succeeded with respect to civilization as a whole. The leagues of ancient Greece never included the whole of the Hellenic civilization, nor did the leagues of ancient China, of medieval Italy, or of modern states. If the United Nations succeed in federating the

states of the modern world, they will be accomplishing a new step in the progress of man. It is a task the difficulties of which must not be minimized, and yet it is a task, the preservation of diversity in unity, which must be accomplished if we are to lift ourselves from the unworkable balance of power without falling into a disastrous world empire.

The long development of international law and the experience of the League of Nations give us grounds for hope. A steady progress was made from the times of Francis of Victoria, Albericus Gentili, and Hugo Grotius, the founders of international law, to that of Woodrow Wilson in organizing states under law. But the international law accepted in the chancelleries of the world was not able to supersede the balance of power as the fundamental structure of world organization. The states followed international law except in important matters of high politics. In these they departed from international law and pursued the precepts of weakening the overpowerful, even though that state had committed no violation of law. The inconsistency of a law which presented no remedy for its most serious violations was perceived, but the insistence of states upon their sovereignty prevented in modern times as it did in ancient Greece the only remedy, that of more effective political organization of the community of states to sustain the law. A law which rests primarily upon self-help necessarily degenerates into a balance of power and a balance of power becomes unworkable with the progress of civilization.

The League of Nations was an attempt to organize collective security, but an attempt which rested upon contracts of governments whose policy was determined by national public opinions. The experience of the League has taught that such a body must rest upon a world public opinion if it is to have the power necessary for its functioning. If the attempt at world federalism which the United Nations have set as their ideal is to suceed, it must culminate in a universal organization capable of giving security through law. There is more danger of too much timidity than of too much boldness. Reliance of states upon an organization that is too weak may be worse than reliance upon a balance of power. A future Ethiopia or Czechoslovakia is not likely to rely upon a league of nations, unless that institution enjoys more political power than did the Geneva institution in 1935 and 1938.

IV

SPACE does not permit an examination in detail of the steps necessary to give adequate strength to such a League, but a few points may be noted.

1. The world organization must rest on a world public opinion, and not merely upon the contracts of governments. People must feel themselves world citizens, not merely citizens of their states. They must picture the world as a federal order, not as an anarchy or an equilibrium of absolutely sovereign states. Political science has come to recognize that political power eventually rests upon public opinion. Dictators, through controlling the instruments of communication, are able to make public opinion, whereas Democracies, permitting the freedom of information and expression, create conditions in which public opinion can develop through discussion and the activities of private associations. In either case, however, public utilization of the force of the community to prevent internal sedition and external invasion depends upon the existence at the moment of a public opinion prepared to support, or at least to acquiesce, in such utilization. If public opinion is hostile to a particular law, that law cannot be enforced effectively.

An organization of governments, which are themselves dependent upon national public opinions, will fail to function in respect to a nation whose public opinion is opposed to the decision of the international organization. Governments cannot be expected to commit political suicide, and the observance of international covenants might have that result in case the opinion upon which the power of the government rests opposes the application of the international covenants. Thus an effective international organization must have behind its system for the making, application, and enforcement of international law a public opinion throughout the world ready to support the world organization even when

in a particular instance its decisions appear to run counter to the national interests. Such a world public opinion can only develop if the leaders of opinion in every country are intellectually convinced that, in present circumstances of world interdependence, the effective functioning of international organization is necessary, and if the public in every country is emotionally prepared to give spontaneous support to the decisions of international institutions.

2. The world organization must be universal. No power can be permitted to refuse to enter or to resign. An effective League must be a permanent union to which the people have committed themselves. The weakness of the League of Nations Covenant, which permitted states to withdraw when dissatisfied with the decisions of League organs, was only too obvious. The situation would be similar if an individual, when accused of crime, were able to renounce his state, and thereby to escape the jurisdiction of the national courts. It has been too frequently forgotten that the observance of contracts depends upon a system of law which itself rests upon firmer foundations than contract. Contracts acquire meaning only when interpreted according to the standards and procedures of a system of law, and they acquire stability only when enforced by the authority of the law. The effort to create the fundamental law itself purely by contract is therefore bound to fail. This position has been recognized by international lawyers, who generally realize that international law, if it is to be law at all, must rest not merely upon the agreement and consent of states, but also upon the existence of a universal community based upon fundamental legal concepts which no state can repudiate. It is true that confederations have at times existed in which the right of secession by the member states was recognized, but such confederations have proved to be unsatisfactory, temporary institutions, unless they developed into true unions recognized as permanent and resting upon the loyalty of the people, and not merely upon the contracts of the states. Democracies, it is true, should utilize the principle of consent of the governed, to the utmost, but that principle is relative. Democracy cannot survive unless in emergencies the whole can maintain its fundamental constitution against nullification by the parts.

3. The world organization must, therefore, have central agencies controlling force stronger than that of any national government. This force, however, must be so hedged about with legal restrictions that it can only be used for the purpose of preventing nullification and aggression. Needless to say, such an organization of collective security must reduce the military sovereignty of states, but it must not create a military sovereignty of the world. The problem of an adequate distribution both of legal and of political power is a basic problem of all federations. While a federation cannot survive unless it is supported by an adequate public opinion, this public opinion cannot function unless it has at its disposal instruments adequate to deal with a revolting or nullifying state. Within its sphere, the power of the central authorities must be adequate, however much that sphere may be limited. Such limitations, preserving a high degree of independence to the states, are necessary because of the dependence of progress upon a variety of cultural experiments. The national states must be free to develop their own cultures in their own ways, and for this reason the scope of world authority must be limited to those matters which are essential for the preservation of the world order. It is possible that an equilibrium between the power of the whole and the power of the parts, capable of sustaining the division of legal authority, could be achieved by giving the world order exclusive control of air forces, whereas the land forces and domestic police authority would be in the hands of the national states. Such land forces, however, should be reduced in power of aggression through limitations in the possession of tanks, heavy mobile artillery, and other aggressive weapons. Commitments by the naval powers to use their forces internationally only at the request of the world authority, might further contribute to the stability of the world constitution.

4. The world organization must establish adequate institutions and procedures, both to settle international disputes and to modify international law as changing con-

ditions require. No league organized to perpetuate any *status quo* can last. Thus along with the maintenance of its laws, the world order must establish efficient procedures of peaceful change, procedures which cannot be frustrated by one or a small number of dissident states, but which can prevent the enactment of laws not supported by world public opinion. It is clear that fundamental justice requires that the subjects of law should not be judges in their own cases. One of the most serious weaknesses of international law has been that states have been permitted to judge their own cases unless they had explicitly agreed to accept an international jurisdiction. This must be modified, and the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice must be made obligatory in principle for all states. But with such obligatory jurisdiction supported by an adequate police force, the *status quo* would be perpetuated unless efficient means for modifying international law were developed.

The problem of international legislation is the most difficult problem of world organization. It seems doubtful whether a universal parliament of man can be created. It is more likely that a number of legislative authorities each competent within a limited sphere will be established. There might, for instance, be an international body to deal with international commercial and financial problems, representing the states and interests in that particular field. There might be another body, organized on a quite different basis, to deal with international political relations, such as problems of boundaries and armaments. Other legislative authorities dealing with health, with instruments of international communication, and with the protection of human rights might require a different system of representation and of voting. The International Labor Organization, with its representation of labor and industrial organizations as well as of states, suggests the special types of organizations which might exist in these various international bodies. In all of these, however, the procedure of voting should be such that no single state can prevent legislation which commands the support of world public opinion. The scope of each of these organizations should of course be defined by the general world constitution, and problems of conflicting jurisdiction could well be settled by the World Court or by a world assembly with general supervisory authority.

It is clear that all of these developments depend upon the creation of an effective world public opinion which brings the individual in direct contact with the world order. To facilitate such a sense of world citizenship, the world order should itself guarantee fundamental human rights and should also punish individuals for crimes against the world community. It is the task of the United Nations while the war is still in progress to initiate the evolution of a world public opinion, and to this end to proclaim the fundamental Bill of Human Rights and the basic offenses for which individuals should be punished under world authority. The United Nations have already taken steps to achieve these goals, and to provide the conditions of an effective world order.

THE COMING EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR



by Maurice English

ON THE AFTERNOON of August 27, 1941, there was a military ceremony in the parade-grounds of the Borgnis-des-Bordes barracks at Versailles, France. The Nazis were busy mounting their "Anti-Bolshevik Crusade," and several thousand French volunteers took part in a march-past in honor of certain guests from the staff of the German Army of Occupation. These guests were accompanied by the two show-animals from the French kennel of Quislings: Pierre Laval and Marcel Déat. The occasion was one for mutual felicitation between conqueror and "collaborationist"; it seemed to set a seal on the policy of Franco-German rapprochement.

At this moment in their history, the self-respect of the French people was saved by a young man who suddenly stepped out of his place in the files of the "volunteers" and aimed a series of shots at the review platform. This young man was Paul Colette. He was neither a Communist nor a "British agent." What gave his gesture its full meaning was the fact that Colette deliberately ignored the German officers on the reviewing-stand—"They were only doing their duty in being there," he remarked later. But he unhesitatingly levelled his revolver at his countrymen, Laval and Déat.

This action of Colette, who struck his blow not at the conqueror but at his own fellow-countryman, the collaborationist, is symbolic of what has been going on in almost every country of Europe. In Amsterdam, crowds jostle and sometimes assault native storm-troopers of Adrian Mussert, the ersatz Dutch Nazi. In Yugoslavia, Serb guerrillas and Croatian Fascists spend their days and nights in alternate raids and ambushes. In Transylvania, a double fatherland, Rumanians and Hungarians are tranced into a temporary truce only by awe of their common master, Adolf Hitler. And in Norway, a newspaper controlled by Major Vidkun Quisling describes the situation as "a civil war without weapons."

An apocalyptic vision is beginning to take shape in the tragic theater which lies between the sands of Africa and the battlefields of the Caucasus. The "land of silent people" is not one segment of the continent, but all of it; and this silent, hungry, desperate Europe has never in the past known a major conflict which did not explode into civil war in the end. And it has never in the past known a major conflict that embraced so much of its territory, re-

duced the majority of men to such misery, or divided them so absolutely. The first World War was followed by civil wars, including several in Germany alone, and a series of revolutions ranging from republican to communist. There was street-fighting in Austria, and a Communist Soviet in Hungary. From the Mediterranean to the Baltic, Slavic and Balkan communists and nationalists waged a series of fratricidal struggles which did not die out until after the Versailles Peace had been signed.

With our eyes fixed on the Far East and Russia, and on our own preparations, we do not realize that civil war is already raging in some parts of Europe, or we mistake the signs of this civil war for mere gestures of resistance to the invader, and nothing more. The world of officials even sometimes talks glibly about the enslaved nations of Europe having rediscovered their unity in opposition to Hitler. In most cases, it is actually the contrary which is true.

Look at the map of Europe: Of how many nations can it be said that their inhabitants are deeply and fundamentally reunited by resistance to the Nazi invader?

In a perfectly true sense, the French civil war is already on. The anti-Bolshevik "Crusaders" recruited by Paris are fighting against Russia, side by side with the Germans and Italians. The Free Frenchmen of General de Gaulle turn up in Commando Raids on Dieppe, in RAF sweeps over the channel, or fight with the British in Africa. These Frenchmen of General de Gaulle's are the military enemies of the French "anti-Bolshevik forces" of Vichy and Paris, and of every Frenchman who favors appeasement, just as truly as though they were fighting face to face. Pétain knew this when he ordered the death penalty for De Gaulle, and Hitler when he threatened that Frenchmen who continued fighting after the Armistice would be shot upon capture.

Young Colette's shots at Laval and Déat might be said to be the prelude to civil war on France's metropolitan soil; elsewhere the French civil war had already begun. From Alsace and Lorraine, thousands of loyal Frenchmen, faced with an option between Hitler's Reich and exile, chose the latter and abandoned their homes, their goods, and their traditions to move into the occupied zone. The fall of Hitler will provide the opportunity for these exiles—including whole sections of cities as large as Strassbourg—to return to claim their property, now in the hands of people who from one standpoint or another, abandoned France when it fell. There have been exodi and homecomings of populations in other wars, but it is doubtful if Europe has often seen anything like the prospect which a nazi defeat holds out for Alsace and Lorraine, when thousands of Frenchmen may be expected to descend on the locusts now settled in the rich cities and fruitful valleys of France's eastern marches.

The Civil War which can be predicted for the rest of Europe, remains endemic in Spain. It is only the harshness of the Spanish censorship, the most rigid in Europe, that prevents the outside world from getting word of the occasional clashes between "bandits" and soldiery, and the rumors of troop movements in the interior of Spain which are common gossip in the legations of Madrid. The actions of the Spanish Government are those of a government which feels that it is living in a state of siege, as the country itself quite literally is. Secret executions are an established feature of Phalangist justice, as Merry del Val, former head of the Foreign Press Service, admitted quite frankly when he told me in Madrid that the execution of Reds was a frequent occurrence in Madrid and other cities.

In terms of random forays by guerrillas in the Asturian mountains, of savage reprisals by Civil Guards and Spanish soldiery for acts of "banditry," and in terms of sullen, unshakable passive resistance by half the population, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 has never ended. The fever is still in the flesh. Government officials will privately admit that there are at least half a million prisoners in Spain as a result of the Civil War. Any observer who has seen how many of the wives and children of these men are begging in the streets will not challenge this figure as an exaggeration.

For the prisoners themselves, the Franco government has inaugurated a "rehabilitation program" that enables those who renounce their allegiance to the Republic to

work out their sentences, which are reduced in some cases by as much as two-thirds. An ardent admirer of Franco's Government admitted to me, out of personal knowledge, that the number of prisoners who had accepted the terms of this rehabilitation program up to January, 1941, was not more than 30,000—out of half a million or more.

Incidentally, though Spain has been on short rations longer than any country in Europe, it was not until virtually every other government—including some neutrals—had done so, that the Franco Government enforced rationing in the de luxe restaurants, at the doors of which miserable beggars used to group to beg alms. I myself have seen beggar women and their children turned away, a few days after a law against mendicancy was passed, from public shelters which lacked food and room to offer them. In reality, Spain is like a man strapped hand and foot, and too weakened by hunger and loss of blood to burst free. When his bonds are loosened by the destruction of nazism, this sick man will have his mind set on a frenzy of revenge.

II

THE potential battlefields of the coming European civil war are limited only by the number of countries which have escaped totalitarian enslavement. Resistance to Hitler has given a negative unity to Poland, in the sense that Jews and Poles know that they are faced with a common destiny, and even the Ukrainian nationalists are finding out that they have no favors to expect from Berlin. But anti-nazism has not automatically resolved the contradictions which made Poland itself a fascist regime before September, 1939.

Nor has anti-fascism unified what was left of Czechoslovakia after Munich; rather, it drove a final wedge into what remained of the dismembered Republic. Since 1938, millions of Czechs have watched the career of a fascistized Slovak state which has made common cause with their deadly enemies. There are Czechs in the armies of the United Nations; there are Slovak regiments fighting with the *Wehrmacht* in Russia.

The center of what has been called "Hitler's Third Front—the front of revolt," is Yugoslavia. But the Yugoslav war against Hitler is already mixed up with a civil war, or what might even be described as a welter of civil wars, in an extravaganza of fratricide such as even Balkan Europe has seldom seen. In terms of the old kingdom of Yugoslavia, there is a civil war between the Serbs and the Croat Ustachi, that ultra-nationalist group which has made common cause with nazism and fascism, and which maintains a Quislingite Government in Zagreb. It is less commonly realized that there is also a civil war in Croatia itself between the Ustachi and anti-fascist Croats, and in Serbia between the Serb patriots and the collaborationist Serb government in Belgrade.

The government radio of Zagreb, capital of the new Croatia, has broadcast reports of fighting between Croat Moslems and anti-fascist Croat irregulars. This radio has also repeatedly denounced deserters from the nazi-dominated Croat army, whom it has accused of "menacing the security and internal order of the country." Last November, newspaper reports revealed that Field Marshal Milan Nedic, head of the nazi-dominated regime in Belgrade, had led a "punitive expedition" to suppress General Mikhailovitch's forces. The failure of this expedition prolonged Serbian guerrilla fighting not only against the Germans and Croat-Fascists, but also against those Serbians of Field Marshal Nedic's allegiance. Meanwhile in Bosnia, and in the Moslem districts of Yugoslavia, thousands of Serbs are said to have been slain or driven out of their villages by the Croats since the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Two remarkable glimpses into the situation in Yugoslavia were given by Associated Press dispatches filed from Zagreb. The first of these dispatches—which, remember, was passed by the nazi censor there—contained this sentence: "Politically and militarily, the situation here is described as strikingly similar to that which resulted in Germany in the blood purge of June, 1934."

The second dispatch may be read as an indication of the pattern that similar stories from other parts of Europe may eventually follow:

> Information reaching here from points throughout Axis-dismembered Yugoslavia indicates a situation charged with distrust,

unrest, terrorism, and even in some cases, virtual civil war. Well-equipped soldiers of the puppet Serb Government, supported by the German army of occupation, are described as engaged in desperate fighting with remnants of Yugoslavia's army, rebellious Chetnik guerrilla units, and what are described as communist bands. . . . Field Marshal Nedic, the Serb Premier, has himself appealed for a halt in the fighting, warning recently that full-fledged civil war was developing.

Yugoslavia is, of course, not the only country where civil war is anticipating the downfall of Hitler, and is carried on simultaneously with resistance to the occupation forces. Rumania broke into violent internal revolt at the moment when King Carol's departure forecast the subjugation of his kingdom to the Axis. This revolt raged bloodily while the German Army occupied the country, and even after Rumanian troops had joined in the attack on Russia. Early this year, the German radio broadcast a warning to Rumanian soldiers who had returned from the Russian war zone and had failed to surrender their arms. The warning stated that unless they did so within ten days, they would be executed "even if the reason for neglecting to surrender arms was not a political one."

Transylvania, the border-march between Hungary and Rumania, claimed by each with an equal fervor of patriotism, is occupied by a hopelessly mixed population, which in addition to Hungarians and Rumanians, includes a scrambling of Slavs, Germans, and Jews. In August, 1940, Germany and Italy resorted to forced arbitration to settle the secular blood-feud between Hungary and Rumania over Transylvania. Half of the region was turned over to Hungary, and the occupants of the ceded territory, as well as the Hungarians in that part of Transylvania which remained Rumanian, were given the choice between deportation and change of allegiance. Rumania and Hungary both stake their national policies on the possession of Transylvania. There is every reason to believe that they are merely waiting for the destruction of the "arbitrators," to resume their own traditional form of arbitrating territorial disputes.

III

In January of this year, the Norwegian newspaper *Oslo Aftenposten,* published an article which asked why there was not wholesale civil war in Norway. This newspaper, a mouthpiece of Quislings, gave the following answer: "We Norwegians could not come to active war because firearms were taken away from us while there was yet time. Nevertheless, there is no other way out than an open fight, although without weapons." The *Aftenposten* then asked the question whether Quisling's followers should "remain on the defensive or attack." Again, its own answer was: "We are going into action. . . . We have no other choice."

Here is a quotation from another Quisling organ, *Folkets Roest,* discussing the "oppositionists," i.e., loyal Norwegians: "If one happens to talk to these oppositionists, they say frankly that we are traitors to our country. We are asked whether we realize what fate awaits us when help from England comes, and *we are told who will then be eliminated.*"

The seaboard nations of Europe, on the farthest fringes of the nazi empire, supply additional battlefields of the coming civil war. Most of these nations have now littered a profusion of puppet dictators, imitation storm-troopers, nazified industrialists, and labor-leaders who have learned to kiss the jackboot. Mussert in the Netherlands, De Man and De Grelle in Belgium—these are inconsequential men, but each of them has his little contingent of traitors and the German occupation troops to back them up in the state of desperation they will know when they see their pathological Bonaparte trapped at last, and all the knives of Europe at their throats.

Italy today appears too dispirited for the toils of civil war and revolution. The country is like a temple where a weary and cynical assembly sits waiting for its middle-aged Samson to bring down the Pillars. The Italians, it is true, have always been the most reluctant people in Europe to indulge in passionate nationalism; but it would be a mistake to conclude from this fact that an awakening will not come, and come violently.

Consider the Italian Army. Tricked, frozen, and massacred in Greece, abandoned in Ethiopia, wrecked in the sands of Libya, derided by its own Ally, this Army has a terrible account to settle with the Fascist party which brought it into the war by an act of treachery, and finally sold it to complete subservience to the *Wehrmacht*. Information from inside Italy makes it clear that the Italian people are stung by their humiliating role, and that underground movements already exist which are paving the way for civil war. That was the official interpretation put by the Fascist Government itself on the activities of the Italians who were tried at Trieste for subversive activities extending as far back as 1938. It is confirmed by numerous reports, some of which may be taken as straws in the wind rather than literal truth, that both communist and nationalist groups are organized throughout the Italian peninsula.

IV

BUT the greatest battlefield of the civil war will, of course, be Germany. Premonitions of that war have already been felt in the past, in the struggle which has gone on between the army and the Nazi party. Its victims have ranged from General von Fritsch and his friends to the coterie around Ernst Roehm, and some of the twenty-six generals who have died since the war began may be included among the victims of this strife. But the issues of revenge in Germany will ultimately be placed on other grounds.

The end of the first World War was heralded in October, 1918, by the bloody mutiny of the sailors of the grand fleet at Kiel. Though speedily suppressed, this revolt was followed by other uprisings in the armed forces, and by the formation of soldiers' and sailors' councils and the emergence of communist groups. The issue of civil war was firmly planted in Germany the following month when Kurt Eisner proclaimed the Bavarian Communist Republic. Thereafter Germany was shaken by a series of social convulsions which came to a head in the Spartacist revolt in January of the following year, and in the militarist putsch of March, 1920, which forced the Republican Government to flee to Dresden. And the whole period of Hitler's rise to power was one of half-suppressed civil war, involving Communists and Nazis and other extremist groups.

One of the factors which had a limiting effect on civil strife inside Germany after the last war was the hope inspired by President Wilson and his Fourteen Points for a just and equitable peace. This is a hope which few Germans will entertain in 1943. Persons who have been inside the Reich during the present war are unanimous in agreeing that fear of domestic chaos worse than that of the Weimar Republic has been a paramount factor in keeping the German people lined up behind Hitler thus far.

When the Reich collapses the next time, every family which has sacrificed a son—and this will include every family in Germany—will be at the throats of those responsible. The elaborateness of the nazi hierarchy has extended this responsibility down the lines from the Fuehrer to the party ward-boss, the storm-trooper who lives across the street, and the next-door neighbor. That day will also be the day when the remnants of the defeated *Reichswehr* reel back across Poland. It will be the day of the opening of the concentration camps,

where so many hundreds of thousands of anti-Nazis have been victimized. Revenge will be the theme of all those who have accepted Hitler's promise of salvation by *schrecklichkeit*—but most of all, of that forgotten half of Germany which never voted for Nazi rule.

V

It would be a mistake to think that the civil war threatening Europe will be fought for revenge primarily. Civil wars too, are economic, like our own and Spain's. We are faced with a starving continent, where the most desperate eat bark from the trees, where dog and cat-meat are esteemed a blessing, where the very peasants can go hungry for olive oil and bread. Europe is now a region whose instruments of production have been trundled off and turned into military engines and the wrecks of engines, whose meagre supplies of oil have been spilled out in the sands of Cyrenaica or frozen in Russia's winter, whose soil, starved of foreign fertilizer and robbed of its man power, is yielding less and less to feed 40,000,000 people.

The motif of the cival war will be revenge, but its mainspring will be loot. This loot, however, will not be the scientific plunder of Hitler's *Wehrmacht*, card-indexing the systematic spoliation of states. It will be the looting of the hungry, the desperate, the rabble, and the snatching of life's meanest necessities. In such a civil war, every man who is ready to rob or kill for food is a soldier, and every woman and child is conscripted by hunger.

We have seen this army waiting, we who were in Europe during the war; we have heard its whimpers for charity die away into a waiting silence, in Brussels and Madrid and on the quays of Marseilles, where the phrase, *"le pain americain,"* was for a while as familiar on the lips (but with a difference!) as the phrase, *"l'heure allemande."* Correspondents have described its pinch-bellied recruits on the streets of Athens, in the rubbleheaps of Belgrade, in the ghettoes of Poland. Its numbers have even been estimated.

A news agency dispatch from Ankara, Turkey, on March 17, 1942, said that a winter of German-Italian occupation had left an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 "famine orphans" in Athens alone. These are the children of parents who either abandoned them or themselves died of starvation. In Finland, 100,000 children have been reported as living on the borderline of starvation. In Italy, the whole population is existing on 15 per cent of the food it used to consume. In Spain and France, the entire working-class population is on subnormal food rations. This condition, however, may be better than that of the citizens of Holland and Belgium, countries of excess population and limited food resources.

In addition to hunger, revenge, and resurgent nationalism, there is a final element which must be reckoned with in assessing the nature of the coming European civil war. This is what used to be called "the Bolshevik menace." There is no doubt that all through Europe the demonstrated power and reborn prestige of the Stalinist state has galvanized the Communists. *Rote Fahne,* the underground organ of the German Communist party, has been reported to be circulating again in the working-class districts of the Reich. Hostages arrested in France and elsewhere in occupied Europe are more often than not described as Jews and Communists. It would be a mistake to dismiss this label altogether as a nazi propaganda tag: before Paris and other capitals of Europe closed down as news sources, American correspondents made it clear

that the police were most active in the proletarian and industrial regions where the Communists have been entrenched.

Would Stalin seize the occasion of a victory over Hitler to revive the Comintern and its program of world revolution? No one can predict, and it is not, in fact, essential to know. What can be asserted reasonably is that such a victory would tend immensely to popularize the prestige of communism, and also increase the striking power and boldness of its adherents in Europe. A Soviet victory would also be calculated to increase the resistance of nationalists. It adds a final explosive ingredient to the cauldron of revolution in Europe.

This is a factor which helps to give its full meaning to the statement that the present conflict is a world revolution as well as a world war. It also gives a special urgency to the thesis that a second front must be opened in Europe by an American expeditionary force. Apart from the military imperatives which indicate a second front, it is clear that only by active participation in Hitler's defeat in Europe will the Western Democracies earn the right to work with the Soviet Union for the rehabilitation of the continent.

The policy of the United States, if it is followed firmly enough and backed up with an American expeditionary force in Europe, has every chance to dominate the eventual post-war policy of the United Nations. It must necessarily be one to guide the European revolution through the inevitable civil war toward appropriate forms of democracy and federalization. To do this it will be imperative to bring Europe's civil war, when it breaks out, to the speediest possible end.

Those who see these aspects of the post-war problem clearly will recognize that there are certain obligations confronting the United States, in addition to that of creating the second front. One of these is to establish a diplomatic rapport with the Soviets, so that the two dynamic forces in the United Nations will have a common European policy, or the nearest approach to a common policy, when the war ends. We must be prepared also to help in the feeding of Europe, and to enlist South America in that enterprise. And finally, we must have completed our diplomatic preparations within the conquered countries.

If the present war is a world revolution, the trend of that revolution will be decided by those powers which back up a program of revolutionary action with the prestige of victorious arms—and which know, like Cromwell or like Lenin, how to give a civil war the course which they want it to take. But for that, their arms must be victorious on the scene where the revolution is to occur. The extent to which our policy makers understand these things, and implement their understanding in action, will determine not only whether we rescue Europe from Hitler, but also whether we will be capable of drawing a durable and unifying peace out of the spasm of revolutionary civil war through which it has yet to pass.

THE article of Mr. English, written sometime before the latest developments in France and in Africa, naturally does not refer to the resulting situation, not to the disquieting news about Mikhailovitch. A more serious omission is the consideration of the democratic character of the government and people of Czechoslovakia which would dispel the author's fears as to the future of that country. The entire subject of the democratic and socialist traditions of Europe and their effect on the post-war world will be discussed by Louis Dolivet in a forthcoming issue.

LETTERS from the Libyan front

by

HAROLD L. BERMAN

GUNNER HAROLD BERMAN, of the Second Light South African Anti-Aircraft Regiment, was hardly eighteen years old when he joined the Union of South Africa Expeditionary Forces. He took part in the Campaign of Abyssinia, 1940-41, and in two Libyan campaigns, until the disaster of Tobruk this summer, when he was trapped with the entire Second S. A. Division and subsequently reported a prisoner of war in Italy. He was twenty when captured. The letters are selected from his long correspondence with his father, Major A. Z. Berman of the South African forces, and other members of his family.

DEAR DAD,

I am writing this letter from our forward positions somewhere in the Western desert. I am sitting in the dugout which provides shade and shelter from the sun and wind and helps camouflage our position from the enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Our gun, too, is dug in to its gunpit and sandbagged, etc.; we maintain a constant and alert vigil for planes and are ready to "stand to" at the first alarm and swing straight into action. You get used to this sort of life remarkably quickly, with gas mask and tin hat always at hand—"desert rats," they call us. . . .

We were previously stationed near Alexandria, and as we came up from there to our present positions, we passed through several places, evacuated and deserted, just crumbling ruins and half-smashed walls, quiet in the day time, but very, very alive at night, with searchlights scanning the sky, the angry rattle and colored lights of the antiaircraft barrage, and the dull thud and boom of Jerry's calling cards.

Honestly, in a way I am quite glad to be back here again; it is certainly a relief to be away from the dismal routine of a base camp and, despite the fact that there is a sandstorm in the offing, I am not very sorry to have reached this place at last. You develop quite an affectionate regard and a sort of perverted pride in the hell holes you have lived in, a sort of left-over from childhood. I've-lived-in-a-worse-place-than-you-have-so-there!—sort of thing. Anyway, breathing the desert air once more, and it smells quite all right.

Despite the continuous hunger gnawing at my vitals, I feel pretty well alive, but not kicking as much as usual. I am getting very tanned here, for with a water shortage,

I don't want any kit unnecessarily dirty, and I walk around with a pair of sand shoes and my bathing trunks all day! Consequently I am as tanned as a South Sea Islander and I spend my days in driving our truck all over the bloody desert.

Before I go any further, could you please send me up a bottle of Enos (not Andrews) and a bottle of Dettol (any antiseptic would do, but the Dettol bottle doesn't break so easily). The slightest cut or scratch festers immediately into a desert sore, which lingers for months and must be continuously newly dressed—it is even worse than the Abyssinian veldt-sore!

Yesterday morning we had quite an amazing example of the carrying power of the desert wind. Quite clearly we heard the Royal Navy bombarding salvo after salvo and broadside after broadside inland from the Sea and now we are all waiting to hear on the B.B.C. News Service the announcement of the place.

We had a rather sad and unfortunate incident during the last few days. Our troop sergeant was killed in an extremely unlucky accident—I have only now come back from the cemetery where I was in the firing party. A burial in a forward area can be a very moving ceremony, so still and quiet with the padre intoning, "I am the Resurrection and the Life saith the Lord." Then the officers paying their last respects, the buglers sounding the Last Post, the firing-party letting off their last volleys, then the heaping of the earth into the grave by the other sergeants. It is very impressive, moreover, as where we are they do not usually permit firing-parties and there were not very many fellows allowed, since it is justifiably held dangerous to congregate too many troops in one spot. I saw not far off nine Jewish graves, surmounted by crossed triangles, instead of white crosses, thus:

It is pleasant being back by the sea and being able to be about in the warm blue waters of the Mediterranean where you are really only on the border of the desert. The other day, Saturday to be exact, Peter Allen and I had to go and draw some beer for the gunners' canteen from a forward Supply Dump about eighteen miles away from our positions, and when I tell you that you can't walk a hundred yards in the desert without starting to walk in circles, you will understand why you need a prismatic compass and why you must take a new bearing every so far. Suffice it to say that we hit the spot dead center on the outward journey and home on the way back, and are both extremely bucked with ourselves as navigators, though to be truthful, more surprised than anything else!

MY darling Mom,

1942! And another year is over and done with! Nor was it so bad, and at times it was almost enjoyable! Of course, there were periods when all I wanted to do was to get home (as everybody feels) but on the whole it was a great year! Why, it was only

a fortnight old when we pulled out of a base camp for the first time and went on to Marsabit and Dokana! The front line for the first time—January 17—a Saturday night in summertime! And then the long procession of *great names and little places* —Gerai, El Guma, Mega and Moyale, Waju and Buna, Yavello and Algibe, Nigelli and Wandey, Moggio and Addis. And after, through month after month of wanderlust, always wanting to get ahead of everybody else, until the crowning distinction of being newly arrived in the Middle East, then sent up into the frontier area beyond Sidi Barrani, whither no South African unit but the Tank Corps had penetrated. And now, two days before the end of the old year, to cross the border into Libya!

I have been in the army for over twenty months now—I find it difficult to believe. In another three to four months I will have been a soldier for two years. I wonder where I will be? My first anniversary I spent in Addis Ababa, the goal of our campaign, and I sincerely hope that, come July first, I will spend it in like manner in the streets of Tripoli.—The year after, D.V., in Berlin!

MY darling, darling Mom,

Here is my weekly letter card again, half past eight on Sunday morning (what are you doing now—still all asleep?) and I am starting my letter. Actually, we continue duty on Sunday (Jerry doesn't stop on the Lord's Day) but we are not inspected; and so, after we had stood-to on the gun at dawn from 5:30 to 6:00 in a mist so thick and damp that my hair was sopping wet despite a tin hat, we all went back to bed before getting up when the cook yelled, "Come and get it!" Putting on sand shoes, we trooped out bleary-eyed, to collect our minute rasher of bacon, our one slice of bread and margarine, and two ladles of coffee—breakfast! And being Sunday, the water ration what it is, nobody is shaving or washing; we leave our towels outside overnight to get drenched in dew and wipe our faces and bodies with a damp cloth, obviating an unnecessary wastage of water —precious water!

And so life goes on, day succeeding day, a monotonous procession of shifts, with flies crying havoc in the sunshine, and the dull thud and boom of explosions continuing with such regularity through day and night that, during the periods of silence, it is so still the quietness roars and rages in your ears. We lie on our blankets in the dugout from about six o'clock, for the sun sets beautifully but swiftly in the Western desert and in the blackout we hold a "Jam Session" of swing hits or a series of sentimental ballads, as the mood takes us. Or the gramophone plays, record after record, with only one tune banned by common consent—"There's a Boy coming Home on Leave!" Or perhaps in the very dark hour before the moon rises to throw its pale glow over the sand and the wadies, one post will moan out over the desert the troop call, "Send the Ack Ack h-o-o-o-o-o-ome" so that the wailing sounds like a pack of wolves in the dark, and is borne along on the wind to be taken up and passed on by the next post a half-mile away. Especially last night, for it was Saturday night and everybody had that Saturday-night feeling, I could see absolutely nothing in the dark, so that only images could be conjured and everybody was in that homesick and nostalgic mood.— Oh! it was a sad, sad, sad gun-team indeed. I hear one of the people from H.Q. is going back 130-odd miles to the advance base for mail and to take our orders into the canteen—we haven't had letters since we got here, so that there should be quite a packet for us. Also it is Tommy Weir's 21st, next Monday night and we are going to make wild, wild whoopee in our dugout. Poor Tommy, having to spend his 21st so far from Wynberg.

MY darling Mom,

Just a brief note to thank you very much for your letters which arrived this afternoon. Also for the ones enclosed, like Billy's. You don't quite know how much I appreciate it—why, the sandstorm that was raging this afternoon seemed to abate when the mail arrived. This is just about the only complaint—those blasted sandstorms just play merry hell with the days. I can't recall when we had six hours at a stretch when the wind didn't blow. Still, I am more than surviving and am nonethe-

less feeling perfectly fit! This despite the fact that the rations are not quite what they might be. . . .

I am still only "half-alive," struggling to attain a normal level of consciousness after the frightful havoc of the worst sandstorm ever. You can have no conception of its evil propensities. Coming from the east a little after breakfast, it grew steadily worse till it passed off about midnight, reaching awesome proportions in the midafternoon.

At a little after three o'clock it had become a swirling tempest of sand and dust, when it suddenly became dark, and the color of our surroundings and of ourselves as well, became tinged with orange, and then violent vermilion, an atmospheric phenomenon for which we failed to find cause, and which prompted the more (or less) imaginative of my colleagues to pass gloomy forebodings and dark hints about the approaching end of civilization and our coming descent into the abyss; and even I, who pride myself on my common sense, was far too occupied by my own distractions to give over any time to mockery. I was becoming hourly convinced of the possibility of asphyxiation under the circumstances prevailing, a prospect in which I was not then (and not now) partial; and although I have marveled at the fact that a punctured lung may cause drowning in one's own blood, I was already firmly convinced that it was possible, nay probable, that I was about to meet my end by drowning in dust. At one time, congestion now assuming potential relationship with thought, I found considerable difficulty in breathing, and finally dropped off into a troubled sleep, beset by dreams of seas of turbulent dust and sinking sands, to awaken at three in the morning to find my face gently fanned by a pleasantly fresh sea breeze. It has rained since, helping the Libyan desert to maintain its contrary notion of expected climatic conditions.

My dearest Dad,

Well, it's pretty hot this afternoon and whenever it's hot the routine of our existence is more noticeable than usual. Routine—I think it is getting away from routine that I must look forward to "after the show." Helfaya and Bardia, Barrani and Matruh (do their names sound ugly to you?) —I shall always remember nostalgically, as one recalls something satisfactorily accomplished, but routine—I just want to get up one morning at six (for stand-to) and then say, "Blast you, go to Hell," and lie in bed to eleven. Perhaps I'll have breakfast in bed and say, "Just for old times' sake, don't bring me porridge, let me have some mealie meal." And when it comes, I can sling it out of the window, or fling it down Mom's large cut glass vase (do you think she will get acid?) in the knowledge I shan't go hungry because I can still have scrambled eggs. What an ambition? But getting away from routine is something I look forward to far more than dances and cinemas—I am going to bed at half past six on Saturday night and if you think I'm going to bioscope like everybody else, be damned to you!

I mean you get up for a half hour's stand-to at dawn and after that you shave in a mug of water or go back to bed as you feel inclined till breakfast, and you look forward to having bacon so you can refuse the mealie meal, and then you lie all day in your bivvy on top of the gun pit, and do your hour's air sentry, with field glasses and a tin hat, thinking, writing, reading, dreaming, and waiting. Occasionally someone shouts "Aircraft." (It is something to do with acoustics that you can hear aircraft better in a confined space than in the open.) Then you listen and perhaps you can tell by the sound that it's a Hurricane, though spotting by sound is fool's play, and if the air sentry identifies it through the glasses as friendly, then you just turn over in your bivvy, but if it's Jerry, and the barrage fills the sky, you turn out at the double, tin-hatted and all and take post—let him go if he is out of range—and then you stand down; but give him hell if he puts his air-screw below a certain height. And so, if you don't open fire, you go back inside or you clean the gun (completely every fourth day; daily cleaning every day) or you have lunch—isn't it just typical of everything that the S. African rations can't simply bear the label M. & V. —Victory Rations, but must also say *Vleis en Groentes, Oorwinning Porsies!* An hour guard at night and it starts again, the old familiar routine.

No, I'm not grumbling—well, perhaps

grumbling, but certainly not complaining—I guess I'm where I'd rather be and doing what I'd rather be doing that almost anything else, except flying in the S.A.A.F. (silly ambition) or sailing in the Sea-War Defense. The last because you can add wistfully—think what a lot of water you can always get. Even our drinking water is pretty salty, so sea water would have a familiar taste. But it is mainly a change of atmosphere; you become deucedly attached to the smell of the sea.

So be careful, when the war is over, of saying placidly—you can always serve lunch at one o'clock, Harold is used to regular times. It is a secret ambition of mine to lunch when everybody else is sipping morning tea. Who is going to settle down to "civilized" life—not me, Sir!

I have written as I feel up to now in this letter, and frankly, I feel "remarkably good"—no dust storm and nothing to do but sleep this afternoon and it's Easter week-end (this time last year at Mega and Siroppe Ridge) and tomorrow it's Sunday (stand-to just the same, but Sunday is Sunday!).

Tomorrow, (Sunday, please note) Rev. someone-or-other of the 3rd S.A. Inf. Brigade who is the Jewish Padre is giving a service, but I think Kantey and Katzenellenbogen have developed atheistic tendencies (besides myself) or are just too dog-gone lazy—not even the opportunity of getting away from the post for a few hours can bring them to disregard the labor of getting dressed in proper battle-dress.

There you are—that's what we live for, are trained for, equipped for, paid for and expected to do—the Messerschmidts were just over though out of range, but the adjacent Ack-Ack guns put up a barrage and we could see Jerry disappearing into the sun. Now we have stood down—but we have had a moment of excitement to relieve the monotony.

MY dearest Dad,

Well, an argument has been going on in the gun-team on the good old, and as yet undecided, topic as to whether one can or cannot arbitrarily say Italians are "yellow;" Germans are not only brave soldiers, but also good ones; Anzacs are the best fighters in the world, etc.

Of course, it is difficult to maintain that the Italians are brave warriors in the face of such devastating routs as Custozza in 1866, Caporetto in 1918, Guadalajara in 1937, and Lybia in 1940-41. And yet, racially they are of the same stock as the Greeks and also the very same as the Spaniards, who, ill-equipped, gave them such a bad time at Teruel and after! And again to say they were dragged into the war unwittingly in the wake of the imperially-minded Fascists is so much wishful thinking—95 per cent of the Italians I have spoken to (and heaven knows, I've met enough) were Mussolini-men and still proud of it. Certainly their equipment was of the best, and they are all far more seasoned troops than we are. Even psychologically, they are no different in actual instances, firmly believing and quite convinced of it, that the B.B.C. broadcasts propaganda and lies and that Radio Roma actual news. Don't we believe the very opposite, and just as firmly!

—Which brings us to the Poles. You know, I have long been wary of our dispossessed Allies, and have always regarded their forces as of little more value than symbols of common resistance. And when the Free French "conquered" Syria—it was just about the last straw! I had always considered them to consist of one Air Squadron, one destroyer, and perhaps a couple of battalions! But these Poles—they are indeed very considerable Allies. Divisions of them—besides the numerous units of them on the Russian front! They are certainly doughty warriors; they regarded Italians as hardly worth a bullet, but Germans! It was the boast of one particular crowd of Poles that I came across that they had seen two years' continuous service and had never taken a single Jerry prisoner—just cut 'em up. They *are* fine Allies, you betcha!

I heard yesterday a story illustrative of the high repute the S. Africans are held in up here and showing why the red tabs are something to be proud of. In the New Zealand Club in Cairo, which is the social center for all Middle East troops, there were a number of soldiers talking, including an Imperial Sergeant with a very English accent and a South African private on leave after the last push. The question of retreat had come up, and they had discussed such retreats-with-honor as Greece

and Crete, when no slur could be cast on the Anzacs, or Dunkirk, or the evacuation of Somaliland, etc. The South African in his "picturesque" accent, which may sound terrible to mother's cultured ears, but is like a breath of home to us, was describing in his Platteland vocabulary the stand his regiment had made at Sidi Rezegh, and said that there they were half dug in against tanks with rifles and bayonets.

"But, Good Lord, old fellow," said the Woodbine sergeant, "why didn't you chaps retire?"

There was a slight pause and the South African replied: "Ag, nee, man, how could we retire? We got no bloody orders to withdraw!"

It is only typical of the opinion they have up here for the red-tab fellows. They will all tell you the same, except perhaps the Tommies; the N.Z.'s, Aussies, and Indians will all say that if they were in a tight corner, they'd prefer to be with the Springboks.

P. S. I have just listened to H.M. the King's message of "sympathy and good cheer" to the beleaguered garrison and people of Singapore. He bids them "equip themselves with resolution." Believe me, resolution is a good thing to equip yourself with, but the trouble with equipment of this nature is that it does not drop bombs! I think airplanes are more useful.

DAD, old man,

A hurried addition to my airmail letter to let you know we have received movement orders and are under two hours' notice—we are pulling out tomorrow. Where to? Why? What for? I can't tell you, but draw your own conclusions. I can't say exactly what we're gonna do about it but Rommel has got to be stopped before Tobruk, and to be blunt, we will go through him like a double dose of salts this time! No mistake!

Anyway, there is nothing to be alarmed about, only, of course, you mustn't expect letters at all for some time. History is being made up here and who am I to bar its progress with my letter-writing.

Leon has just heard that his cousin from the T.H.A., who was a prisoner of war at Sidi Rezegh and escaped to link up with the New Zealanders, was awarded the M.C.

Well, that's all. Don't worry, I can look after myself. (You should see how fast I duck when bullets fly!) But expect no mail till you see it. Good luck in Port Elizabeth.

S'long Dad, old man,
Yours to the hilt.

P.S. Good for Bill—I'm proud of her!

P.S.S. Got anything to read?

P.P.S.S. Letter writing is not only a privilege, but Messerschmidt & Co. make it a veritable luxury.

SCIENCE AND STATESMANSHIP

by

Juan Negrín

RECOVERY, reconstruction, and the laying of foundations for a lasting and, if possible, a permanent peace, will depend fundamentally on a successful union between statesmanship and science. No less on this union depends the attainment of the immediate objective of victory in the present conflict, a victory without which all our plans and proclaiming of principles will be in vain. I do not intend here to discuss this statement systematically. Science—pure and applied—and statecraft are not subjects to be confined within the limits at my disposal, which are barely sufficient for a mere indication of the points to be treated.

It is solely my intention to offer, in a succinct and perhaps almost aphoristic form, a few reflections resulting from personal experience—from the somewhat rare experience of a professional scientist who, disliking and shunning political activities, found himself involved in them through the obligations of citizenship, and who in 1936, on the outbreak in his country of a war which is still being fought, was committed by destiny to tasks of government which in one way or another he has continued to perform during the whole of this turbulent period.

I should like to say, first of all, that the spirit informing these considerations does not support either openly or disguisedly a regime of "technocracy," less still of "sophocracy." Technology and science must provide the essentials for rational government, but they can in no way replace it. Science and government have distinct methods and aims. It is clear that the man of science may possess or acquire the gifts of a leader, but there is no similarity between the formation, discipline, or "style" of the two. The role of the technician and the scientist, as such, is that of a chief collaborator, not a substitute.

Between the statesman and science a dual relation is possible—firstly a passive one, wherein the statesman incorporates learning, assimilates the scientific method, and becomes imbued with a scientific spirit; and secondly an active one, more directly utilitarian, wherein he makes use of the teachings and progress of science for his achievements.

What can the statesman find in science?

Science can serve him by its capacity for forming a criterion. Scientific criticism and method make it easier to remove the antagonisms of social life and the contradictions in individual conduct and collective behavior, antagonisms and contradictions produced by that paradoxical human nature which is so full of coexistent antimonies. Science can also serve to correct the professional deformation of the statesman. I do not here refer to those perversions frequently found in the politician, although not specifically or exclusively pertaining to him, such as superficiality and lack of objectivity; indifference to truth and a taste for fallacious argument; the ignoring of principles; an inclination for local or personal favoritism; a sectarian exploitation of party politics; and finally a tendency to vanity and a striving after effect, which not infrequently finds its deadliest punishment in adulation, that sweet poison by which so many early hopes of public life have perished. All this is represented by corruption born either of private interest or

the desire to ensure, without caring for the means, public favor and the conquest of a power which, when achieved thus, is usually short-lived. Against this science can do little. It is a problem of civic morals and sanity.

I am referring rather to those genuine qualities which are the mark of the statesman and which can easily cause a professional deformation of his personality. Leadership, one of the first conditions of a statesman, implies an instinct for premonition combined with a capacity for cold calculation; a creative imagination held back by a sane realism; an enterprising and combative spirit counteracted by a realization of possibilities; energy counterbalanced by moderation; boldness combined with prudence; ability to form decisions rapidly, but calmly and without undue haste; firmness and persistence free from obstinacy. A scientific foundation is no bad method of maintaining the delicate balance required by such opposite qualities and of removing any confusion which might be caused by an incongruous predominance of any one of them.

On the other hand, the great motive power of a statesman is faith in his work. This is needed by the ruler just as much as by the artist and the scholar, for without it no creative work is possible. But pure faith and deep-rooted conviction must not lead the statesman into any dogmatic doctrinairism. Scientific education counteracts agnostic incredulity, but at the same time it is the source of that doubt which inspires action, and it creates that healthy spirit of skepticism which proves the paradox that faith is more intense in those who best know how to doubt.

Science, perhaps more than any other human activity, can infuse in the statesman that prevalent subconsciousness which gives his work an experimental character, his convictions the form of postulates, his ideological doctrine the scope of provisional theory, and his program the significance of a working hypothesis. In short, if the statesman can become instilled and impregnated with the scientific spirit, his mission will be ennobled and he can consider himself as an active research worker. In government, as in science, one of the chief incentives must be an ardent desire to discover truth, and even to inquire whether truth exists—that is to say, whether the essence of things and events can be attained by the methods at the disposal of the human intellect.

II

THE vast problems of reorganization which will be created after the war by a devastated world, with an economic, social and political structure undermined, and in parts razed to the ground, cannot be successfully approached without the help of science. One may be optimistic concerning the possibilities of reconstruction, if routine is placed in chains, and if the leaders of the future do not persist in applying out-of-date solutions to fresh problems. Certain it is that the efforts and wealth of generations have been destroyed, but the countries which have preserved their vitality have always shown unforeseen and amazing powers of speedy recovery after the cruellest of wars. Apart from what is irreplaceable on account of its historical or artistic value, there is nothing that cannot be remade and excelled in a short time, always provided that the help of science is not scorned, and its guidance accepted. In this way it will be possible to avoid a repetition of what for future generations will be the astounding and incomprehensible fact that, for many years after the last war, human labor—the greatest wealth which exists on earth—was recklessly squandered, and millions of men kept in idleness. The totalitarian countries have given proof of wisdom, and have gained an advantage, in utilizing—although only in a partial and inhuman form—scientific principles for the creation, provision, and distribution of work. If with a more rigorously scientific judgment and progressive spirit, in accordance with the respect which we take pride in conceding to the human personality, the countries affected by the war make an estimate and rational planning of all possible effort, the wounds will soon heal and leave no trace of any scar.

Technology and science have placed at the service of the human intellect tremendous stores of energy which allow it to multiply its efforts infinitely, and to achieve in decades what before the last century

would have necessitated a whole historical period. While we are approaching the time when energy will be fabulously abundant and cheap, we may be certain that, even today, a rational co-ordination of its production and utilization throughout the whole world will make it far more easily available and will considerably reduce its cost. In this way a rapid restoration after the war is feasible. Effective effort in the years to come, which will be vitally necessary if our civilization is not to be destroyed, cannot be made without a planning and rationalization which must ignore the present state frontiers.

For this planning and rationalization the essential instrument is science. Besides the recovery, reconstruction, and material reorganization of a world laid waste, the statesman will be confronted with other problems for whose solutions he must look to science: problems of culture, education, and general instruction, aids to knowledge, development of research, encouragement of the arts; problems connected with the physical improvement of the race, with the raising of the standard of living, and the bestowing of a progressive content on collective life, creating new values and morals.

In stormy periods of history, everyday problems are sometimes battered into a different shape, and so made easier of solution. It would seem probable that such widely debated subjects as the scope of state tutelage in science and art, or state control of education and instruction, and of the development of physical culture, lose a large part of their polemical attraction in the light of the new situation created by the war. (a) In the first place, collective interest and the instinct for defense demand that every country shall exploit to the full the potential faculties of its citizens, and that in consequence education and learning shall be placed unrestrictedly within the reach of all. (b) Secondly, if we are to survive as an independent collectivity, contacts with other countries in order to obtain the highest possible physical, intellectual, and professional standard in the citizen are a basic necessity.

It is the task of science to draw up this program, and of the statesman to carry it out, and to grant that natural desire of the needy to raise and dignify their standard of living, which has been the basis of profound political agitation as far back as historic memory can go. Problems of the future, and of such substance as those which have been touched upon, will constitute the theme of this and, I hope, of future meetings; but this should not distract us from a more immediate task: the aid which science must give to the statesman in order that we may achieve victory. To give our exclusive attention to plans for the future is like drinking the wine before the grapes are gathered.

Everything in fact depends on the present conflict. In this conflict, it is true, we are fighting for a liberal concept of democracy, for the independence of the peoples, for the rights of the individual, for a progressive conception of the world. But that alone does not represent the essence of the present struggle. Beneath all this there is something biological, primitive, and animal, with which we can only find an analogy by going back in imagination to prehistoric times, when races and species perhaps disappeared altogether in conflicts of extermination.

A people who—sad truth though it is—knew better than any other how to take advantage of science in their endeavor to achieve hegemony, have been seized with the delirium of Lucifer, and as a god-like nation are trying to subjugate the rest of the world. Their resources are terrifyingly great, their preparation solid, their foresight meticulous, and the risk which they represent to all of us is greater than has ever been known in history. In the tremendous, life-and-death struggle which is now being waged, a struggle wherein no effort can be too great, and wherein no one has the right to consider himself as standing apart from good and evil, science must not only assist—as she does already—by improving the methods for destroying the enemy and for protecting us against his attacks, but also, in the spiritual sphere, by serving as a lantern to show us our path and a leaven to lighten the task of the statesman.

The historical cycle begun in the second half of the eighteenth century and characterized by the clarification of democratic principles and the struggle for their application, is showing, in my opinion, symptoms of decay and is about to give place to a

new epoch. There have been abundant conflagrations during this period, and the present moment is perhaps its crisis. From an historico-scientific examination, the statesman may gain concentrated experience which will allow him to sketch in outline the generic features of the present age. This restrospective analysis will make it possible for him not only to distinguish by contrast obscure contemporary phenomena, but will also give him a historical perspective which will show what is homogeneous in our epoch and will reveal the *leitmotif* at present hidden by a veil of confused happenings. From this standpoint it can be seen that we are witnessing the gestation of a new world, and if the nations try to prevent its advent by supporting the old and outworn, they will jeopardize not victory alone but their very existence. This has been only too well understood by those countries which in the world today represent retrogression and barbarism, and have therefore nailed to their mast of hysterical deception the colors of revolution.

III

THE advance of humanity is a discontinuous process, and even its evolution is achieved in sudden leaps. Restriction in its development, if it could be brought about, produces stagnation, involution, and death. Just as in living nature, human society accumulates impulses for renewal, and suddenly a revolutionary phenomenon appears as though by an abrupt mutation. In my opinion there is no doubt that we are living in a period of tremendous mutations. And here is a new field in which science can serve as mentor to the statesman and can help him to remove the obstacles in the way of rejuvenation and progress, such as a decrepit archaism, and false traditions which kill spontaneity and lead inevitably to a regime of snobocracy. There would be no culture or civilization without traditions. These prevent us from breaking away from the past and losing the idea of continuity. Indeed, the symbol of human progress is a quintessential system of traditions. In war, the ideals which inspire us are a stylized synthesis of our European, Christian, and human traditions, the finest creation of the spirit and substance of our civilization.

But how many examples are there in the past of peoples who have fallen beneath the load of their own obsolete traditions! Every tradition which is not historically dynamic contains the germ of death, but traditions generally necessitate a periodic revitalization in accordance with the spirit of the time. Science provides the touchstone to reveal the senescence of traditions and to point out those which need renewal and those which should be removed. Science can give new life to inanimate traditions. As also occurs in questions of belief, everyone in matters of science proclaims the incontrovertibility of his doctrines. And although we all maintain our convictions, I do not wish to fall into the error of proselytizing my audience. But the politician will find in science a sieve by which he can distinguish, classify and purify the aspirations of the masses who are fighting, and an apparatus for elaborating and formulating feasible solutions.

Jurists, sociologists, economists, and historians, principally, with the help of the other sciences, will have to prepare the varied formulas, formulas which will not force a hasty improvization, at the end of the war, of the solution of the fundamental problem of establishing a supernational and super-state organism, in sympathy with our democratic designs, but with sufficient authority and strength to enchain that part of national sovereignty which it will be necessary to sacrifice on the altars of a durable peace.

In the hearts of our fighters there lives a faith in democratic principles, which are the kernel of our civilization, and which are manifested by a complete individual liberty as far as thought is concerned, and only restricted in action as the legitimate interests of others are affected; by tolerance—a corollary of liberty; by the idea that the people are the source of public power, and that their will, expressed directly or through delegates, is the decisive arbiter of their own administration and government. For those who today are fighting for a democratic state, this represents the defense of collective interests and the guarantee of what we consider the rights of the individual.

Science can render a valuable service to statesmanship by paying attention to the following points:

Selection of leaders in every field of national activity.

Regard for the education of the masses.

Active participation in public life.

It is the patriotic and human duty of the scientist to bend himself to these tasks, tasks to which the statesman should summon him. His special conditions are of exceptional value in the present circumstances, particularly the wide feeling of tolerance which is perhaps more common among scholars than in any other class of society; the zeal for truth, which should be the common denominator of the scientist; and that wide international and universalist comprehension which—as far as it is possible in human beings—is free from exclusivist prejudices of race, and creed.

In order to create a new and better world it is not enough for the statesman to rationalize government and to plan on a world scale. It will be necessary to promote and infuse new moral values, to which the scientist will give form and content, in a supernational and humanist sense.

In the last resort the goal of science and statesmanship is similar: they both in their proper spheres pursue truth, a quality which in the realm of human relations finds its highest expression in fairness, liberty and justice. Twenty-four centuries ago Aristotle said in his "Ethics" that the supreme end of politics was human good. In the same sense as that of the Stagirite philosopher we may say that the highest aim of man is goodness.

SCIENCE AND WORLD UNITY

By Waldemar Kaempffert

EVER since it became necessary to wage war against Germany, Italy, and Japan we have been told that we are fighting for freedom and democracy. Much more is at stake. It has not been sufficiently dinned into us that we are fighting for a culture—a culture which was made possible by democracy, a culture which is essentially scientific and technologic. That culture is a product of the Renaissance and of eighteenth century liberalism. It is a culture fashioned by steam engines, electrical machinery, aviation, four-day transatlantic liners, coal-tar chemistry, automobiles, motion pictures, printed books and periodicals, rayon, and plastics—a culture which is the common possession of all industrial nations. Backward peoples try to acquire it, for they know that the whole idea of progress is now expressed in terms of science and technology. Wars have been fought for religious reasons, but never for the sake of science. Human morality varies with latitude and longitude and with the social environment. But science is everywhere the same in its convictions and in its procedures. Alfred North Whitehead has said that the acquisition of the scientific attitude brought about the most intimate change in outlook that the human species experienced. Yet statesmen have not yet made the most of science in bringing about world unity.

Peace maintained by an international

army is peace maintained by force. Better than force is a unifying ideal. The only ideal on which nations as culturally far apart as China and the United States, Ethiopia and Great Britain, Egypt and Sweden, Greece and Canada can agree is that cherished by every scientist. Religion preaches the brotherhood of man, but only science practices it. In normal times some 250,000 first-class research scientists meet in international conventions, asking no questions about race, religious creed, nationality, or political belief. These highly trained men and women are fashioning the material world of tomorrow. They receive less for their work, on the average, than an American bricklayer. They give freely of their knowledge to all mankind. They have shown that it is possible to sink prejudices and passions in a common cause and to think in terms of mankind and the planet. And so it is here proposed that, while we experiment with an international army which is to deal with aggressors, we organize research on a world scale, cultivate science and technology with the conscious social intention of raising all countries to a single high economic and intellectual level and of giving all men the common objective outlook of the scientist. Before we can have the World State, for which H. G. Wells and others have argued so convincingly, we must acquire experience in international co-operation. It is easier to acquire that experience in science than in politics.

The compelling reason for this approach lies in the social influence of science and technology. Why is the world already so unified economically that a crisis in one country has its effects in others that may be thousands of miles away? Solely because of scientific and technologic advance—the type of advance that has made petroleum, aluminum, tungsten, rubber, tin, and ten thousand other materials indispensable in war and peace. The very fundamentals of economics have been undermined because of the achievements of the scientist and the engineer. Where once we had an economy of scarcity we now have an economy of abundance. We talk of planning to make the most of the world's enormous productive capacity. But the Western Democracies have not yet incorporated research in any economic or political world plan.

Economists as a class no longer hold to the laissez-faire theory of Adam Smith—a theory based on a belief in the sanctity of free enterprise and free competition and on a fictitious "natural order." Science has developed in accordance with this laissez-faire principle. Just as the automatic operation of the "laws" of supply and demand were once supposed to regulate prices and consequently the production and consumption of goods, so it was supposed that the spontaneous evolution of science and technology is inevitable. Discoveries and inventions undoubtedly do come forth at some indefinite time and in some indefinite way. In the West only the industrial laboratories have departed from the laissez-faire principle. They have shown that despite the unpredictability of what may emerge from research, science can achieve its goals more surely if it is properly organized and directed.

Only recently have scientists begun to realize that the old formula "science for science's sake" has lost much of its old validity. For centuries they had no clearly defined goal, no sense of social purpose. An interesting problem was presented by a star, an atom, a gas under pressure, a micro-organism, and somewhere a specialist was impelled to study it and lucky enough to find a philanthropist to pay his costs. For this reason the physical sciences have far outstripped the biological sciences, with the doubtful exception of agriculture and medicine. Profits and military advantage lie in physics and chemistry but not in biology. Only the Marxists have boldly formulated a state plan for the social utilization of science and technology and the wholesale organization of research, but with the reservation that scientists must accept the social philosophy of dialectical materialism.

Suppose we organize science internationally, lay down a long-time flexible plan of research, finance experimentation and investigation in all fields by contributions from participating nations, bolster the sciences that lag, see to it that there is intelligent supervision without dictation. The chances are that we would accelerate the tempo of discovery and make rapid progress in unifying mankind.

The conditions that must be accepted in carrying out any such proposal are those

under which science has flourished best, which means the fullest freedom in research, in international movement and communication, and in the application of discoveries for the benefit of society as a whole. First of all, we must create a World Scientific Commission which will be composed of the foremost natural and social scientists. These acknowledged leaders will not be older than fifty. They will be paid as liberally as are the judges of the highest courts in the United States and Great Britain. They will serve no longer than ten years, so that room will be made for men who still retain much of the initiative and imagination of youth. They will have at their disposal funds subscribed by all nations proportionately to their pre-war national budgets. One-half of one per cent should be enough.

The Commission will be fully aware of its social function, meaning that the unknown is to be penetrated and explored with no thought of profit, yet with the conviction that direct material and immaterial benefit will accrue. So far from dominating science, the Commission will be fed not only by the laboratories that it supports but by those of universities, industrial organizations, and governments. There will be no vast palace of research where hundreds of chemists, physicists, and biologists will work under the direction of some general of science or of some committee of master minds, but a directing body which will frame a program large enough to include all the natural and social sciences. Committees will assign projects to qualified men in any part of the world on a non-profit contract basis—a method which our Office of Scientific Research and Development has followed with brilliant success in improving searchlights, signals, and metals for the use of the army and navy in the present war.

The cost of research conducted on this far-flung scale will be large, yet trifling when compared with the financial waste incurred in maintaining a standing army or a powerful navy. Not millions but scores of millions must be spent annually by an intelligently managed organization if we are to tighten our grip on matter, on energy, on the living cell, on medicine. Even nations that may reject proposals for world federation have everything to gain by supporting a plan that promises to conduct research on all fronts. We want new, workable theories and discoveries that theoretical scientists as well as manufacturers, engineers, inventors, physicians, and farmers can apply.

II

CONSIDER these examples of what should be done by internationally organized research. It is a disgrace to medicine that virtually nothing is known about arthritis. The approach has been purely empirical. So with cancer. How is a piece of beefsteak converted into the tissue of arms, legs, and organs? Our knowledge is only rudimentary. Why do we inherit blue eyes and stub noses from similarly endowed parents? The geneticists can give a partial answer, but they cannot pick out of the American population the 18,000,000 who are carriers of epilepsy and who are likely to have socially unfit children if they marry the wrong mates. Why can serums and vaccines cope with some infections? The actions are clearly chemical. But what is the chemical that is so effective? We simply do not know.

These questions will not always cry out for answers. But internationally organized research could provide the answers far more rapidly than we have a right to expect under the old system, given a sound program and money enough. Arthritics would cease to groan if the answers were forthcoming. A diagnosis of cancer would not usually mean death. The marked epileptics would be detected by some simple test. Serums and vaccines would give way to chemicals in the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases.

Scores of other problems could be similarly attacked. We are still without a means of predicting the weather a fortnight in advance. We know very little about the process of plant growth, and we have no certain way of changing the starch and sugar content of vegetables and fruits chemically. In the paraffin series of compounds there are three billion possibilities of which hundreds must be of enormous importance. Because of the high cost of a cyclotron, a machine by which atoms are bombarded and disintegrated, we have not yet learned how to control the release of the energy

in a thimbleful of water. The relation of sunspots to auroras and terrestrial magnetism has been only partially revealed. Wherever we turn we find these problems. Yet without a World Scientific Commission there is no way of attacking them systematically. The cost should not stagger countries that were accustomed to spend $80,000,000 for a single battleship.

If scientific research were organized and conducted internationally, the immediate result must be intellectual federation and in the long run political federation. For as science and technology advance, nations tend to resemble one another more and more. Industrially the countries of the West hardly differ. Russia, once technologically backward, is rapidly assuming the industrial aspect of the United States. Since the dissemination of scientific techniques has brought about this uniformity, what may not be expected of a wider, deliberate, and systematic procedure?

The prospects of a World Scientific Commission are brighter than may appear. The League of Nations scored its most signal failures in politics and its most signal successes in what use it made of the natural and social sciences. The work of the League's scientific commissions is enduring. It has influenced medical thinking. It has caused nations like Great Britain to consider the matter of feeding the undernourished. Even without the League's scientific success as a precedent we have the example of the International Institute of Agriculture and of the work done by co-operating governments in hydrography and meteorology. Moreover, some of the sciences have long been loosely organized internationally—astronomy in particular.

We need a practical demonstration of co-operation on a world-wide scale before we are ready for political federation—a demonstration that social unity is not a utopian dream. The ultimate purpose of federation is to treat the biological, social, and economic environment of man as a whole. Since it is the function of science and technology to understand and control the environment, no better beginning in federation could be made than by organizing and conducting research internationally and thus accustoming the world to collaboration. If this argument is correct the world-wide cultivation of the natural and social sciences must ultimately break down the barriers raised by nationalism, and this for the reason that social changes inevitably brought about by changes within science and technology will in themselves demand international consideration.

The International Significance of the INDIAN PROBLEM

by

Bertrand and Patricia Russell

THE present war, while it naturally and inevitably stimulates nationalism in the various countries involved, requires something more than nationalism if it is to end in victory for the United Nations. For if an alliance is to work without friction, it must have a common purpose. Our war aims must be such as seem superlatively important to the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Soviet Union, and China. What obviously unites us is resistance to Axis aggression, and the wish to create a world where those who are not aggressive can live in peace. But success in this aim demands some sacrifice of separate national desires. The British must be prepared to sacrifice their rule over countries that wish to be independent of them. The Russians realized years ago that they must abandon the attempt to spread communism to other regions. The Axis propaganda pretends that the United States has economically imperialistic designs in Latin America and elsewhere; if Americans felt any temptation in this direction, they would have to resist it.

In these respects, the United Nations must restrain their own nationalistic impulses for the sake of victory. But it may easily happen that, for the same reason, they have to restrain nationalistic impulses in other countries. There exists, as to this, a certain confusion of thought; many people are not clear as to the limits that can rightly be placed on national independence. In the case of India, this problem is acute.

Let us begin with a simpler case, that of Egypt. If Egypt had had unrestricted independence, it would have refused to allow the troops of either side on its territory; if we had acquiesced, this would have led, as early as 1940, to the occupation of the Suez Canal by the Axis. No one has suggested that the British ought to have allowed this to happen, out of a pedantic regard for the principle of self-determination. But those who dislike imperialism are not clear as to *why* they think the United Nations justified in occupying Egypt while the war lasts. The same situation exists in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and now in North Africa. Norway, Holland, Belgium, and the Balkan countries, whose independence we respected, have been conquered by the Nazis.

To arrive at any principle in this matter, it is necessary to distinguish between war and peace. We all recognize that, in peacetime, the relations of nations ought to be regulated by law; we hope that, after the present conflict, such regulation may become possible. But war is a negation of law. It is foolish to enter upon a war if there is no chance of winning it, and there would have been no chance of winning the present war if we had left each nation completely free to determine its own policy. The only result would have been that there would be no independent nations in the world except Germany and Japan. The question: "How far, during the war, should we respect the rights of nominally independent nations?" is one to be decided, not by legalistic arguments, but by its bearing on victory or defeat. This, however, may sound too harsh; it is subject to many considerations which will soften its working in practice.

In the first place, respect for the rights of

neutrals, whenever possible, increases sympathy for our side; Latin America might have been completely alienated by a high-handed policy. In the second place, we are fighting to preserve the possibility of national self-government, and we must make it clear that we do not, even temporarily, interfere with any country except for grave reason. In the third place, when we think interference unavoidable, it must be strictly limited to what is necessary for the conduct of the war. In the fourth place, to prevent the suspicion of private imperialism, any interference should be sanctioned by all Allies. In the fifth place, there should be a solemn undertaking by all the United Nations that any nation, not an enemy, shall after the war enjoy as much independence as the United Nations will claim for themselves.

II

LET us now apply these considerations to India. The failure of Sir Stafford Cripps, the subsequent movement of civil disobedience, and the repressive measures taken by the Government of India, have caused a certain perplexity in the minds of those who dislike imperialism and feel that every nation has a right to freedom. It seems to us that what the Congress party claims is more than any group of human beings have a right to claim, and that nations which are at war are obliged to repress interference with their war effort, such as that with which the Congress party has attempted to enforce its demands, whether such action takes place within their own boundaries or not.

It is worth while to set out clearly the demands and policies both of the Congress and other leading Indian parties, as Americans, misled by propaganda, are too apt to assume that the Congress demands are the only ones which need to be considered seriously, and are also deceived as to the nature of these demands. Congress party representatives in this country present to American audiences only those aspects of Congress policy which they know will meet with sympathy. They profess that internal discord between different religious and political groups in India is a British invention which can safely be ignored, though all the Indian leaders, when they write for home consumption and not for foreign propaganda, tell a very different story. They claim that the Congress party represents India, and are then obliged to deny the obvious fact that Gandhi dominates the Congress party, since to admit this would be to disprove their claim that India, if granted unconditional freedom now, would immediately organize vigorous armed resistance to Japan.

Gandhi is not pro-Japanese; but he is wholeheartedly and unalterably convinced of the rightness and efficacy of non-violence in all circumstances. It is not generally realized that Gandhi has stated that the Indian Army should be disbanded with the withdrawal of British power, and that India should give no aid beyond tolerating the presence of Allied troops on Indian soil. It is obvious that no adequate substitute could be found for the disbanded Indian Army, since the United Nations cannot spare 1,500,000 trained troops to take its place, and a hastily armed and untrained Indian populace could at best only practice guerrilla warfare, for which the plains of Northern India are far from suitable.

The independence that Gandhi wants is in fact freedom not to fight, and he has declared: "I believe that there can be no settlement with the Congress, short of complete independence during the pendency of the war, for the simple reason that the Congress cannot commit itself to active help in the war with men and money. That would mean a reversal of the policy of non-violence which the Congress has pursued for the last twenty years." Other Congress leaders, of whom the most vigorous is Nehru, are in favor of armed resistance to Japan, but they could not hope to carry out such resistance if Gandhi opposed it. Nehru's political life has been, by his own account, a long process of giving in to "Gandhiji" against his better judgment.

Apart from the faith in non-violence in which the party is steeped, there were overwhelming objections to the Congress demand on which the Cripps negotiations broke down—the demand, namely, that the British should at once hand over the Government of India to a body of Indians chosen, as far as possible, to represent proportionately the various sections of Indian

opinion. Even at best, there would have been, during the transition, administrative chaos, with the Japanese already on the frontier. Moreover, the majority in such a Government would, presumably, have belonged to the Congress party, which is vehemently disliked by large parties in India. There is no reality in the Congress declaration that they would have been willing to allow Mr. Jinnah to form a Government, since Congress would still have had a majority in the legislatures, which would have made such a Government unworkable.

The great recent increase in the power and energy of the Moslem League is a direct result of the increased power of the Congress party, which abandoned its policy of non-co-operation to take office in the Provincial Governments in seven out of eleven provinces in 1937. Moslems claimed, with what justification it is impossible to determine, that the Congress Governments pursued a deliberately anti-Moslem policy, and Mr. Jinnah has declared that the day of their resignation shall be celebrated by his followers forever as "Deliverance Day." Since the Cripps mission, Mr. Jinnah has redoubled his efforts and his following has grown rapidly. "The whole policy of the Congress party," he says, "was to create a National Government in which Hindus would have an overwhelming majority. Such a Government would be set up with British and now with American bayonets. Moslems would be placed at the mercy of Hindu rule. This is a position which Indian Moslems would never accept." He has stated that "Mohammedans might stand in need of the sword to prevent any aggression against their rights." And their rights, they consider, are nothing less than Pakhistan, a separate Moslem State.

Then there is the Hindu Mahasabha, a militant organization of orthodox Hindus, opposed both to Congress and to the Moslem League. Its membership has been growing rapidly, while that of the Congress party has been decreasing, and its President, Mr. Savarkar, has announced that it will meet with force any revolt of the Moslems against incorporation in a predominantly Hindu India.

The Sikhs number only six million, but as they pointed out in their rejection of the Cripps proposals, their importance is out of all proportion to their numbers, because of their military prowess. Unfortunately, they are largely concentrated in the area which the Moslems claim as Pakhistan. They will never submit to being incorporated in it.

Finally, the depressed classes, including the "untouchables," have declared through their leader, Dr. Ambedkar, that they will never submit to Hindu rule. In their opinion the Cripps proposals would have placed them in this position, and they would be a good deal worse off if, as Congress demands, the British were to hand over the Government immediately.

A Provisional Government created now by Indian party leaders would have no popular mandate. It would not be directly responsible to an electorate and could not be made to resign except through armed rebellion. It might choose to perpetuate itself, or, at least, to decide a number of major questions before resigning office. For example: Should the future Constitution be determined by a single Constituent Assembly elected from all India? Or should there be two bodies, one representing Hindus and one Moslems; or one representing Provinces with a majority of Hindus, the other Provinces with a Moslem majority? A single Constituent Assembly would have a Hindu majority and would be unacceptable to most Moslems. The Congress proposal leaves all such questions to a body appointed in a hurry to meet a crisis, and almost inevitably such as either Hindus or Moslems would repudiate.

III

WE know that the propaganda of the Congress party presents a very different picture. It is said that, if the British granted complete freedom to India now, India would become enthusiastic for the war and would make a terrific war effort. The example of Ireland suggests otherwise, and no one can accuse any Irish party of pacifism. It is suggested that Congress really represents all India. The danger of civil war is represented as a British invention. No one who has read the documents in the case, or the voluminous writings of Gandhi on Hindu-Moslem hostility, can regard this propaganda as valid. There is no evidence

that external danger is diminishing the bitterness of these ancient quarrels; rather the opposite. If the English were to withdraw, the war effort of Hindus and Moslems might well be directed against each other, not against the Japanese.

The question whether, in time of peace, India should be left at liberty to fight a civil war, is one to which we shall return shortly. But at the present moment, when chaos in India would mean almost certain Japanese conquest and would greatly imperil our chances of ultimate victory, it is obvious that order must be preserved in India. Mr. Rajagopalachari, ex-Premier of Madras, who was until lately a member of the Congress party, realizes this and vigorously dissents from the demand that the British should leave India at this critical time. He says: "There is no reality in the fond expectation that should Britain leave this country in simple response to a Congress slogan, a vacuum would be created, in which we could begin with a fundamental national organization. Every inch vacated by Britain would be occupied by Japan. The enemy will deliberately foster and exploit existing chaos in order to make his own work easy and reduce the country to hopeless subjection."

This is obvious common sense. Clearly the belligerents are entitled to do what is necessary to prevent a social convulsion which may lead to their defeat. And if it is permissible to occupy North Africa for military reasons, it is also permissible to continue to occupy India for the same reasons. It would be ridiculous to say that, because some Indians are unwilling to wait till the end of the war, Americans, British, Russians, and Chinese, as well as Indians, should run a grave risk of becoming enslaved for an indefinite period. Yet that is what the claim of the Congress party amounts to.

On the other hand, a wide-spread campaign of civil disobedience might hamper the conduct of the war. Some leaders, notably Nehru, are moved toward moderation by this argument, but most of the Congress party seems to agree with Gandhi when he says, "I see no difference between the Fascist or Nazi Powers and the Allies." And not a few sympathize with Japan as an Asiatic Power.

IV

WHAT then should be done?

The following suggestions are based on two premises, both of which have been part of our political beliefs for a very long time. They are: (1) That Great Britain should grant Indian demands for *Swaraj,* not through the concession of Dominion status as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations (the Indians are not British), but admitting that India has the same right to independence as any other country in the modern world. (2) That this right to independence on the part of nations is strictly limited. No nation should be subject to another nation, but each nation should be subject in some respects to all the others. This is simply an extension of the principle of democratic government to international affairs.

There are two classes of decisions to be taken: first, as to the war period; second, as to the status of India after the war. Both must be taken while the war is in progress, since they affect the attitude of Indians to the war.

For the war period, the problem should be treated solely in relation to success in the war. It is important that the civil disobedience campaign should cease and that Indian leaders (not only of the Congress party) should have indubitable proof of the British intention to do everything toward meeting their wishes that is compatible with the efficient prosecution of the war. Negotiations should be revived, on the understanding that, so long as they continue, there will be no civil disobedience movement and the present political prisoners will be set at liberty. The negotiators should not be all British, but should represent the United Nations. For this there are two reasons: first, that the Indian question is to be considered from the standpoint of victory in the war, which is a matter that concerns all the United Nations equally; second, that the deep suspicion of the British which unfortunately exists in India makes purely British promises unacceptable. We should suggest, therefore, that the negotiators should consist of four commissioners, representing respectively the British, American, Soviet, and Chinese Governments. The initiative for the ap-

pointment of these negotiators should come from the British Government.

It must be admitted that even international arbitrators would be unlikely to find the problem a simple one. Gandhi has expressed his fear of having American rule added to British. There has been indignation among Moslems over an alleged pro-Congress bias both in China and America. And Dr. Ambedkar recently repudiated the suggestion of United Nations intervention in the following terms:

> Nothing is more shameful for Indians than frantic appeals to the President of the United States, General Chiang Kai-shek, and other leaders of the United Nations to come to India's rescue by forcing the British people to give India liberty. These appeals are bound to be fruitless. China is too dependent upon British help to do what some Indians want them to do. Americans are living in glass houses, as all who know the Negro problem will admit. President Roosevelt could hardly have the courage to throw stones at the British.
>
> To me it seems as impolitic as it is unbecoming for Indians to get other nations to find a solution for their problems. It is impolitic because the Allied Nations urging settlement of the Indian problem are looking at it from their own point of view and not from the viewpoint of Indians. They want a settlement, not because they are interested in doing justice to the various elements in its national life. They want a settlement because they want to use India as a base for operations, and they want the base to be peaceful. Their primary interest is to win the war in which they are engaged. The settlement of India's question is only incidental. Under such circumstances they might suggest a settlement in haste which the Indians may have to regret at leisure.

Dr. Ambedkar's fears are most natural. But the danger of a hastily devised solution can be avoided. The United Nations Commission should go to India, ascertain the main facts, and converse with the leaders of the various parties, with a view to discovering and recommending (a) interim measures, for the war period, designed to end the present deadlock and help the war effort, (b) a long-run solution of the Indian problem, to be put into effect when the war is over. The Commission should, in

fact, resume the task in which Sir Stafford Cripps failed, with more hope of success, since they would not represent only the British Raj or only the white man.

With regard to the war period, their purpose should be to discover what is the utmost that can be done immediately in the way of handing over administrative power to Indians without risk of administrative chaos. They will have to remember that it is not enough to please only one party, since the resentment of the others might produce a situation even worse than that which now exists. We do not know what recommendations they will find possible, but in any case, Indians and Americans will know that their findings will be dictated solely by military needs, not by any wish to preserve British imperialism. We think, therefore, that at least one good result may be expected, namely that there will be a great diminution of the widespread suspicion of Great Britain which at present exists in the United States. And in the meantime, the mere existence of such nego-

tiations will make possible the release of political prisoners, provided that the Congress leaders are prepared to call off the civil disobedience campaign while the negotiations continue. We suspect that many Indian leaders would show greater readiness to negotiate a settlement if they were to become convinced of the likelihood of an Allied victory.

With regard to the long-run solution of the Indian problem, the Commission might also be able to give useful advice. But as to this, they would need the guidance of certain general principles, which would have to be set forth in the terms of their appointment.

V

WHAT should these general principles be?

The simplest solution, which would no doubt be advocated by most Indian political leaders, would be that the British should undertake to evacuate India unconditionally at a given moment, say six months or a year after the cessation of hostilities. It may be said that, when the war is over, what happens to India is India's business, not that of the British or the United Nations. What if there is civil war? an Indian might say; the Americans, the British, the Chinese, and the Russians have all had civil wars, and have not welcomed foreign intervention. It is sheer imperialism, he may continue, for outsiders to decide what is for India's good, and if Indians want internal conflict they have a right to it.

These considerations would be valid if conflicts could be localized. We do not see how to answer them if international affairs are to remain anarchic, and on this hypothesis there is no alternative to unconditional British withdrawal after the war. But if any international authority is created, other considerations become relevant, and suggest a different answer. Such an authority, faced with the risk of civil war, must ask certain questions. Would there be any security that a civil war in India between Hindus and Moslems could be localized? Is it not highly probable that Mohammedans to the West and non-Mohammedans to the East would be drawn in? Can we be sure that no nation would seize the opportunity for imperialistic intervention? The history of the Spanish Civil War does not encourage optimistic answers to these questions.

If the war is to end in a peace which is not merely an armistice, there will have to be certain international controls over the action of single powers. There will have to be an Alliance pledged to resist armed aggression anywhere. But the Alliance must not only veto *foreign* aggression; it must also protect lawful governments against internal revolutions such as those by which Fascists have established their military dictatorships. If, for example, such an international organization had been in existence when General Franco rebelled with arms against a newly elected legitimate government, its duty would have been to send sufficient forces to hold the rebel army at bay while a plebiscite was taken to determine beyond doubt the wishes of the nation. Any constitutional change in any country should in future be sanctioned by a plebiscite, not imposed by an armed minority; and any regional minority should have the power of presenting its grievances to an international authority, which should be empowered to conduct a plebiscite in the region concerned to determine whether or not it should be granted local autonomy.

If this principle is accepted, the task of finding a long-run solution of the Indian problem cannot be settled by *merely* saying that the British must go. It will be necessary to discover some political organization of India which the various parties will accept, and which they will undertake not to resist by civil war. As things stand, it is not easy to imagine such an organization. Mere majority rule will not do, because the Moslems will not consent to be ruled by the Hindu majority, any more than the Irish formerly submitted to the rule of the British majority. The Moslems must be granted independence of the Hindus, and the Sikhs must be granted independence of the Moslems. We are not arguing as to whether these claims are reasonable; we are saying that they must be conceded if civil war is to be prevented. Nehru has remarked that Indians are suffering from the disease of nationalism, which prevents them having a clear view either

of Indian or of international affairs. He should have said "nationalisms," since the Moslems are now claiming to be a separate nation. Before any permanent solution of the Indian problem can be found, Indian factions must learn to see themselves not only in relation to each other, but as interlocking pieces of the global jig-saw puzzle.

The commission, accordingly, will have to state bluntly that, until Indians can agree to obey peaceably some system of self-government to which the leading groups have assented, the United Nations (not merely the British) will remain to preserve order. If this were known to be the fixed policy of the United Nations, it is possible that the Indian parties would reach an agreement. If not, it would have to be reluctantly decided that India, for some time, must submit to external control, not by Great Britain, but by an international authority.

This principle should, of course, not only apply to India. Domestic chaos giving rise to fascist tyrannies cannot be tolerated. The obvious course would be to decree that an existing constitution can only be changed by plebiscite, but that plebiscites are held whenever any large group demands them. This must apply, not only to the whole population of a state, but to any minority which, in some region, is in the majority. If changes are not to be violent, there must be provision for constitutional methods by which they can be made.

The imperialism of single nations, such as the British, the French, and the Dutch, has become an anachronism, and an invitation to war, because it is no longer backed by irresistible military force. But in certain parts of the world, if there is not to be dangerous chaos, national imperialism will have to be succeeded by an international control. The principle of national independence, if treated as absolute, is anarchic, and makes the prevention of war impossible. The independence of every country should be limited by the duty of obeying the law: externally, by abstaining from aggression; internally, by abstaining from civil war. The international authority should have the right and the duty of enforcing this obedience to law upon any state that endangers it. Subject to these conditions, nations should be free to manage their own affairs.

It would be a grave error to think that questions as to what is to be done about India after the war can safely be left until the war is over. Wendell Willkie, in his speech at Toronto on November 25, set forth with admirable force the reasons for coming *now* to decisions as to the principles on which peace is to be based. "The people must define their purposes during the war," he said, "for I live in constant dread that this war may end before the people of the world have come to a common understanding of what they fight for and what they hope for after the war is over." India, to which these wise words are emphatically applicable, is a difficult problem, both practically and theoretically. In the above discussion, we have assumed that the United Nations are fighting, first, to obtain a peace which shall be more than a breathing space between great wars, and, within that paramount object, to secure the greatest degree of justice and freedom compatible with peace, both within each nation and in the mutual relations between different states.



THE SOVIETS *and* AMERICA

by

Albert Rhys Williams

THE advent of the Soviets to power in 1917 broke a tradition of 150 years of friendly relations between Russia and the United States. American troops participated in the Allied effort to overthrow the Soviets, and even after these troops were withdrawn, the contradictory belief, on the one hand, that the Soviets were doomed to failure and collapse and, on the other, that they threatened our way of life, prevented the recognition of the Soviet Government. This, however, did not prevent a considerable flow of trade between the two countries. As our commercial relations with them increased, the Soviets grew in power and prestige. By the time Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected to the Presidency, the U. S. S. R. had reached a position of influence in Europe and Asia.

Expanding his good neighbor policy to other continents than our own, President Roosevelt expressed his regrets "that these great people, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage" had no direct means of communication. The Soviets immediately responded to this overture, and on November 17, 1933, recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States ended the long period of estrangement.

Among the many motives leading to this step, "the most impelling," said President Roosevelt, "was the desire of both countries for peace and . . . strengthening the peaceful purpose of the civilized world."

The hopes then expressed were doomed to tragic disappointment. One might speculate on how different the world would be today if Maxim Litvinov's efforts for a Pact of Collective Security had had the full-hearted backing of the United States. Unfortunately, the spirit of trust and confidence was lacking. There was friction ranging from inability to adjust the claims of old war debts with the Soviet counter-claims for compensation for intervention to resentment against communist activities. Some were real obstacles, but most of them were trivial and imaginary. They were played upon by reactionaries to whom the word, Communist, was anethema and who pointed to the "Red Menace" in any strike for bigger wages or better conditions, or even in the extension of social gains under the New Deal. All this was spurred on by German agents bent upon creating the utmost suspicion and distrust against the Soviets. They did everything possible to widen whatever rifts there were into chasms.

Hostility against the Soviets reached its all-time high in 1939, however, when they made the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Hitler. The Soviets were regarded as accomplices and blood brothers of the Nazis, conspiring against civilization. Then suddenly the Red Army was locked in deadly combat with the *Reichswehr*. Just as suddenly came about a complete reversal in feeling and opinion. Almost overnight Russia was transformed from the enemy of civilization into its champion and savior; and Stalin from an arch villain to the "great warrior-chief of his people."

This reversal rose, not simply out of self-interest in the unexpected acquisition of a new and powerful ally. It was due to a reappraisal of the past in the light of the

new situation. Those very actions of the Soviets that had so confused and antagonized public opinion of America now appeared in retrospect as astute, far-sighted measures of defense. The pact with Germany gave the Soviets time to build up their armaments, to equip their factories with high-speed steel and precision instruments. The pushing back of the Finnish frontier and the incorporation of the Baltic States gave them outposts against invasion. The Five-Year Plans with all their attendant privations and hardships gave the Soviets the munitions to carry on this momentous struggle against the Nazis.

All these facts, coupled with the spirit and ability with which they are carrying on the struggle, have produced a great upsurge of sympathy, respect, and admiration. Once hostile groups are now friendly. Circles that formerly would hear nothing positive now do not want to listen to anything negative. So far has this gone that there is a tendency to say that between the two countries there are not such differences after all. This in one way is a great gain.

II

NEVERTHELESS, there are certain differences in life, in institutions and outlook. Quite likely Russians may do things to startle and shock Americans and *vice versa*. In the long run, instead of blinking at the differences, it may be better to recognize them and to try to understand their nature, and how they came to be.

Take, for example, a major issue, the question of freedom. One hears there is "no freedom in Russia." Yet millions of Russians are marching to the front, singing, "In all the earth, where breathes a man so brave and free." And it is true, the Soviet Union offers and secures certain freedoms enjoyed in no other country. In no other country in the world is the Negro or Mongolian less handicapped by reason of his color, or are Jews so utterly exempt from the evils of anti-Semitism. In no other country are the doors open wider to men and women of ability no matter how lowly their birth. In no other country are the workers better insured against enforced idleness, illness, and old age. "And what liberty," asks Stalin, "can there be for a man in danger of losing his job, his home, and bread?" To the Soviets, economic rights and security are fundamental to everything else. These are written into the Soviet constitution guaranteeing to each citizen opportunity to work, to education, to leisure. This is the gist of the Soviet concept of freedom. It means the presence of opportunity—freedom *for* something.

To Americans freedom primarily implies absence of restraint. It means freedom *from* something—the right of each man to think, do, say, and go as he pleases. We do not like secret police, arbitrary arrests, officials prying into our affairs, pushing us about, telling us what to do. Neither, for that matter, do the Russians like them. No people have a keener sense of their own worth, and personality. No people enjoy more to express their ideas and feelings, or gathering together to voice their plaints and grievances.

That is one reason why the new constitution defining these rights was hailed throughout the country with so much enthusiasm. Among its unique articles are a Bill of Economic Rights, a Bill of Racial Rights, and a Bill of Duties. After that, as in the Constitution of the United States, comes a Bill of Personal and Political Rights, even more explicitly defined than in our Constitution. Here to every citizen are guaranteed all the freedoms—speech, press, worship, and assembly—everything up to "inviolability of his home and secrecy of correspondence."

Excellent in theory, say the critics, but little evidence of these rights in practice. At best, they represent the Soviet's aims and aspirations rather than realities. That is true, likewise, of many ideals written into the Constitution of the United States.

In 1789, we proclaimed the equality of all peoples before the law. But it was seventy-five years before the Negroes were granted their rights as citizens and voters; and in some areas these are still more honored in the breach than in the observance. In 1919, Lenin declared that in the "immediate future" all citizens would enjoy the right of suffrage. But it took seventeen years before that was achieved. Time and circumstance likewise have their bearing upon those evils, so much deplored in Russia—censorship, secret trials, concentration

camps, restrictions on foreign travel, attempts to "freeze" workers to their jobs.

The Soviet Union has been living under a threat of invasion for the past ten years, facing on one frontier the strongest military power in the world, and often in actual combat with the second strongest on the other frontier. It is as if Canada and Mexico were hostile fascist states—only ten times more powerful than they are—with millions of armed men on our borders. Imperiled from all sides, infested with foreign agents and spies, lacking traditions of political freedom possessing millions of nomads and peasants scarcely able to read and write, driving at top speed, undergoing terrible sacrifices to prepare for the inevitable conflict, the Soviets, nevertheless, wrote this bill of civil liberties into their constitution. That in itself may be rated as a considerable achievement. To be noted, also is the fact that the extent to which its provisions have been put into effect was in direct relation to the external danger. In each period of relative safety there has been an extension of the area of freedom and the practices of democracy.

Bearing this in mind, what may be expected from a peace that would bring security to the Soviet Union? Unless one assumes that freedom is incompatible with a highly socialized state, or that, while other countries are changing, Russia remains static, it seems reasonable to look forward to a large and perhaps rapid evolution in the direction of greater freedom and democracy. In that case, the Soviets would be closer to American concepts and peacetime practices in this field. On the other hand, in such fields as planning, social security, and racial attitude, it may be that America will be closer to Soviet ideas and practice. Litvinov put it this way: "As a result of the war, Russian communism will be modified, American democracy will be modified, British capitalism will be modified. The things that have stood between them will be broken down. The changes in them will bring them closer together."

III

BUT some differences are bound to remain. One may stress them as in the past to the detriment of the interests of America and Russia. Or in the interest of better relations, one may dwell upon their similarities. For it is easy to see that there are many ways in which the two countries are alike. Both countries are "the melting pots" of many races and nationalities. Both are big in territory, in population, and natural resources, which in turn impart a certain largeness of mind and spirit to their peoples. Both are proud of their revolutionary origin, and after passing through the throes of bitter civil war, embarked on a period of astounding industrial development. Both believe in the power of modern science and technology to bring about an economy of plenty for the material well-being of all.

As striking as are these resemblances in history, geography, and industry, they are not less so in their aims and character, in the ethical and democratic spirit of their peoples. Neither is based on a caste or privileged group; both, believing with profound faith in the character, worth, and capacity of the common man, are dedicated to the interests of all the people. Both are without grandiose dreams or schemes of world empire. As Ralph Barton Perry has said, they are "opposed alike to the nazi goal of enslaved masses by a master class, and of enslaved nations by a master race."

Besides these grounds making for greater unity, sympathy, and understanding, is one thing more the two peoples have in common. Each has good reason to be grateful

for service rendered the other. Certainly the Soviet people are aware on the whole of the good will and good intentions of the Americans. True, we took part in intervention in 1918, but while other countries were counting upon dividing up the skin and carcass of the Russian bear, we insisted on the territorial integrity of Russia. We sent our army into Siberia along with the other Allies; but against the Japanese, who wanted to remain, we exerted such pressure that they, too, were compelled to withdraw. We gave no credit to the Soviets for the building up of the country, but we sent thousands of our best engineers, technicians, and architects. So efficiently and conscientiously did they perform their tasks that not one was ever accused of sabotage and they won the respect and admiration of all. We long withheld recognition from the Soviets, but when the great famine of 1919 swept through the Ukraine and the Valley of the Volga, we sent our food and medicine to the value of sixty-six million dollars. This rescued countless victims from starvation; in the words of H. H. Fischer, "made for America a unique place in the hearts of millions of Russian people."

How firmly America holds that place in their affections I found on my last visit to Russia. Journeying back from the Volga, I came at nightfall to an Old Believer's village, still clinging to its old dress and customs. A half-hour after the village grapevine announced the arrival of an American, came a knock at my door. There stood a patriarch with a long, white beard, flowing down over his long black kaftan; behind him, two younger men bearing a trencher covered with a gay, embroidered towel. On it was a huge loaf of bread and a pile of salt—*khleb-sol*—the symbols of hospitality with which they have paid honor to visitors from time immemorial. Bowing low, and making the sign of the cross with two fingers, the elder spoke:

> We give welcome! Twenty years ago we and our wives and our children and our cattle were dying of hunger. We ate grass and roots and the straw from our roofs. It seemed that even God had forgotten us! But in that black hour, America heard our cry. Over the far seas you came, bringing bread for our bodies and courage to our hearts. May God's blessing and our blessings be on all Americans.

Again Russia is in desperate plight, scourged by an enemy more terrible than any since the Tartars ravaged the land. Again in response to their need, out of America in steady procession sail the ships laden with tanks, airplanes, and munitions. And with them go the ships of mercy laden with food, milk, clothes, and medicaments. To tens of thousands they are granting reprieve from suffering and death; saving children from going barefoot in the snow; alleviating the torments of the wounded; restoring invalid soldiers to the fighting front; putting courage into the hearts of the people to go on with the struggle; storing up good will and gratitude.

Conversely, America has good reasons for

good will and gratitude to the Soviets. Above all stands the steadfast resistance of the Red Armies, giving to America that respite and breathing spell so imperative for mobilizing its industries and military forces. In recognition of the inestimable value of this are the sincere, full, and generous tributes pouring forth in the press and pulpit and radio.

"Who can exaggerate what the Russians have done for us in fighting and wearing down three hundred nazi divisions in the West, and at the same time the holding back of thirty to forty Japanese divisions from action in the Pacific?"

"Every one of the millions of German soldiers, tanks, and planes destroyed by Russians is just one less to be pitted against our armies in the West."

"In their defense of Moscow and Leningrad, the Russians are fighting in defense of New York and Washington."

With this evaluation of the Soviets' military prowess and service goes a new evaluation of their achievements in industry, farming, education, and science. There is a better understanding likewise that between the two countries exists no fundamental conflict of interests; on the contrary, countless reasons for co-operation and collaboration. To their mutual advantage this is now taking place, engendering a spirit of mutual good will that bodes well for the future, when in the words of Maxim Litvinov, "the two countries which have been companions in arms will, after the war, be busied with the common tasks of reconstruction."

A FEDERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF Central Eastern Europe

By Jan Stańczyk

CENTRAL EUROPE is inhabited by over 100 million industrious and peace-loving Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Rumanians, Hungarians, Lithuanians, and Bulgarians. Hitherto these peoples have been subjected to political pressure and economic exploitation by the Germans. Since the first World War, by means of armed tyranny followed by economic pressure, Germany has brought the labor, food, and raw material of these hundred million people into her own service. And through such methods Central-Eastern Europe became an economic hinterland on which the German Reich has built up her economic and military might. It is primarily the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe, who are condemned to supply Germany with cheap labor, cheap raw material, cheap food, and in return to buy the finished goods of German industry; it is they who made it possible for Germany to develop an excessive industrialization to the point where it threatens the economic development of other countries and enables her to raise her military machine to a power continually threatening the peace of the world.

If, therefore, this second World War provoked by Germany is not to be also the beginning of another war, if the peace for which the freedom-loving peoples are struggling, suffering, and dying is to be a lasting one, we must base our post-war political and economic structure of Europe on principles which will make it impossible for Germany to bring about further wars. In order to achieve this we must first and foremost ensure the creation of a bloc of the Central-Eeastern European peoples, and then enable them not only to reorganize their present one-sided agricultural type of economic system, but also to develop their backward industrial economy. For the nations in that part of Europe can never have political independence so long as they are confronted with Germany's excessive industrialization, while they remain economically backward areas surrendering their resources to German industry at the same time that a hundred million of their own people live in endemic poverty. For we must always remember that German imperialism is due not only to the warlike character of the German nation, but also to the excessive development of German industry, which is completely out of all proportion to the German domestic requirements.

The figures given below clearly illustrate

the great difference which existed between the scale of economic existence in industrialized Germany and that of the agricultural countries of Central-Eastern Europe. We take as our basis of comparison the situation in Germany and in Poland. A similar condition of affairs existed in all the other countries of Central-Eastern Europe with the exception of Czechoslovakia, which was classified among industrialized countries.

National statistics per head of population

	Poland	Germany
National Income		
1929	169.8	470.1
1933	94.5	320.0
Savings Deposits		
1938	8.4	113.0
Foreign Trade		
1938	13.8	62.6
Production 1937		
Steel	43.04	294.6
Rolling Stock	28.09	209.1
Acid	5.05	30.1
Cement	37.03	187.0
Consumption 1935		
Sugar	8.9	19.1
Coffee	0.2	2.1
Tea	0.05	0.07
Tobacco	0.5	1.7
Meat	18.4	49.0

Owing to Germany's excessive industrialization she strives to conquer the world markets by exporting almost half of her industrial production, after the demands of her own population, which enjoys a high standard of living by comparison with many other countries, have been met. And it is obvious that if the Germans come up against difficulties in the export of their commodities to foreign markets, the German Army will soon be on the march to carve a road for German economic expansion, to obtain cheap raw material and markets for the disposal of their commodities. The German war aim of "more living space" for the German nation eloquently and terribly confirms the truth of this statement.

Therefore in order to assure a lasting peace in the new post-war organization of Europe and the world we must assure for the nations of Central-Eastern Europe, not only political independence, but also economic independence. The block of one hundred million people which inhabits Central-Eastern Europe will be the most certain factor for peace in Europe, because it will provide political and economic stability in that part of the world. For the Germans have begun all their wars by attacking weak nations. They have always shown an exceptional respect for strength. And an alliance of the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe, resting on a strong foundation, assuring the well-being of a hundred million people will economically, politically, and—if necessary—militarily, be a force able to assure a lasting peace to Europe, and in consequence peace to the whole world.

Moreover, the emergence of an alliance of peoples of Central-Eastern Europe is not only to the advantage of the peoples immediately interested, but also to that of all the nations of the world, including the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. For this war which the Germans have provoked is being paid for with the blood and ruin not only of the peoples who are Germany's immediate neighbors, but it is also, as we already know from experience of the last and even of the present war, a heavy charge on Russia, Great Britain, and the nations of America, separated though they are from Europe by three thousand miles of ocean.

Yet the price of economic aid to the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe will be incommensurably low by comparison with the sacrifices which the world is having to make in consequence of the disintegration of these Central-Eastern European peoples into small states. The aid granted by Americans and Britons in restoring and developing the economic life of the Central-Eastern European nations will repay itself abundantly to those who give that aid, and to the world generally. For it cannot be challenged that if the price—itself utterly disproportionate to the wartime sacrifices which the nations have made in two wars within some twenty years—were devoted to this end, it would be possible to assure Europe and the world not only a lasting peace and economic stability, but also the well-being of peoples who have lived in dire

and constant need because of their weakened national economy. Give the hundred million people in Central-Eastern Europe a higher standard of living in the three spheres of labor, income, and consumption, and they will become a tremendous market for the products of the world; they will be brought into the orbit of world economy as a positive factor in economic co-operation, a fruitful factor in production, exchange, and consumption.

It must not be forgotten that economic crises, the poverty of millions of people, and the social disintegration of nations have their causes in the existence not merely of rich people side by side with poor people, but also of rich nations side by side with poor nations.

The freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples must not only win this war against oppression, but must organize the post-war coexistence of the nations so judiciously and on such sound political and economic principles, that it will be impossible for the crime of new wars ever to be repeated. Moreover, they must ensure that in the new post-war world there shall be no place for economic misery or for political oppression of nations or of individuals anywhere on our earth.

The Global Farm Problem

by

T. SWANN HARDING

UNTIL the recent war news took over the headlines, one of the most discussed and least understood problems of our nation was the question of agricultural parity. Almost everywhere it was regarded as a local issue when, as a matter of fact, it is global in its implications.

Farm parity is a changing concept. Parity price is determined as follows: Data are first collected on the prices of 174 items farmers buy for household or productive use. These data are averaged, farm taxes, interest, and freight charges are next reflected, and thus a theoretical national average is attained. This is compared with the similarly determined average for the period, 1909-14, in the case of most crops affected. The percentage increase found is now applied to the base average farm price of the particular product for which parity is being calculated. The result is the current parity price.

Net farm income will attain about 136 per cent of parity in 1942, and parity has, of course, been the major objective of the farm program since its inception. Parity income is the net farm income needed to maintain the 1909-14 ration of per capita farm income to per capita non-farm income. For the first ten months of 1942 cash income from farm marketings totaled $12,-117,000, as compared with $8,906,000 in the corresponding period of 1941. The total for this year will be about 15 billion dollars, an increase of one-third over 1941 and nearly double the 1935-39 average. This sum also tops the former wartime peak of $14,600,000,000 for 1919. The increase in income, 1942 over 1941, results from a rise in prices of around 25 per cent and a 12 per cent increase in sales. Government payments will raise the total cash farm income in 1942 to 15.6 billion dollars as compared

with 11.8 billion in 1941. It looks as if the farmer is not doing so badly.

During the first World War net farm income rose from 97 per cent of parity in 1916 to 147 per cent in 1917, then to the record level of 165 per cent in 1918. In the period 1935-39, farm prices averaged just about parity, but 112 per cent of parity was attained in 1941. The so-called farm bloc for a long time battled to have the parity index revised upward. This could have been accomplished, the bloc felt, by giving full weighting to farm labor costs, an item omitted in 1937-38, because its inclusion then would have lowered parity.

The Department of Agriculture has consistently held out for maintenance of the parity index unimpaired. However, under the Emergency Price Control Act, ceilings could not be imposed upon farm prices until they reached 110 per cent of parity. To this provision the Secretary of Agriculture agreed because, at that time, farm prices averaged only 99 per cent of parity and they had continuously been under parity for many years. He felt that if an average of parity was to be attained, some farm prices must be permitted to exceed 100 per cent, for others would not attain that. On September 15, 1942, however, the Secretary told the Senate Banking and Currency Committee that conditions were such that the restriction was no longer needed. Thereafter, the Administration fought for an unimpaired parity index. The index remained unimpaired in the Price Stabilization Act which became law October 2, 1942. Under Section 3 of this act, no maximum price shall be established or maintained for any agricultural commodity, or for any commodity processed in whole or in substantial part from any agricultural commodity below a price that reflects the higher of the following: (1) Parity price; (2) the highest price received by producers between January 1 and September 15, 1942. The President may modify the price when necessary to secure increased production for war purposes, to "correct gross inequities," or whenever costs incurred by farmers since January 1, 1941, "adequate weight" being given to farm labor, are not duly reflected.

Thus the battle for parity has been won. Have farmers then attained millenium? Unfortunately, they have not. It is, in fact, ironical that right while the parity battle raged most furiously farmers were more interested in declining farm man power than in price, and in the functional process of producing the wartime needs of the nation than in maintenance of parity indices. Farmers have just topped all previous production records. Instead of turning out only 6 per cent more than in 1941, they have turned out better than 13 per cent more. They have doubled their production of oil crops—soybeans, peanuts, flaxseed for linseed oil, and cottonseed—more than wiping out the deficit due to our lost trans-Pacific oil imports.

But much of this task was accomplished by the planning and labor of some 1,600,000 individuals who are now in the armed forces or at work in industry. If the present drain on farm man power continues, another million individuals will leave the farms between July 1, 1942, and July 1, 1943. At the same time, farm machinery will be much more scarce, fertilizers and insecticides will be more difficult to procure, and the whole situation will tighten in so far as the farmers' instrumentalities of production are concerned. The American farmer wants to do his share, but if shortages of labor, materials, and equipment become too onerous, he will simply have to shut down plant and undertake only what he himself can manage to do.

Farmers do not want to do that. Moreover, many at present underemployed farmers on small holdings could increase their production of food and fiber very considerably if they were staked with government loans. There are about two million such farmers, and only about half a million of them have been helped by the sole government agency organized and staffed to do this sort of thing, the Farm Security Administration. It has been under constant fire and its activities have been curtailed. The FSA, however, is a thoroughly up-to-date instrumentality of government of the kind modern technological society urgently requires. It is also traditional in basic ideology because it seeks to equalize opportunity for those rendered underprivileged by modern society through no fault of their own. It recognizes that farm production matters more than price.

In wartime this is most urgently true. It

is no longer a question of doing this or that and of trying to make it pay. It is a problem in human engineering, in part, and in part one of utilizing machines, man power, materials, and processes functionally to create all those things we need to win the war. Agriculture has a basically important place in this picture. This fundamental industry is so recognized even by the most rapacious dictatorships. If our farmers have at last achieved the highest income in history, this has done no more than make them a relatively privileged class in our society, which is precisely what they tend to become all over the world.

II

HAS that solved the farm problem then? It has not. For farmers have so long operated in deficit and have so long produced our food, fiber, and timber needs at a discount, that a slight bettering of their situation just now does not even equalize their status, much less place them in a general, preferred position. But as the war continues, we, just like the British and the Germans, will increasingly recognize the fundamental importance of the tillers of the soil. After the war is won we must settle the farm problem on a global, not on a national, basis.

"Solving the farm problem" became quite a joke in the United States in recent years. The proposed solutions were the butt of endless witticisms and cartoons. About as far along as many of us went in our thinking was to say that farmers got paid for not producing. As a people, we failed signally to realize that our own farm problem was part of a world problem and that other nations, both democratic and totalitarian, faced the problem and sought solutions in splendid isolation. Unless such problems are considered on the premise that the world is an organic unit, they simply cannot be understood, much less solved. For science and technology have inexorably integrated and unified the globe. That has made of all national problems world problems, just as it has made all wars global wars. At the same time, technical and scientific progress have rendered traditional ideas about national self-sufficiency and sovereign independence obsolete. For no nation can now act without regard to the interests and problems of other nations. We acknowledge this when it comes to epidemics and in peacetime we set up international control. We must acknowledge it as well in industry, economics, and politics.

So far it has been little understood that a nation with a sick banking system, a sick government—like that of the Nazis—a sick industry, or a sick agriculture, menaces all other nations in the world. The farm problem was really a world problem. The measures any one nation takes to solve it affect all other nations. If production is reduced by rigid controls or commodities are destroyed, every nation in the world is affected. Yet each nation sought until war came to solve its farm problem on a nationalistic basis.

Though we speak usually of our six or seven million farmers, there are in the nation only four million tracts that could be properly qualified as farms, for two million of the tracts described as farms by the Census Bureau have annual cash incomes averaging only $215, which is patently insufficient to support a family. Over a million tracts reported ownership of no agricultural implements and a million and three-quarters reported ownership of not a single horse or mule. Even then on two of the four million tracts classified above as farms, annual cash income averaged $647 a year and the lowest amount of cash necessary to provide a farm family with a minimum adequate living is $700.

There was an American farm problem. Many measures were adopted in the effort to solve it, among them direct and disguised subsidies, payments for soil conservation and the reduced production of soil-destroying crops, efforts to raise prices of farm commodities, and other measures adopted by industry in a depression. For American agriculture worked in the frame of reference of American industry and some conformity to industrial procedure in depression was inevitable. In taking such measures, however, industry tends to disregard the social consequences of its acts. Agriculture did not do this. Emphasis was placed upon the conservation of our natural resources—soil, water, and forests. Rational means of surplus disposal were introduced which acted as price-control mechanisms

but also, under the food-stamp and other plans, made food available to the underprivileged at the same time. Crop insurance, elaborate financing devices, and commodity-market controls were all established.

In the earlier stages of its enhanced mechanization American agriculture provided the nation with food and fiber at a sharp discount. In depression it was expensive to maintain this highly mechanized industry in something like running order. Compensation for past favors had to be given farmers by means of what were essentially government grants. As a result, even in the United States, the agricultural industry has tended more and more to become a government-planned and government-regulated enterprise. Here, as elsewhere, war brought agricultural prosperity. This is not an evenly distributed prosperity and there is still much rural distress. But farm income as a whole is higher than ever before and the average farmer willingly states today that he is far better off than he was a year ago, while he expects to become still better off. Moreover, he has done a big job.

But in attempting to solve the pre-war farm problem the means taken stuck pretty closely to the price end of the situation. The proper procedure would have been to begin with a scientific survey to ascertain the food, fiber, and timber needs of our population; this should have been followed by a scientific plan for satisfying those needs functionally. That would have been a rational solution though one still within a narrow nationalistic frame of reference. Instead, efforts were made to raise prices, regardless of the fact that this would only render still more consumers unable to buy what they needed. Nevertheless, accompanying relief measures were soon instituted, but they were designed originally to assist the underprivileged to pay the usual prices charged to others. Yet when the oversupply of hogs forced farm prices down to $3.98 a hundredweight in July, 1933, and the much maligned "little pig" slaughter took place, this yielded 97,531,000 pounds of dry salt pork which was distributed through relief channels. But the measure also saved sixty million bushels of corn that were necessary in the drought year, 1934, to maintain hog numbers and the pork supply when the national corn crop was halved by the weather.

III

WE were not alone in our farm troubles, though we acted as if we were. Every other country, democratic or totalitarian, was trying then to lick the farm problem. The misfortune was that they were all trying separately, whereas the problem could only be really licked on a world basis. Thus around 1934, Walter Elliot, a venturesome conservative, was British Minister of Agriculture, and the wiseacres were saying that he had effected a peaceful agrarian revolution unrealized by forty-five million Britishers. It was said that he sought to replace wasteful competitive individualism with rigid government planning. For the state was to regulate the production and prices of all important products, agricultural and otherwise.

The British Government began by paying subsidies to wheat growers, as early as 1931. This increased acreage enormously and production went up 42 per cent in one year. This was accompanied by a throttling of imports and rigid production control all along the line, regardless of the wisdom of these steps viewed from a world standpoint. The British agricultural marketing schemes were also put into operation in 1931, likewise fathered by Mr. Elliot. Under these, all producers of commodities registered and then voted on a scheme drawn up by the National Farmers' Union and the Ministry of Agriculture. If a majority favored the scheme, it was applied to all producers by compulsion and with small regard for consumer interests.

Thus, like us, Britain unintentionally prepared for possible war much before it broke out. Under wartime conditions all sorts of devices have been used. Six million acres more have been put in cultivation, and the tractor population of the British Isles has doubled. British cereal production is now up 72 per cent, and the numbers of livestock, except beef cattle, have considerably increased. Control is rigid, and, as compared with the status of our farmers, undemocratic. There are about a hundred county war committees all over Britain which have final local power over agriculture. The chairman of these committees are appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture; their six members, one of whom must be a labor representative and one of whom must be a woman to represent the consumer point of view, are appointed by the chairmen with approval of the Ministry. These committees set up quotas for local farmers who must raise what they are told or face eviction or jail. If the farmer is evicted, the land is taken over and operated under trained managers.

Farm labor is tied to the land and is forbidden to move about searching for other jobs, either industrial or agricultural. In compensation, however, the purchasing power of their wages is double that of prewar times, and this has risen definitely as

compared with wages of industrial workers. Farm workers also have a 50-hour week. While the farmer is compelled to pay these higher wages, his own situation has also improved, for farmers are a coddled class under wartime conditions. They are recognized as in a special category even by the Axis states and are treated comparatively well for fear of alienating them. The British farmer's fixed charges have been stabilized, while the prices he pays for fertilizer and equipment are controlled. Meanwhile, the price of the products he sells has been advanced.

This recent tendency to favor farmers somewhat at the expense of consumers, which was common to both Britain and the United States, was also apparent in the Axis countries, except Japan. Japan has, however, for years been using such devices as price stabilization, output control, easing of the farmer's debt burden, fostering farm ownership, crop insurance, and artificial lowering of the cost of fertilizers and other supplies, in order to aid her farmers. Nevertheless, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has sought primarily to promote self-help among farmers. They have been told that they can solve most of their own problems if they will only try. On the whole, the measures undertaken have been used so sparingly that the end result was unsatisfactory, at least in accomplishing the chief aim of increasing production in farming and fishing villages.

However, this must not be construed as implying that the war food situation in Japan is bad. It is not. As Secretary Wickard said December 17, 1941, it is instead very good. Since then conquest has improved it. The Japanese live mainly on rice, wheat, and fish, and are amply stocked. Reports of rice shortages in recent years have indicated in the main an effort to accustom the people to rationing. Moreover, the land planted to mulberry trees has already been reduced a quarter of a million acres. Wheat, barley, and vegetables have been planted instead. In general, Japan was already self-sufficient in foodstuffs.

The other Axis countries, Italy and Germany, have forthrightly placed their farmers in a position of preference regardless of cost to consumers and the rest of the nation's economy. There is no reason to regard even the farmers in Hitler's Germany as slaves under the whiplash. Without food and fiber there can be no industry and no warfare. The farmer is the kingpin of the whole. The Nazis are fully aware of this and move cautiously in matters concerned with agriculture so as not too greatly to offend the tradition-bound peasantry.

This was true in Italy. The Fascists originally paid little attention to agriculture but it began to interest them around the mid-twenties. Regulation goes directly down from the Duce himself, through the Fascist Grand Council and the National Council of Corporations to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. There are Directorates General for land reclamation, agriculture proper, and for financing and production planning.

In Italy the agricultural Corporation includes representatives of all economic activities involved in the complete production cycle from raw material to finished product, just as in industry. There are individual corporations concerned with grains; vegetables, flowers, and fruits; viticulture and wine production; edible oils; sugar beets and sugar; animal husbandry and fishing; forestry and wood products; and textiles. Workers and employees are organized in their respective associations. A decree of April 28, 1937, gave the agricultural Corporation direct control of commodity prices. The Ministry, on the other hand, deals with farm production problems. The relations between farm owners and laborers, prices, marketing, and consumption all fall within the purvey of the Ministry of Corporations. The general drive, however, has long been for autarchy — agricultural self-sufficiency without regard to cost. Elements involved therein have been the extensive use of substitutes, import and price control, the encouragement of production by use of high tariffs, assurance to producers of fixed minimum prices, the award of cash prizes to highly productive farmers, provision of low-priced fertilizers, the distribution of high-quality seed, and direct subsidy.

Naturally this program increased the Italian's cost of living. But that was immaterial because the drive of the program was basically political, not economic. It was a step on the road to aggression. Hence the

Government simply acted to give higher prices to the farmer and to place him in a preferred category. This wartime economy was set up during peace. It is of interest to note that regulation of everything from seed to processed food was included. However, fraud and adulteration flourished.

In Germany, the Nazis took hold of agriculture immediately they came to power. The objective was to render Germany agriculturally self-sufficient. The aim was political. A hereditary farm law tied the farmers to the soil, if they had the right "Aryan" blood. The four-year plan of 1936 was renewed in 1940. Farmers had to submit soil samples on request and to follow government advice on the scientific use of fertilizers, as well as on what to grow and how to cultivate. Farmers could neither sell nor leave their farms, but they were nonetheless a relatively pampered group—as things nazi go. Complete control was taken also of food stocks and food processing. Food manufacture could proceed only under license, the expansion and contraction of production taking place as ordered. Output was requisitioned when needed and distribution to consumers strictly regulated. The German Ministry of Food and Agriculture unified activities in these fields.

This Ministry formulates general agrarian and trade policies. It issues basic orders and directives dealing with the production and rationing of food. It controls the Reich Food Estate which, in turn, carries out policies in detail, and directly regulates the production and marketing of food and feeds through twenty-odd regional and two-hundred-odd district branches. There are also local farmers' associations, membership being compulsory for all producers, processors, and wholesale and retail distributors of food. These organizations have full official status and are no longer mere nazi agencies. The basic motive is and has been increased production and national self-sufficiency regardless of cost. Production, marketing, processing, and distribution are treated as segments of an organic whole. German farming has become the heaviest subsidized on earth. Prices of milk and butter were increased March 11, 1940, in order the better to reward farmers, and a subsidy of forty dollars an acre began to be paid for turning meadowland to cultivation. The program involves complete price and import control.

The flight from the land was stopped abruptly by putting hindrances in the way of labor desiring to move from one farm to another, or from farms to industry. However, both farm housing and working conditions have been improved. Farm wages have been raised, although farm labor is still in a less favorable position than industrial labor, even when all extras are thrown in. Prisoners of war, students, and women are organized to aid farmers. On the whole, price policies have been favorable for farm products, though recently increasing costs of production have tended to cut the margin. However, the Government shows no desire whatever to arouse passive resistance on the part of the peasants and such measures are taken as, it is felt, will secure their sympathetic co-operation. This shows that even the most ruthless dictatorship must handle the basic producers with intelligence and some measure of special consideration.

IV

WE ourselves were very fortunate in that our Government had proceeded with a much derided farm-aid program since 1933. While the United States and Great Britain were not consciously preparing for war, much less aggression, their Governments did take some measures to help ailing agricultural industries. But under peacetime conditions the production, processing, and distribution of foods is handled in both countries by an elaborately inefficient and overlapping instrumentality, a complicated conglomeration of trades and businesses mismanaged for profit by private enterprise.

The necessary basic foods have been manipulated and elaborated into all kinds of special and trick foods in order to coax money out of consumer pockets. The simple means of sustaining life has thus become a large collection of interrelated industries, some concerned still with satisfying our primary wants at a good profit, but others producing and selling frauds and luxuries palmed off upon consumers as necessities. The functional problem of properly feeding the population on scientific principles has been neglected. Instead, the system, if

we may call it that, was based upon the idea of producing food at a price level at least one-third of the population could not afford to meet. Even under wartime conditions the tendency for a long period both in Britain and in the United States has been to operate food control with as little interference with existing trade practices as possible, however wasteful and bungling such procedures are. Needs, not permitted expenditures, the nutritive requirements of the population, not price control, should be the objective.

Certainly in wartime, consumers should not be fair game to be bullied and defrauded at will as in what are quaintly called "normal" times—the legitimate prey of manufacturer, merchant, and advertiser. Yet even in such times our only method of effectively aiding the underprivileged was through the established agencies of the grocer and the banker. The Food Stamp Plan was ingenious and commendable in the extreme, but it certainly was not strictly functional in operation. To solve the problem functionally, properly qualified experts should be called upon to estimate the food, fiber, and timber requirements of the nation, meaning in case of the first, the nutrient elements required to keep every citizen in a state of maximum fitness. Other experts should then take these estimates and devise a program along the lines of our Food for Freedom farm-production goals for the production, marketing, processing, and distribution of this food. This would constitute a scientific approach to the problem.

Sooner or later such an approach must be adopted even during peace. However abhorrent many devices of totalitarians are to us, we must adopt the useful parts of their program if we are to stand up against them effectively. They are profoundly right in their assumption that agricultural production and the food industry must be under a single highly-centralized governmental control. Great Britain has gone rather far along this line under pressure of acute food shortages, but even yet not far enough.

We long tended to assume that we need bother comparatively little about food. We felt that our potential productive capacity was all but unlimited in this field. We allowed insufficiently for the calls upon us of others of the United Nations. We have already rationed sugar and faced shortages of certain meats and canned goods. More and longer shortages and much more rationing are bound to come in the future. The more quickly we reorganize our entire agricultural and food industries as an organic whole and without regard to profit the better. The sooner we ration many foods other than sugar and meat, the better also.

What of the future? What of the postwar world? The Draft Convention on wheat announced by the State Department July 2, 1942, points the way. This is an agreement arrived at after a year's deliberation by representatives of Argentina, Canada, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. It marks a break with the old method of individual competition in food production among the nations. Under this method each country produced whatever wheat it desired, even if at high cost, and all countries then fought for the available outlets. Overproduction, confusion, and monetary loss resulted; meanwhile huge blocks of human beings had too little wheat in their diets. As a result of this agreement, world needs for wheat will be the first consideration, due attention being given to providing an adequate diet for all.

Hereafter a pool of not less than one hundred million bushels of wheat will be maintained at all times as an international ever-normal granary. Wheat will be produced in regions where it can be grown economically. There will be free trade in wheat at all times and the pool will be used for inter-governmental relief of war-stricken countries and in such food-deficient areas as require it. The basic aim is fuller and more efficient use of human and natural resources. Prices will be maintained which are fair to consumers yet adequately reward producers. Ruinous surpluses will be avoided. A Wheat Council of experts is to administer the agreement.

Such agreements should be made regarding other commodities just as quickly as they can be formulated. Only by such voluntary international regulation of the production and distribution of agricultural and industrial commodities can we avoid chaos in the hoped-for free world of tomorrow. Only thus can the global farm problem be solved.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

Czechoslovakia Fights Back

By Milič Kybal

MARCH 15, 1939 came as a sudden blow to the Czech common man. For one thousand years he had distrusted the Germans too much to believe Hitler's *"Ich will keine Tschechen,"* but after Munich he thought his nation had lost so much that no more could be asked of her. Only the day before had he read that some politicians in Bratislava had declared Slovakia independent. Then they were there — German troops marching in a blizzard through the black streets of Prague — their tanks and trucks and motorcycles swarming all over the country.

That day the underground movement was born in Czechoslovakia; in no other way could the nation react to the occupation. Since Munich, no Czech had resigned himself to the loss of what some people abroad called the Sudetenland. It had been theirs from the dawn of Czech history. Sometime, somehow it would have to be won back. Now, with the Germans holding all of the country the task would be harder. A certain feeling upheld the people's faith; a world war would soon break out, which would finally shatter the forces of evil and bring about freedom again.

The whole nation, united into a single block by the adversity of fate, clung to these hopes with the same stubborness that on so many other occasions had saved it in the past. The Germans failed completely to grasp the psychology of the Czechs. Under these circumstances, the Protectorate the Germans declared over Bohemia and Moravia was accepted by the people only as a makeshift solution preferable to direct annexation; it was to serve solely as a means of facilitating Czech resistance until the day of final reckoning should come. The ideal of the Republic never disappeared from the nation's will and mind; on the contrary, it was stronger than ever.

The Czechs set to work right away. The first job to do was to spirit away politically prominent men who sooner or later would fall into the clutches of the Gestapo. In this way Senator Vojta Benes, brother of the President, was tipped off about his impending arrest, whisked away to the Polish border in an automobile, then at midnight stealthily led with his wife across by reliable people. Others were taken to safety by miners through abandoned coal shafts; still others were helped by railwaymen in freight cars.

Another category of men who were helped abroad were former army officers, mainly fliers and technical experts. They were eager to get into the war which was bound to come. Finally, a good number of engineers, inventors, and technical men left the country, some of them carrying their plans and formulas on paper, others relying only on their good memory. Once in England, they helped turn out the famous Bren machine gun,

pumps against incendiaries, gloves and shoes for the services, flashlights and batteries for civilian defense, and scores of other essential articles.

Many reached safety by fooling or bribing Gestapo agents. A good number of fake traveling salesmen crossed the frontier representing firms who could not export. The Czech officials in the Protectorate were always most helpful. It was always possible to say to them: "Please rush these papers, I'm leaving the country." The most spectacular feat of the underground organization along this line was the case of Ladislav Feierabend and Jaromír Necas, two ministers of the Protectorate Government. They respectfully paid a visit to Protector von Neurath; three hours later they vanished into thin air. Later, they appeared in England where they were made members of the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile.

The Martyred Hen

A PHASE of the struggle in which the entire nation participates is on the economic front. It is an unequal contest where the nazi aim is to grab without limit, and where the Czechs can rely only on their ingenuity and mutual aid. The Germans soon realized that they could get nowhere with the cunning Czech peasants. Only a truly Prussian economy could produce at least part of what they wanted: all cattle and pigs had to be registered; quotas were established for farm products which must be fulfilled under penalty, and peasants were permitted to dispose of their products only to German authorities. Despite heavy penalties, including capital punishment, hoarding, unlicensed slaughtering, and smuggling still flourish. Even if the Germans are thus able to plunder efficiently Czech farms, the enormous number of nazi officials this requires is a victory for the Czechs. Food supplies for the Nazis were sabotaged also by some Czech officials of the Protectorate. Thus Dr. Otakar Frankenberger was shot, his chief guilt consisting, according to the Nazis, "in deliberately keeping secret and failing to carry out the regulations of the Reich officials in his capacity as responsible officer for stabilizing the market." But whom are the Nazis to shoot when they find a dead chicken with a card tied to its neck reading: "I preferred to die rather than to work for the Germans?"

Another battle of even greater importance to the Germans which they have had to wage in the Czech lands since the first day of invasion takes place in the factories. The powerful Czech armament plants immediately became the object of nazi regulation and supervision. Now, one nazi guard has to watch five machines in the Skoda plants. This does not prevent Czech workers from adding zinc and sulphur to molten steel, which makes the turned out guns useless after having fired a few shells, or from putting sand or graphite under the caps of explosive bombs.

Not only open sabotage takes place, but an ever-present stubborn passive resistance impedes the wheels of industry. Workmen take a few seconds longer in each movement at the machine, make more mistakes, waste more material, are harder on their tools. Along assembly lines, bolts and rivets are not tightened enough, bearings are not properly greased, somehow fine sand gets into them. The result is most often observed only on the battlefield; there, breakdowns are most useful. Particularly after Hitler's attack on Russia were the Czechs spurred to further action in their desire to help their Slavic kinsmen. In the summer of 1941, war production in the Protectorate dropped off 40 per cent. This made Hitler send Heydrich there to whip it up by terror, since all other means had failed.

News from a Madhouse

ON the propanganda and ideological front the Nazis have met their worst defeat. They have dissolved 25,000 organizations, including the Sokol, the largest of them all; they have muzzled the Czech press and closed all Czech colleges and universities; in spite of this, nazi ideology has not penetrated the people's mind. To combat nazi lies and misrepresentations and to steel the people in its daily fight the underground press was born. Based on information that the revolutionary workers can obtain directly or on statements made over the radio by representatives of the Government-in-exile in London, it circulates throughout the country at the risk of the lives of thousands of people each day. The two most prominent of these papers are called *Into the Struggle* and *Czechoslovak Republic*. Not only is information being received; it is also sent out. In 1941, President Benes' Government obtained 1,200 separate news items from the underground organizations. One secret broadcasting station was operated by a Czech doctor in charge of a lunatic asylum. The Nazis discovered it after long months of search only after a Gestapo agent was intentionally sent there for treatment.

Above all, the factor that strengthens the people most is the conviction that the Repub-

lic is something worth fighting for, that under the leadership of Masaryk and Benes it never stood for wrong, nor had it been guilty of appeasement or aggression. The knowledge that their Government symbolizes their future liberty and that their men are fighting over Germany's skies, in the Middle East and in Russia, that the other United Nations are striving for the same cause, keeps the people from falling into despair.

The Heydrich Case

THE struggle at home is climaxed by direct revolutionary action. By the end of 1941, the Nazis were unable to conceal the fact that it existed. Heydrich's first act in Prague was to order the arrest for treason of General Alois Elias, the Prime Minister of the Protectorate whom von Neurath himself had confirmed in office. The Nazis had created their first puppet government in Czechoslovakia, but it has also been the first government whose members were deserting or were being condemned for high treason.

At the same time death sentences were being passed on Czechs "for giving support to saboteurs who entered the Protectorate by parachute." Even a Czech gendarme was condemned to death "for giving his service weapons to enemy parachute agents." Despite the torture the Gestapo undoubtedly inflicted on these patriots in order to find the parachutists who had landed from R.A.F. bombers, they never caught any of them. At least, they never bragged about it.

Whether they came by parachute or not, the exploit of the two Czech patriots who accounted for Hangman Heydrich constitutes the most dramatic incident of the whole revolutionary action. In view of the fact that President Benes



himself had been asking the Czechs over the radio not to provoke the Germans into committing wholesale massacres, it is not probable that the parachutists were being dropped with orders from the Government-in-exile to kill high nazi officials, but rather to communicate with the revolutionary groups at home and to commit sabotage of militarily important objectives.

In Heydrich's case it was one of the revolutionary organizations which took the initiative. Whatever was to be the cost the Czechs were going to pay, drastic action was necessary since Heydrich was planning to do away with the last remnants of the country's autonomy and to introduce compulsory labor service for Czech youth. It is probable that he also intended to introduce compulsory military service for the Czechs, scattering them into German regiments fighting on the Russian front. His plans were betrayed to the underground movement by highly placed Czechs in the Protectorate. On May 27, 1942, on his way to Berlin the Hangman was attacked and mortally wounded by two mysterious men. They had been waiting for him at a point where the Puchmayerova street in a Prague industrial suburb makes a sharp turn, showering Heydrich's car with bullets from an automatic pistol and hitting it with an anti-tank bomb.

After twenty-three days of the most thorough and extensive man hunt the Gestapo ever staged, it claimed to have tracked down the two attackers in the old Saint Charles Borromeus Church in Prague. They were not taken alive; with revolvers and hand grenades they resisted until the end. The bodies supposedly were those of Jan Kubis, age 29, former sergeant of the 34th Czechoslovakia Infantry Regiment, and of Josef Gabcik, age 30, former warrant officer of the 14th Infantry Regiment. Despite these claims made just before the deadline within which the population of Prague was to give up the attackers the mystery remains unsolved. Only after the war will it be known whether this was not a mere face-saving device of the Gestapo, and whether the two real attackers were able to reach safety after all. Meanwhile, the wave of terror which the Germans unleashed in Bohemia and Moravia cost the Czechs 1,700 acknowledged victims, including the destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lezaky. But Heydrich's projects were shelved.

The Nazis rave about "communist" plots in Czechoslovakia, but by now in conquered Europe all Communists have become patriots, and all patriots are called Communists. Regardless of former political affiliation, social standing, or religious beliefs, never before have the Czechs been so united as at present. The spirit of courage and sacrifice which carried the people, physically shattered but morally unbent, through more than three and a half years of unprecedented oppression is the same that will ultimately restore their liberty.



BOOKS

THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL MAN, by Peter F. Drucker. 298 *pages. Day;* $2.50

At the very beginning of this interesting book the author claims that "social economics without political principles are harmful," an assertion natural to an economist of the German school. The entire book reflects this attitude, whether in the comparison of France and Germany—"Germany has been Europe's geological fault for these last fifty years . . . but France played the same part for a hundred years before"—or in the argument (which is now current in certain German circles) that "nazi leaders represent a type which never before has been the 'ideal type' of German society, neither in background, nor in personal character, class antecedents, profession, conduct, or belief." A historian who, in his explanation of totalitarianism, excludes the special German element, which in reality was one of the conditions for its complete realization, and explains its genesis exclusively as a product of an industrial crisis, commits grave error.

Despite this orientation, as well as a tendency to schematization and caricature,—for example, the chapter on the nineteenth century in France —Dr. Drucker has written an instructive book. Its main question is this: How can an industrial society be built as a free society? It centers the author's interest in the problems of social integration and political power—problems posed by industry and completely unknown to the old mercantile society. Scholarly and conscientious analysis of industrial facts leads him to the important conclusion that managerial power today is both illegitimate and irresponsible since it is not controlled by the shareholders. Since the union leaders' power is similar to that of corporation management, the author concludes his excellent analysis of trade unionism with the statement that "to substitute union leadership for corporation management . . . would not make any real change in the structure of society."

Dr. Drucker urges the integration of each individual into the society of which he is a member. (This is another language for the ideas of the young French school of "personalism," not mentioned in the book, which demands an organic society composed of persons and not of irresponsible individuals of the old liberal type.) When he arrives at the application of his interesting and stimulating theory to Germany, he becomes inaccurate. Thus, in Chapter V, Hitlerism is superficially described as an attempt "to create a functioning industrial society."

In contrast, however, the chapter dealing with freedom is original and brilliant. "Freedom is the heaviest burden laid on man," he writes: "to decide his own individual conduct as well as the conduct of society and to be responsible for both decisions. Freedom is not so much a right as a duty." Here the author fully identifies it with the Christian concept of man's nature: "Any philosophy which claims perfection for human beings denies freedom; and so does a philosophy that renounces ethical responsibility." Finally, he touches his highest point when he says: "The first flower of the tree of liberties was St. Augustine." The late President Masaryk expressed this view in the slogan "Jesus not Caesar."

On the subject of bureaucracy, Dr. Drucker makes some of his most provocative statements. In Europe, he says, "the administrative omnipotence undermined self-government far more than the lack of judicial control of the legislative." This analysis is sound. Rejecting the majority system, he believes that a good government "is a function of the normal character of a society and the genius of the individual statesman." He sees the United States as the only country where a free industrial society can be developed in a free, non-revolutionary, non-totalitarian way. The spectacle which he presents of American history is actually a fireworks of observations and more or less correct conclusions. His reply to the question presented by the book, namely the realization of a free and functioning society, is only partial. He recommends: "Neither total planning nor the restoration of nineteenth-century laissez-faire, but the organization of industry on the basis of local and decentralized self-government. And the time to start is now."

MILOS SAFRANEK.

HOW TO WIN THE PEACE, by C. J. Hambro. 384 pages. Lippincott; $3.00

Public discussion on peace planning continues. The latest "expert" to discuss the problem is C. J. Hambro, president of the Norwegian Parliament from 1926 until the nazi invasion of 1940, and also president of the League of Nations Assembly. Mr. Hambro has drawn upon his long experience in international affairs in order to point out some of the basic issues which must be faced and solved if the aftermath of this war is to be more successful than that which followed Versailles.

At the outset, the author makes it quite clear that he is not among those who believe that nazi political ideology is a kind of poison concocted by the Hitlerite clique in order to drug the German people into a blind acceptance of the "new order." On the contrary, he believes that this view represents such a danger for the United Nations that he devotes much of the first section of his book to an argument, backed up by copious quotations, to show that nazi thought and policy is merely a continuation and exaggeration of the philosophy which has dominated Germany ever since the days of Fichte and Hegel, not to mention von Treitschke and a host of lesser intellectual lights. This is an extremely important point for, if it is true (and the author's argument is convincing), it will be useless and even dangerous to base the post-war settlement on the theory that the destruction of the Nazi will enable the true German spirit to assert itself and to bring Germany back into the fold of the "civilized" states. The destruction of Hohenzollern power in 1918 failed to bring about this result, and the author is convinced that a war settlement based on the destruction of the Nazis will be equally futile.

Mr. Hambro feels that the technique of peacemaking at Versailles was faulty, and he argues at length in favor of a preliminary settlement to be followed by a "cooling-off" period, during which men's passions will subside, before a final treaty will seal the peace. It is true, of course, that some of the decisions at Versailles were hastily made and, in the light of subsequent events, ill advised. But does it follow that postponement would have improved the settlement? Is there any indication that a delay would have made possible a wiser decision?

Actually, there is good reason to believe that when peace is made by a coalition of powers, delay may injure rather than improve the opportunity for a satisfactory and lasting settlement. As soon as the war is over, there is an inevitable tendency for the coalition to fall apart, and for each power to begin to pursue a narrowly nationalistic policy. Thus, if after the present war, the victors do decide in favor of a "cooling-off" period before they draw up the final terms, the early post-war years will be filled with such difficulties that Britain, despairing of accord with the United States, might move further toward a close understanding with Russia. Conversely, it is possible that Britain and the United States might move closer together on the ground that they must make a peace in such a way as to block possible Russian expansionism in Europe. In either case, it would be even more difficult to reach a collaborative agreement after the "cooling-off" period than it would be immediately after the end of hostilities. In this light, Mr. Hambro's judgment seems premature.

When he turns to consider the insoluble problem of the large versus the small states as factors in the peace settlement and in future world organization, it is natural that he should make a strong plea for the small powers. It is natural, too, that as a convinced believer in the need for international political organization, he should be strongly opposed to any and all schemes for regional organization. On both counts his arguments are well-reasoned and worth study.

To improve the League of Nations, the author believes that some means must be devised whereby national representatives must be given a greater burden of responsibility. As he states the problem, "Few things have been more detrimental to the authority of the League than the fact that even Great Powers looked upon the delegates in the Assembly, the decisions taken, and the resolutions adopted . . . as . . . of hardly more serious consequence than a resolution adopted by a well-intentioned mass meeting in Albert Hall or Madison Square Garden." The solution can only be found through the grant of greater powers to national representatives and through the making of a new and clearer line of demarcation "between national authority and international authority in the regulation of world affairs."

All this clearly foreshadows the need for an organization in which the famous unanimity rule, which was such a stumbling block at Geneva, will be abandoned. This, in a sense, is the crux of the whole matter because upon it depends the future of an effective international organization. Mr. Hambro has not solved the problem by any means, but he has raised it, and it is to be hoped that, this time, a better solution can be found.

G. K.

THE WAR IN MAPS, text by Francis Brown; maps by Emil Herlin. viii + 159 pages. Oxford; $1.50

WAR IN OUR TIME, by Harry B. Henderson and Herman C. Morris. 416 pages. Doubleday, Doran; $3.75

In these two works the man in the street has a complete and excellent summary of the war. Simply written, the accounts are both factual and interpretative. The authors lay their chief emphasis on straight reporting but there is enough said (and much to be read between the lines) to interpret the causes, the development and the ultimate outcome of the conflict.

This is particularly true of the text which Mr. Brown provides for the excellent maps of his volume. His book is a mine of essential information which offers more than geographic knowledge. It gives new meaning to resources, distances, and contours. It lays the foundation for an understanding of military strategy and the problems of supply which are important in putting that strategy into effect. If there is a flaw in this volume, it is to be found in Mr. Brown's ambitious introduction. In eight short pages he has tried to present the entire background for the war, and his analysis suffers in that it says too much and not enough. He is unable, in his brief statement, to make clear the distinction between the underlying causes of this conflict and the reasons which the Axis Powers have given for it. Similarly, he fails to present all the forces in the Democracies which made fascist growth and aggression possible. A twofold fallacy which underlies his explanation is that fascism is an outgrowth of the Peace of Versailles and that it is the bulwark of capitalism against the threat of communism.

The authors of War in Our Time have avoided this pitfall. They have not essayed to present an extended political analysis of this conflict. They have merely recognized its chief characteristic.

> It is a war waged by the Fascist in every country against the Democracies of the world in an attempt to enslave all peoples. Thinly disguised for a time as a war against communism, World War II has always been directed against the Democracies. The sides have never changed: Japan, Germany, Italy vs. Britain, France, Russia, China, and the United States.
>
> The terrible tragedy of World War II is that it need not have been, that it was preventable. Each new demand, each new aggression by the Fascist Powers was merely building the foundation for the ultimate struggle for world conquest. At any point the facist advance might have been checked—in Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, in Spain, Austria, China, Czechoslovakia, even after Hitler demanded Danzig. It was prevented because selfishness, fear of communism, and isolationism dominated the statesmen of the democratic countries and barred the erection of a strong system of collective security pacts. What we have had in these years since 1931 has not been "Peace in our time," as Neville Chamberlain put it, but war in our time.

In the contents of their book they have depended entirely on the extraordinary work of the camera. From the first gruesome picture of the massacre of Chinese in Korea in 1931 to the portrait of devastation which is the sinking of the Japanese heavy cruiser "Mogami," they make us eye-witnesses of the military and political episodes of this war. They have created a fascinating, critical, and historical document of the highest importance.

J. J. S.

THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE WAY, by Henri Bonnet. 170 pages. World Citizens Association; 50 cents

Following a first small volume on What the United Nations Are and What They May Become, Mr. Henri Bonnet has written a second excellent survey of the essential objectives and methods of the United Nations. The author has made splendid use of his experience in the League of Nations and in the Institute of International Intellectual Co-operation, of which he is the Director. He examines first of all the general objectives of the United Nations and then their repercussions on Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In the chapter devoted to Europe, the author describes the various plans for European confederation and the agreements signed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia, Russia and Poland, England and Russia. Following the same method for Asia and Latin America, the author treats the situation prevailing in China, India, and in the Arabic countries. In the Latin American chapter he examines the Rio countries.

Finally, Mr. Bonnet makes a survey of the economic and financial policy and the social problems of the United Nations, courageously urging the necessity of a reduction of sovereignty in the interest of world organization and concluding with a strong argument in favor of an immediate United Nations organization in the following words: "In creating right now the means to express fully their common determination, the United Nations will prove that freedom is stronger, more re-

sourceful and more efficient than fear and terror—the real weapons of fascism—and that they will be able to attain the higher purposes that have dawned on the spirit of Man."

We hope that this small volume will reach all those who are interested in the organization of the United Nations.

L. D.

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY, by Halford J. Machinder. xxvi + 219 pages. Holt; $2.50

Major Eliot—and many others—were surprised when they read this book. Originally published in 1919 by a man who knew the field of global geography, and quite generally ignored at the time, the book now reappears to show the remarkable prescience, of an author who knew more about geopolitics than the Germans who later aped his material and pretended to have invented the idea.

Fundamentally Mackinder realized that what he called the World Island, in other words Europe, Asia, and Africa, was essentially the world, surrounded by water. Outside it there were simply other smaller and less important islands like North America, South America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Mackinder reasoned that whoever controls Eastern Europe therefore controls the great heartland of this region; which means control of the World Island entire; and whoever rules the World Island effectively, commands the world. Nearly a quarter of a century ago the author realized the tremendously important geographic and strategic position of Germany. Essentially he foresaw just what the Nazis tried to do, and he fought for peace terms after the Armistice which would prevent their attempt.

The book is more vital to an understanding of the dynamics of a successful peace now than it was two decades ago. The major wars of history have been fought by central land powers against enveloping sea powers and the present war follows that pattern on a global scale. In addition a postscript expounds his story of the world neighborhood and the true neighborliness which must abound there if men and nations are to be free.

T. S. H.

ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY'S MIND, by Joseph Bornstein and Paul R. Milton. xxi + 295 pages. Bobbs-Merrill; $2.50

What are the techniques by which the nazi psychological experts have hoped to bring about the defeat of the United States? How can they best be met? These are the questions which the authors of this book have essayed to answer. They answer the first by pointing out with a considerable amount of detail the various methods by which our enemies have believed that a revolution in this country could be brought about. These are: isolationism, fear of communism, anti-Semitism, and the Fifth Column. The answers deal rather more with appeals to American common sense than with specific counter-measures. Though the development of war psychology in this country has lessened the importance of some of the warnings contained in the first section, the comments of the authors on such matters as race discrimination and its dangers to American unity are unhappily still pertinent.

YOUNG MAN OF THE WORLD, by T. R. Ybarra. xiii + 316 pages. Washburn; $3.00

Like all premature autobiographies, this work of Mr. Ybarra leaves much unsaid. But there is a saving grace about the book that matches the grace and ease of style in which it is written. Mr. Ybarra is one correspondent who does not pretend to omniscience. He states what he knows—and it is much; he sets down what he thinks—and it is often profound and revelatory; but he does not pose as a prophet nor as the confidant of the great men and vicious men of our time. For this and for a couple of pleasant hours of reading we are duly thankful.

SERGEANT NIKOLA, by Istvan Tamas. 311 pages. Fischer; $2.50

There are few episodes of this war which can compare in the elements of romance and drama with the guerilla fighting that the Chetniks are now carrying on in the mountains of Yugoslavia. Some day the story of that struggle will receive the epic treatment which it deserves. Perhaps because he is too near the saga, both in time and in place, Mr. Tamas has failed to capture the heroic spirit and the dramatic interest inherent in his story. Although a competent craftsman in the novel, the author is encumbered by details which are informative but uninspiring.

THE BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE, by W. E. Simnet. 255 pages. Norton; $3.00

In these days, when talk about British "imperialism" is far from absent from the press and when persons wonder how the peace settlement can be made to dovetail into any plan for the perpetuation of the British Empire, it is useful to have this little handbook

concerning the actual extent, organization, and administration of the Empire. Written by a British authority on colonial affairs, it contains much useful information on each unit of that vast political organism. The chapters on native policies are not as objective or complete as they might be, but the book is far from a simple propaganda piece written in order to squelch American criticism.

ATTACK, by F. O. Miksche. xxi + 267 pages. Random House; $2.50

Major Miksche, a Czech officer who saw service in the Spanish Civil War, has not written a book for the dilletante who wishes to pick up a smattering of military science in order to converse glibly at cocktail parties. His book is a serious technical study, profusely sprinkled with charts and diagrams, of the modern technique of *Blitzkrieg* as used by the Nazis. The wealth of technical detail may dismay most readers, but the serious student of military tactics will find this book a first-rate exposition of the subject. Written largely out of the author's experiences and observations in the Spanish war laboratory where the *Blitz* technique was tested, the book indicates how these methods were adapted to the early campaigns of the present war, and how signally the commanding officers opposing the Germans failed to grasp the essential nature of the problem which they confronted. This is not a book to be overlooked by those who really wish to study modern warfare.

OUR FIGHTING FAITH, by James Bryant Conant. 105 *pages. Harvard;* $1.25

President Conant of Harvard is one of the public men who saw early and clearly and stated boldly the issues of this war. Of the five addresses included in this little book, only one precedes the incident at Pearl Harbor. But in it, as well as in all the others, Mr. Conant insists that American tradition and ideals impel us to face the moral issues, and that in the conflict between the ideal of peace and the ideal of freedom, Hitler has left us no choice but to sacrifice the first for the second. In his thoughts on peace, Mr. Conant is again one of the vanguard. "A few days ago," he states, "it might have seemed bold to argue that the United States should take an active part in international collaboration. Today the case needs no documentation. Indeed, when the fighting ceases, I believe it will be taken for granted that this country must assume leadership in establishing peace and order. Isolationism will be as extinct as the volcanoes on the moon."

A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

POSTMORTEM ON MALAYA, by Virginia Thompson. Macmillan. The story of Malaya down to its conquest by the Japanese with attention to its strategic and material values.

WE CANNOT ESCAPE HISTORY, by John T. Whitaker. Macmillan. The course of history in various countries during the last decade as it shows why we are fighting and what we are fighting for, by a veteran foreign correspondent.

THE SILENT WAR, by Jon B. Jansen and Stefan Weyl. Lippincott. Factual account of conditions under nazi rule, with a discussion of the roots of subversive activity and a manifesto of what the underground is fighting for. Foreword by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr.

BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER, by Robert A. Brady. Columbia. A study of peak trade associations in Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The N. A. M. is described in the section on the United States.

I AM GUILTY, by Pierre Cot. Alliance. An indictment of the betrayal of France by the former Minister of Aviation, who was convicted at the nazi-controlled Court of Riom.

SECRET SOURCES, by Wythe Williams and William Van Narvig. Alliance. Inside story of the origin of the Wythe Williams scoops on the news; description of this newsgatherer's private espionage network in Germany.

THEY CAME AS FRIENDS, by Tor Mykelbost. Doubleday, Doran. Inside story of Norway's resistance to the nazi invaders; the background of treachery; underground organization.

FROM PERRY TO PEARL HARBOR, by Edwin A. Falk. Doubleday, Doran. Account of the relations between the United States and Japan from 1853 to December 7, 1941, with emphasis upon the rise of sea power and the conflicts which developed in the Pacific area.

EXCHANGE SHIP, by Max Hill. Farrar and Rinehart. Story of a correspondent taken prisoner by the Japanese, of the "Gripsholm's" human cargo, and of the evacuees from the Pacific.

COMBINED OPERATIONS. Anonymous. Macmillan. As much information on the Commandos as the British Ministry of Information has made available.

ITALY FROM WITHIN, by Richard Massock. Macmillan. The story of fascist Italy, as observed by the former A.P. Chief in Rome.

WAR DISCOVERS ALASKA, by Joseph Driscoll. Lippincott. The first newspaperman to visit Alaska since Pearl Harbor writes an account of what is happening on our last frontier.

MAKE THIS THE LAST WAR: THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, by Michael Straight. Harcourt, Brace. A detailed study of the international co-operative structures forced upon us by war, showing how these organizations can be made to function, and must be made to function, to win the war now and to achieve world order in the future. By the Washington editor of *The New Republic.*

THE RUSSIANS: THE LAND, THE PEOPLE, AND WHY THEY FIGHT, by Albert Rhys Williams. Harcourt, Brace. Facts about Russia and the Soviet state, anecdotes of life in Russia, analysis of Russian character and ideas. An answer to the question: "What will they do when the fighting is over?"

THE NAZI STATE, by William Ebenstein. Farrar & Rinehart. An account of the changes in German government, politics, and administration since the outbreak of war in 1939, based almost exclusively upon nazi sources.

THE PEACE WE FIGHT FOR, by Hiram Motherwell. Harper. An appraisal of the world picture on Armistice Day and of the needs immediately thereafter of food, money, and organization. In three parts: Fragmentation, Reconstruction, Peace.

WEAPONS AND TACTICS, by Tom Wintringham. Houghton Mifflin. An analysis of the revolution in warfare which has taken place in the last twenty-six years, with emphasis on our need for adaptation.

"AND JUSTICE FOR ALL," by Hans Heymann. Harper. How an ideal of "justice for all" can be realized in planning for the organization of a peacetime world.

JOURNEY AMONG WARRIORS, by Eve Curie. Doubleday, Doran. The story of Eve Curie's trip for Free France to the far-flung frontiers of battle; report of her conversations with such men as Nehru, Gandhi, Cripps, Wavell.

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WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

We owe a debt of gratitude to the First Conference of the World Confederation of International Groupments for a large portion of our contents this month. The Editors had to exercise all their will power to resist the temptation of including even more of the excellent papers submitted at the Conference, but some of them will be presented in later issues.

As chief inspirer of the Conference, which he considers the culmination of his lifelong effort for international collaboration, *PROFESSOR LI YU YING* opened the proceedings with his address on *The Roots of Co-operation. DR. LI YU YING* is well known to our readers for his previous contributions. He is a member of our International Honorary Board and Chairman of our Board of Directors. One of his efforts at present is the writing of an encyclopedia on world affairs, the introduction to which, "World," was presented to the participants of the Conference.

It was characteristic of *FIORELLO H. LA GUARDIA* that in opening the Conference, he did not make a conventional welcoming speech. Just as characteristic was his forthright and sound political statement. His tremendous tasks as an executive of the largest city in the United States have not confined his interests to local affairs. One of the most colorful figures in American political life, he has been equally insistent in advocating progressive principles of government for the city, the nation, and the world. He is one of the charter members of our International Honorary Board and has been a staunch supporter of our movement.

The climax of the Conference was the World Confederation Dinner, which owed much of its success to *MRS. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT,* who presided. Liberal causes have invariably received inspiration and encouragement from *ELEANOR ROOSEVELT.* As a speaker and writer, she has contributed greatly to American understanding of permanent and democratic peace based on freedom and justice, which forms the thesis of her recent book, "The Moral Basis of Democracy."

Our view that women must be represented in the consideration of world affairs and in the making of the peace found practical expression in the presence of *KATHLEEN COURTNEY* as one of the speakers at the dinner. *MISS COURTNEY* has been prominent in the political life of England. She worked in the suffrage movement under Dame Millicent Fawcett and has been particularly active in the interests of the League of Nations in London and Geneva. During the last war, she did relief work in Corsica and Salonica and after the armistice, continued the service in Austria, Greece, and Bulgaria. For the past five years she has been Vice-Chairman of the League of Nations Union, and is now Chairman of the General Purposes Committee of the London International Assembly and Chairman of the International Sub-Committee for the Training of Allied Women in Social Welfare.

In his earlier contributions to our pages, *United Nations in War and Peace,* and *The New Zealander and His Land,* our readers recognized the enlightened statesmanship of *WALTER NASH,* Deputy Prime Minister of the New Zealand War Cabinet and Minister for his country in Washington. Coming from a member of the Pacific War Council, which is showing the practical results of international collaboration, his address at the Conference advocating the participation of all nations in the making of the peace carries particular weight.

In the appointment of His Excellency *WEI TAO-MING* as Ambassador to the United States, the Chinese Republic again upheld the tradition which has sent illustrious scholars and public men to represent China in our country. *DR. WEI TAO-MING,* who began his career as Professor of Law, has been Minister of Justice of China, Mayor of Nanking, Ambassador to France, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, and a member of the Supreme National Defense Council.

In responding to Mrs. Roosevelt's introduction, *LUIS QUINTANILLA,* Minister from Mexico to the United States, who has just been appointed Plenipotentiary Minister to the Soviet Union, graciously acknowledged the services of President Roosevelt to Pan-Americanism by saying: "First of all, let me tell you

how happy I am as a Latin American to speak before the wife of our distinguished good neighbor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Your husband, Madam, has done more to consolidate the ties of friendship between our sister republic than any other single man since the beginning of the past century." "A Latin American Speaks," a new book by *DR. QUINTANILLA,* will appear in January.

Since his country's boundary with Russia represents half of the latter's frontier with central Europe and the Balkans, the article of *CHARLES A. DAVILA,* former Rumanian Minister to Washington, has special significance in the consideration of post-war problems. *MR. DAVILA* consistently opposed King Carol's dictatorship and resigned his post when the fascist elements came to power in his country. He is the leader of Rumanian democrats abroad as Honorary President of the Rumanian-American Alliance for Democracy, which includes ninety organizations representing the great majority of the 300,000 Americans of Rumanian origin; and he is a staunch supporter of Juliu Maniu, head of the Rumanian National Peasant party, of whom he writes: "Mr. Maniu, a Roman Catholic, is a constitutionalist democrat. He is openly opposing today Antonescu's regime, subservient to Hitler, and demands that Rumania retire from the war."

One of the outstanding papers presented at the Conference was *Education as a Factor in Post-War Reconstruction,* by *ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,* President of the American Association for Adult Education. *DR. MEIKLEJOHN* has long been a leader in the philosophy and practice of education in America, as Dean and Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, Chairman of the Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin, and Chairman of the School of Social Studies in San Francisco. His recent book, "Education Between Two Worlds," which will be reviewed in our next issue, develops the thesis of the interdependence of education and international order.

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At the same time that *HAROLD L. BERMAN* left the Law School of the University of Cape Town to volunteer for service in the South African Army, his father, a City Councillor of Cape Town, enlisted as a private. The latter was rapidly advanced in rank and is now a Major. His latest letter to this country summarizes his son's activities: "He had been right through the Abyssinian, as well as the first and second Libyan campaigns; at Sidi Rezegh, where our own troops, the South Africans, had put up a very fine show and turned the tables at the most critical state of the battle; also at Solum, Bardia, and Halfaya. During the tragic third battle in Libya, his battery had been badly mauled as they were covering the retreat from El Gazala. His gun-team had been in it from the very start of the ill-fated third campaign, and had withstood the continuous hammering of the Luftwaffe at a time when our own air force was driven out of the skies. His last letters spoke of days and days without any sleep, of a fortnight's veritable Hell."

Major Berman also reports that another member of his family is entering the service in the person of "Billy," his eldest daughter. "She has just turned seventeen. As a rule they do not take them before eighteen, but she is a bright and almost grown-up girl, and there is no point in holding her back. At the moment she is still at the University, where she was doing part-time training in searchlights. As I have no other boy to take Harold's place, I suppose there is no other alternative than letting her have her way."

Taking time out from his task of teaching the handling of ordnance in a Government Depot, *LE GARDE S. DOUGHTY* is working on a first novel and writing occasional verse. His poems have appeared in many magazines.

MAURICE ENGLISH was correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune* in France and Spain during the first part of the war. In July, 1941, he became editor in chief of the International Division of N. B. C. He is now regional editor in charge of broadcasting to Italy at the Office of War Information.

Although he has been a member of the Department of Agriculture since 1910, *T. SWANN HARDING* naturally voices his personal opinions rather than official views in *The Global Farm Problem. MR. HARDING* is a frequent contributor to our book pages, and previous articles of his appeared in our March, May, and August issues.

WALDEMAR KAEMPFFERT, editor of the science department in the Sunday edition of the *New York Times,* writes all the editorials on science and engineering for that paper. He is the author of "Science Today and Tomorrow," "The New Art of Flying," and other popular books on science and engineering. As the first director of the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago, he laid out the plan which is now being followed by that institution.

DR. MILIC KYBAL, a young Czech scholar of the Charles University of Prague, witnessed the first six months of the German occupation. He is at present Lecturer in Economics at Whittier College, writer on foreign affairs for the *Los Angeles Times,* and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Committee of Southern California.

JUAN NEGRIN, who sent us his article from London where he is engaged in scientific research, is equally competent to discuss science and statesmanship. Before he was Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic, he served many years as Professor of Physiology at the University of Madrid.

As representative of the Polish workers at the International Labor Office and as one of the six founders of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, *JAN STANCZYK* has long been an initiator of plans for reconstruction of that area. He is in the Near East to assist in providing for many thousands of Polish refugees, and he has been invited by American labor organizations to visit this country in the spring. Before the war, he was Deputy to the Polish Sejm from the Polish Socialist party and Secretary-General of the Polish Mine Workers Union. He is now Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Polish Government-in-exile.

ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS has spent more than ten years of his life in Russia where he witnessed the Revolution of 1917 and fought in the defense of Petrograd against the Germans, He has written several books on Russian life, the last of which "The Soviets," was chosen for the library of President Roosevelt at the White House. His article in this issue forms one of the chapters of his forthcoming work, "The Russians—the Land, the People, and Why They Fight."

QUINCY WRIGHT, member of our International Honorary Board and of the Executive Committee of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, is working almost exclusively on the political questions affecting the post-war world. His two volume work, "A Study of War," has recently been published.

We call attention to a stenographic error in the printing of the Round Table in the December issue. On page 250, the statements made by *GEORGE KAGAN* were by mistake attributed to *RAOUL AGLION.* In this connection we may mention that *ARTHUR UPHAM POPE* will be given an opportunity to reply to our comments on his article in the February issue.

Like its circulation, FREE WORLD is moving up—from the eleventh floor of 55 West Forty-second Street to the twentieth floor of 8 West Fortieth. Please note.



"Intelligent America can no longer afford to ignore geopolitics"

— COL. HERMAN BEUKEMA
U.S. Military Academy

THOUGH German geopolitics may seem weird fantasies, nevertheless German logic and plans for conquest are to be found in their geopolitics and the teachings of Karl Haushofer. The *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and books by the geopoliticians have been known by only a few in this country, and have been considered too fantastic to be taken seriously. This fallacy is due to the fact that no documented critical analysis of German geopolitics has ever been attempted. Few people have taken the trouble to consider carefully the effect of geopolitical writings on the course of recent European history.

FARRAR & RINEHART therefore planned and are publishing three books to make available to Americans these theories and teachings. The first, *German Strategy of World Conquest,* presents an objective analysis of the writings and doctrines of the geopoliticians, setting forth the part they have played in Nazi Germany. The second book, *The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action,* traces Haushofer's research of geopolitics, his mental acrobatics in building his case, and attempts to reduce to simple terms the mysteries of Haushofer's teachings. In the third, *The Nazi State,* emphasis is placed on another aspect of Nazi idealogy, the robot race, which for the last ten years the Nazis have been creating, and discusses the problems of postwar adjustments with these human robots. *It is suggested that you subscribe for these books now, to be delivered as issued:*

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